CHAD: FRENCH AMBASSADOR BLAMES POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000894

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRENCH AMBASSADOR BLAMES POLITICAL
OPPOSITION FOR LACK OF DIALOGUE

REF: NDJAMENA

Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

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SUMMARY:
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1. (C) The French Ambassador to Chad believes that none of
the actors in Chad's political-military conflicts are willing
to use dialogue to reach a peaceful solution to the country's
succession problem. Although he believes that the
international community must keep up the pressure on all
parties to pursue a political compromise, he seemed ready to
admit defeat -- not just for his own efforts, but for
France's formula for a unity government, electoral and
judicial reforms, and eventual opposition exercise of power.
He seems to fear that President Deby's manipulations of his
political opposition and rebellious countrymen will certainly
not solve Chad's problems, but may also feed the into the
difficulties of implementing the Darfur Peace Agreement. END
SUMMARY

PARIS' MESSAGES TO CHAD
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2. (C) French Ambassador to Chad Jean-Pierre Bercot reported
on the June 15-16 visit to Chad of France's Minister Delegate
for Cooperation, Development and Francophony, Brigitte
Girardin. He said Girardin's messages to Deby were the same
as those she delivered to the political opposition: (a) that
Chad had to move forward, and the reality on the ground was
that Idriss Deby Itno is in the President's chair; (b)
President Deby must offer dialogue to the political
opposition -- and the opposition must accept -- without
pre-condition; and (c) Chad is on a slippery slope, and a
political opening is absolutely necessary if the country is
to avoid a much worse situation.


3. (C) President Deby apparently responded in the negative to
France's current suggestions for an opposition Prime Minister
and a national unity government. Bercot reported that his
reason was the total incapacity to govern of the members of
the political opposition. Deby pointed out to the French
that the members of the opposition umbrella group
Coordination of the Political Parties for the Defense of the
Constitution (CPDC) do not trust each other, do not work
together, have no political platform, and present no leader.
Bercot said Deby stressed that he did not know what the
opposition wanted aside from his departure and the inclusion
of armed rebellions in the negotiations, and could not enter
into a dialogue with people who gave no reason for discussion.

WHAT CAN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMMUNITY DO?
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3. (C) Bercot linked his arguments for international
community action to the continued negative pronouncements of
Sudan's President al-Bashir on accepting a UN peacekeeping
operation (PKO) in Darfur. He pointed out that Deby's
conflict with al-Bashir encouraged armed rebels in the East,
and intersected with the difficulties of implementing the
Darfur Peace Agreement. According to Bercot, this UN PKO
would be French President Chirac's last major international
effort before he steps down in 2007. With the UK's Prime
Minister losing steam, and the Germans focused on their
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, only
Chirac and President Bush were invested in Sudan. Pressure
on Deby to seek a face-saving meeting with al-Bashir at the
AU Summit in Banjul, Gambia, was in Bercot's opinion a first

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element to relieving pressure on Deby's eastern flank -- and
in getting al-Bashir to move toward accepting a robust UN
PKO. In this regard, Bercot said France had recently
proposed to the UN Secretary General to provide full
logistical supply support to a 500-strong "African
Gendarmerie" force to bring security to the refugee and IDP
camps in Chad's east, as long as the this support was seen as
separate from France's bilateral military engagement in Chad.


4. (C) Second, the French Ambassador said the main
international players in N'Djamena should seek out Deby's
so-called Committee of Wise Men (Comite des Sages),under the
chairmanship of the former Chadian President, General Felice
Malloum. Bercot said he had "sent" the head of the
Delegation of the European Commission, Ambassador Robert
Kremer, to talk to the Committee, as a way to "de-politicize"
France's message that political dialogue will bring the
necessary resources to pay for root-and-branch reform of the
electoral and judicial systems -- reforms that could bring
the political opposition into power behind a parliamentary
majority in first half 2007. Bercot specified that France
and the EC were ready to fund these reforms right away,
through the UN Development Programme (UNDP).

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PRESSURE THE OPPOSITION --
BUT IS ANYONE LISTENING?
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5. (C) Third, the French envoy said Chad's international
partners had to put full pressure on the political opposition
to accept dialogue with Deby, and to present concrete
proposals for change. However, Bercot despaired that there
was anyone really capable of having this dialogue with the
President. He reported that key members of the CPDC were
trooping into his offices seeking visas for travel to France
during the critical period leading up to Deby's August 8
investiture for his third term. He suggested the CPDC was
falling apart, and that individual members were heading to
Europe to talk to France's political opposition, and Europe's
human rights organizations, with the messages that France
supports a dictator, and the dictator has to go -- but no
political program, and no idea of who would lead Chad.


6. (C) In the absence of a viable political opposition,
Bercot suggested that Deby is seeking to split up the armed
rebellions, pulling leadership elements away and into a
dialogue -- thus undercutting the political opposition's call
for their inclusion at the table. Bercot mentioned
specifically his suspicion that Deby is in discussions with
the FUCD's Mahamat Nour and his allies. He said the
political opposition was thus falling into a trap of their
own making, allowing Deby to pick whom from the rebel groups
he would invite to the table, and undercutting the CPDC in
the process. That said, Bercot did not believe that Deby
would talk to rebel leaders coming from his own Zaghawa clan.

DANGEROUS FOR DARFUR?
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7. (C) Ambassador Bercot cautioned that the choices Deby
might make in the near future could make it more difficult
for the international community to accomplish its aims in
Darfur. He speculated that Deby would only reach out to
Chadian rebels without roots in his own clan, and noted that
at least some of these could be considered "Arab", or at
least from northern Chadian clans such as the Tama, who could
be seen as having Sudanese backing. He linked them to
spoiler groups in Darfur, opposing the DPA. Thus, Bercot
expressed the view that Deby's choice of whom to deal with
from the groups or individuals involved in westward-facing
rebellions could include people tied to eastward-looking DPA

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spoilers. And, where this kind of "opening" to armed
opponents in Chad will certainly not accomplish anything in
terms of bringing about political dialogue, it may strengthen
DPA opponents.

IN THE END, SEEMS ALL
WILL FAIL
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8. (C) Having lined up this constellation of actors and put
them into the current context, Bercot finished gloomily with
the opinion that the political opposition were trapped by
their own refusal to talk, inability to lead, and insistence
on having rebels at the table; Deby was trapped by his
willingness only to offer empty dialogue, rejection of an
exit strategy through a unity government, and complex
attempts to manipulate all sides to create for himself a
space in which he could survive; and the international
community was trapped in having only one game to reasonably
play -- that of dialogue toward power-sharing -- but no
credible Chadians with whom to play it. He stated plainly
that France's ideas for the structure of a transition from
Deby rule is dead, since no one had accepted them. "There is
no doubt in my mind," he said, "We -- the international
community, and especially France -- are a big part of the
problem."


9. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL