CHAD/DARFUR: FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS ON KHARTOUM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000950

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SUBJECT: CHAD/DARFUR: FOREIGN MINISTER BRIEFS ON KHARTOUM
TALKS


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SUMMARY:
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1. (SBU) Chad's Foreign Minister says he proposed to Khartoum
a kind of reciprocal withdrawal of sanctuary for armed
groups. Sudan suggested joint Chad/Sudan patrols of the
common border. Neither side gave formal responses to the
other's proposals. Chad awaits a follow-on mission from
Khartoum in the near future, though no date has been set.
END SUMMARY.

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TALKING TO THE SUDANESE
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2. (SBU) Ambassador called on Chad's Minister for Foreign
Affairs and African Integration, Ahmed Allam-mi for a
briefing on recent bilateral discussions the Minister had
undertaken with his Sudanese counterpart. Allam-mi reported
that, on the margins of the AU Summit in Banjul, President
Idriss Debi Itno, Libya's al-Qadhafi, and Sudan's al-Bashir
had met in an attempt to relax the atmosphere between the
Chadian and Sudanese leaders. The two were able to engage
with each other, and agree to begin exchanging high-level
missions to explore resolving their difficulties along their
common border.


3. (SBU) Allam-mi undertook the first such mission to
Khartoum, arriving on/about July 10. The Chadian was
instructed to reiterate N'Djamena's official positions: that
Chad supports the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),and has
encouraged Darfur's rebel groups to sign on to it; and as
such, Chad was committed to helping ensure that those
Sudanese groups that do not join in the DPA do not use Chad
as a rear base for military moves against those who have
signed the agreement.


4. (SBU) The Minister said he had proposed a kind of
reciprocal withdrawal of support for armed groups using
territory of one country to launch attacks into the other.
Practically speaking, this would mean that Chad would
continue to pursue all available support to make secure
refugee and internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in
Eastern Chad, including the deployment in Chad of foreign
peacekeepers or other forces if such were to come available.
Chad would not allow those people who were essentially
"political activists" rather than refugees to carry out
activities in Chad against either Sudan or the DPA -- they
would be given over to AU hands. Chad would make every
effort to secure its border, with the help of the
international community, if possible. In exchange, Chad
expected Sudan to do the same -- provide protection to
Chadians who requested refugee status, but cease paying
Chadian "mercenaries" to create instability, and end support
to Chadian "defectors" in Sudan.


5. (SBU) Allam-mi reported that his interlocutors responded
to the proposals with their own. He said Sudan again stated
opposition to AU or any other foreign deployment in Chad, as
an intervention in Chad's internal affairs (never mind that
Chad was quite ready to cede sovereignty to obtain help in
securing the area and the border). The Sudanese preferred to
organize joint Chad/Sudan border patrols to secure the area.
Sudan committed to send a high-level mission to N'Djamena
soon (no date set) to continue the dialogue.


6. (SBU) The Minister stressed that he had listened to
Sudanese proposals, but not made a formal reply. He

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expressed his opinion to Ambassador that the likelihood was
slim that Sudanese and Chadian forces could jointly patrol
the border. He noted the close family and clan ties of
forces originating in these regions would create significant
tensions among such troops -- and that forces drawn from
other regions of either Sudan or Chad would be ineffective
working in the border area. He said he could imagine
Sudanese and Chadian military observers working along
international peacekeepers, but not armed joint patrols.


7. (SBU) Allam-mi suggested that the Sudanese seemed to be
searching for a way out of their current predicaments, and
came to the Chadians as "demandeurs". He said that Chad is
"condemned" to talking with Khartoum, but would be extremely
skeptical of Sudanese offers -- "We remain vigilant."
Nonetheless, Allam-mi thought that perhaps the first step
toward more normal dialogue had begun, and said he awaited
word from Khartoum as to when they would be ready to send a
mission to N'Djamena.

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WHAT ARE THE DARFURIANS DOING?
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8. (SBU) Allam-mi touched briefly on recent activities of
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) factions and the Justice and
Equality Movement (JEM),saying he could not figure out where
Minni Arkou Minawi's actions were taking him and his
movement. "They seem intent on killing each other; we have
some influence with them, through family ties, but only some.
In the end, we may have to let them fight it out among
themselves." The Minister said it seemed the JEM fighters
were intent on battling all the way to Khartoum, a goal he
could not imagine them having any chance of achieving.


9. (SBU) Ambassador again questioned the Minister regarding
reports of support to SLM/A factions opposed to the DPA.
Allam-mi's answer was much more direct than during past
discussions. He said "support" was a matter of
interpretation: The President had charged his half-brother
Daoussa Deby, and the Minister of Territorial Administration,
Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour, with managing relations with
the factions of the SLM/A -- drawn largely from Deby's own
Zaghawa ethnic group. They had made and maintained contacts
with the Sudanese side of "the family", and those contacts
were in conflict with Minni Arkou Minawi. Allam-mi said that
Chad thought the SLM/A should have united behind Abdel Wahid
Mohammed Nour, and never imagined that he would have led a
faction away from signing the DPA. Thus, although Chad's
national interest and stated policy was to support the DPA,
Daoussa Deby's and Mahamat Ali's key contacts were in the
faction that did not sign. "It's a complicated situation,"
he concluded.


10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL