CHAD: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON WORLD BANK AND DEBY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000095

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/24/2015
TAGS: PREL CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRENCH AMBASSADOR ON WORLD BANK AND DEBY
PROSPECTS

Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (C)


1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging tour d'horizon, the
French Ambassador in Chad defended President Deby as the only
option for Chad, and affirmed that France would defend Chad's
territorial integrity. France, according to Ambassador
Bercot, is working to prevent Chad from becoming a failed
state, and its efforts should be better appreciated. Bercot
welcomed what he interpreted to be Washington's recognition
of the importance of keeping Chad stable, particularly in
view of the potential impact of instability on the Darfur
conflict. Dismissing arguments that the United States and
France should work together to support a peaceful transition,
Bercot stated that there was no system in Chad to support:
there was only Deby. End summary.


2. (U) French Ambassador to Chad Jean-Pierre Bercot hosted
Ambassador Wall and DCM Tamlyn to lunch on January 24 for a
wide-ranging discussion of Chad's current impasse with the
World Bank and prospects for the Deby regime. French DCM
Francois Barateau also attended.

World Bank and Chad - a problem of communication
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3. (SBU) Ambassador Bercot explained that the current impasse
with the World Bank was for the most part the result of poor
communication. President Deby, he said, had been ready to
postpone promulgation of the revised oil revenue management
law until he was informed that the World Bank had requested
Citibank to freeze Chad's escrow account. Even before the law
was passed, Bercot believed that agreement could have been
reached if the World Bank had only communicated with Deby at

an appropriately high level (i.e. at the President or deputy
level). Having lower level technocrats deliver the message
had been counterproductive. President Deby, according to
Bercot, would have been amenable to consideration of a short
moratorium on the law -- possibly just until the elections --
so as to provide some resources during this critical time.
Bercot also underscored what he considered to be extreme
maladroitness on the part of the oil consortium for not
arranging a meeting between Deby and the ExxonMobil CEO when
Deby desired such an encounter. According to Ambassador
Bercot, President Deby feels that Chad is getting a pittance
compared to what the oil consortium is making -- and even
compared to what neighbor Cameroon is reaping. Bercot
emphasized that he was not defending Deby -- he was simply
presenting the case from the Chadian perspective. Deby, to
Bercot's mind, was a soldier. He was not an economist, and
he didn't have a very deep understanding of the issues. He
had approached negotiations with the World Bank as a soldier,
had used war-time tactics, and had failed to achieve his
objective. However, it looked as if things were getting back
on course. Bercot referred to the letter dated January 20
from the President of the World Bank to President Deby, in
which Wolfowitz expressed understanding of Deby's situation,
and a desire to continue talking. Bercot felt that the two
would need to meet to resolve the issue, but seemed inclined
to believe that resolution was eminently possible.

France and Chad's conflicts
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4. (C) On the subject of Chad's current security situation,
Bercot acknowledged that Deby needed money for weapons and
aircraft. He said that Deby had asked the Government of
France to sell him weapons, and France had unequivocally
refused -- and had further cautioned him under no
circumstances to use French nationals to procure weapons in
third countries. As a result, as was well known, Deby was
seeking weapons in Georgia, Khazakstan and Israel.
Ambassador Bercot said that France had agreed to continue to
provide logistics support -- which meant that French planes
were daily transporting these newly-aquired items, including
guns and ammunition, to the East. But, stressed Bercot, we
will not sell him one bullet. Ambassador Wall asked if
France would assist Chad if the country was attacked.
Ambassador Bercot responded that France was ready to defend
Chad's territorial integrity. Asked if that included
supporting the President in the event of an armed assault in
the capital, Ambassador Bercot said that that decision would
be taken at the time. He reminded Ambassador Wall that he
foresaw only three scenarios: Deby died in office, Deby was
ousted and killed or Deby vanquished his opponents. Deby

would not leave alive, he assured Ambassador Wall.

Where Chad is heading... .
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5. (C) Turning to France's larger role in Chad, Ambassador
Bercot explained that France really had no interests any more
in Chad. They had had a reason to have their armed forces
here at one time, but now it was simply a convenient place to
train. Rather, France was in Chad in order to protect some
1,000 French citizens and to prevent instability in the
country and in the region. In a tone of aggrievement, Bercot
complained that France was assuming this burden all alone --
not only was it not getting any assistance in this effort
from any western country, but to boot it was also accused of
propping up Deby's regime. This was not the case, they are
only seeking to "freeze the situation" and to keep it from
deteriorating into chaos and turning into another failed or
rogue state. In response to Ambassador Wall's arguments that
the way forward to avoid a crisis was to work for a peaceful
transition, Ambassador Bercot argued that no one could
replace Deby. It was true he was sick -- he might have ten
years under normal circumstances -- but it was doubtful that
he could "biologically or physically" outlast his next
mandate. At the same time, there were no candidates on the
political landscape that could hold the country together.
After the example of Habre and Deby, opined Bercot, any
leader will be a prisoner of his clan and all one could
expect was extreme rapaciousness. As an example, according
to Bercot, opposition politician Ngarlejy Youroungar had
recently visited China and told the Chinese that they "could
have the country on a platter" and build a pipeline from the
oil region north through Port Sudan if they would support
him. Nonetheless, Bercot speculated that it was really time
for a southerner to take over -- ideally a southern muslim.


6. (C) Ambassador Wall responded that we should be
supporting a process that can be accepted as credible and
legitimate -- not an individual -- and pointed out that
there were in fact many candidates who could emerge from such
a process with stature to serve their country. Ambassador
Wall explained that protecting President Deby from the
backlash against his efforts to stay in power would not spare
Chad or its international partners from having to deal with
the tensions now mounting in the country. The longer the
current impasse continued, the more dangerous the situation
would become. He appealed to the French Ambassador to work
together in promoting a process of peaceful change.
Ambassador Bercot commented that in Chad there was not even a
system - or a process - to support. He stated that if Deby
was overthrown, his clansmen would be killed or would flee.
As for the rest of the government, they would be rehired
under the next administration (as they had been rehired by
Deby from the Habre administration).


7. (SBU) Brandishing reporting cables from his Embassy in
Washington, Bercot briefed the Ambassador on the latest
meetings between AF Bureau officials and French officials.
He also read portions of an evidently much-perused copy of
the Secretary's statement on "transformational diplomacy."
He appeared to be taken with the notion, and welcomed
Washington's recognition of the need for such an approach.
He noted that the Secretary may not have had Chad in mind
when she mentioned the importance of better diplomatic and
military coordination, but it was certainly appropriate.
However, he bemoaned the fact that the U.S. Embassy had so
few resources and assets in Chad. He said that in French
meetings with Washington officials, they had asked Washington
to give the U.S. Embassy in Chad the means necessary to make
a difference. Bercot expressed sympathy that the United
States didn't command the resources and contacts that he had,
such as French advisors in every Chadian government ministry,
who are able to give him the pulse and temperature daily of
what was happening in the Chadian government (a high-ranking
Chadian presidential confidant called Ambassador Bercot at
this point to ask a favor, conveniently illustrating Bercot's
point).


8. (C) Concerning exchanges between French officials and
State Department officials, Bercot reported that he
understood that there may be differences in Washington on how
tough to be on Chad over changes to the oil revenue
management law. Ambassador Bercot welcomed what he
interpreted to be dawning recognition by State Department

policy makers of the importance of keeping Chad stable --
particularly in view of the negative impact that instability
would have on the Darfur situation. Ambassador Bercot closed
by saying that he had been instructed to work more closely
with his American counterpart in Chad, and therefore proposed
meeting at least once a month for discussion. He also offered
to partner with the United States on development projects if
there was interest.

Comment


9. (C) It appears that Ambassador Bercot only hears that part
of the message that he agrees with. In this instance, he
welcomes Washington's recognition of the importance of Chad
for the region's stability (a la France),but resolutely
chooses not to hear the message that Chad's international
partners should be working to prevent the crash landing that
so many -- including France -- predict for the Deby regime.
WALL