CHAD AND JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT MAKE UP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000087

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD AND JUSTICE AND EQUALITY MOVEMENT MAKE UP

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: During a two-week stay in N'Djamena, the
President of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Dr.
Khalil Ibrahim, shared his thoughts on the normalization of
relations between Chad and the JEM, the Chadian-Sudanese
conflict, prospects for peace at the negotiating table in
Abuja, and his desire to have improved relations with the
United States. Khalil reiterated his concerns that the
Government of Sudan is not serious about achieving peace in
Darfur, preferring instead to pursue a military solution that
includes regime change in Chad. Discussions with Khalil
reveal his national aspirations in Sudan and utilization of
regional alliances to obtain them. End Summary.

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NORMALIZING RELATIONS
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2. (C) Justice and Equality Movement,s President Dr.
Khalil Ibrahim has spent the past two weeks in N,Djamena
meeting with Chadian officials, including President Deby, and
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) faction leader Minni Minawi.
Khalil told Ambassador and P/E officer that President Deby
invited him to Chad as part of the process of repairing the
strained relations between Chad and JEM on January 13. Part
of the normalization process is securing the release of JEM
prisoners in Chadian jails. According to Khalil, many of
these prisoners have been in unknown jails, tortured, and
thrown out of aircraft. Chadian authorities also have
confiscated JEM vehicles and weapons and harassed JEM members
traveling in and out of N'Djamena. Khalil said that JEM did
not come to Chad seeking support, but to improve the
relationship by building on talks started last October.


3. (C) Khalil explained that over the past two years, the
poor relationship with President Deby had cost both Chad and
JEM. Chadian efforts to split JEM included support for the
National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD),seizure
of cars and weapons, and imprisonment of JEM members.
However, geopolitics dictated that the Sudanese rebel
movement must have access to Chad. In addition, it is
important for JEM to have good ties with Chad as it is
serving as a co-mediator in the negotiations. Finally,
Khalil said lack of contact with Chadian officials has
resulted in misunderstandings and misperceptions that now
need to be corrected.

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VIEWS ON CHADIAN-SUDANESE TENSIONS
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4. (C) Khalil stated that it is clear that the GOS is
backing the Chadian rebels. He said that the GOS had
recently delivered over 200 landcruisers, heavy gun
machinery, and rocket launchers to the Chadian rebels. In
addition, Khalil said that evidence of Chinese-manufactured
weapons and the meticulous planning involved in the operation
are indications that the GOS intends on changing the &whole
system8. Khalil said that Chad does not need the help of
JEM or SLM against the GOS-supported Chadian rebels because
Chad's army is strong enough to defend itself. (Comment: In
a later clarification, Khalil said that the fact that JEM and
SLM control the Chad-Sudan border from Tine north to Bahai is
important for Chad so that Deby can concentrate his forces in
other areas. SLM and JEM are poor movements and cannot
contribute militarily to Chad's defense. End. Comment.) In
response to a question of JEM,s alleged support for Chadian
military deserters, Khalil said that historically,
intermarriage between tribes and clans means that many
Chadian soldiers have spouses and families on both sides of
the border. JEM is not recruiting Chadian soldiers,
according to Khalil. However, over time, there are many
Chadian military disaffected with the ruling Movement for
Patriotic Salvation (MPS) that have joined JEM.


5. (C) The goal of the GOS is regime change in Chad,
according to Khalil. The GOS plans to replace the entire

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system in Chad with an Arab government and Islamic system.
Khalil said that Mahamat Nour is not the GOS,s answer to its
Chadian problems, but just a tool by which it will replace
Deby and his family. Khalil said that the GOS wants to
replace the Deby family system to end Chadian support for the
Darfurian rebel movements and undermine the
internationally-supported peace process. The GOS believes by
removing Deby that it can achieve a military solution to the
situation in Darfur, according to Khalil. He added that
similar to its actions in Darfur, the GOS is intent on
cleansing the area of indigenous people to make room for
Arabs, especially the Chadian Arabs now serving as
jandjaweed. According to this calculation, the jandjaweed
will move to Chad, become a ready reserve when needed, and
avoid international prosecution because a newly-installed
Sudanese-influenced government will refuse to turn them over
to the International Criminal Court.


6. (C) Khalil believes that the border war will escalate
after the African Union summit in Khartoum. The GOS wants as
many heads of state to attend as possible. The movements
will boycott the talks during the AU summit and will walk out
if Bashir is elected to take over the AU. Khalil said that
if Bashir becomes AU Chairman, the Darfur peace process will
be destroyed. Khalil also described President Olusegun
Obasanjo as having lost interest in the Darfur peace process.
He urged the international community to encourage Obasanjo
to do more.

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COLLABORATIVE, REGIONAL APPROACH TO PEACE IN SUDAN
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7. (C) Khalil described his approach to the peace process as
comprehensive. He stated that JEM is not seeking to upset
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement reached with the south.
JEM does not want the south to cede any of its newly achieved
rights obtained at Navaisha. Instead, JEM wants to ensure
that other marginalized populations can gain their rights.
He said that a collective approach for peace in Sudan must
include other regions as the eastern people share the same
objectives and demands as Darfurians. He emphasized several
times that peace in Sudan must include the eastern movements.
Khalil said that a truly comprehensive peace would begin
with a revolving presidency, beginning with the south, which
he views as the only way to keep Sudan united. Khalil said
JEM is anxious about what it views as the northern
government,s plans to separate the south from the north.
The only solution to preserving the CPA, in Khalil,s view,
is for Salva Kiir to become president.

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WHY KHARTOUM IS AFRAID OF JEM
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8. (C) Khalil said that JEM is more dangerous to the GOS
than SLM because of its experience as government insiders,
its ability to raise public awareness, its vision, and its
ties to the eastern movements. According to Khalil, JEM is
the best protector of Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement
(SPLM),who are coming to the government as outsiders. As a
result, the NIF government is already in the process of
destroying SPLM. Khalil stated that within 24 months, SLPM
will ask for a premature self-determination.

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KHALIL ON ABUJA PROCESS: ONE HAND CANNOT CLAP ALONE
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9. (C) Khalil said that the GOS is not taking the peace
process in Abuja seriously. He said that if the GOS
genuinely wants peace, a deal can be concluded in one week.
He admitted that the movements made some tactical mistakes by
stating their bottom lines on issues up front and leaving no
margin to negotiate. However, he said the movements did this
because they felt under pressure from the international
community to be upfront with their demands. As a result,
Khalil said the movements, positions appear to the
international observers as inflexible. In addition, some of

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the inflexibility is the result of the process through which
the common negotiating positions are adopted.


10. (C) On power-sharing, Khalil restated the movements,
positions. Darfur must be one administrative region. At
the center, a rotational presidency and a supreme council of
the six regions will ensure unity. He also added that Darfur
and the east should each have vice presidencies and
participation on a ministerial council. He reiterated the
demand for full participation of Darfurians, based on their
percentage of population, in the governance of Khartoum,
civil service, and police and security forces. He said there
are 12.5 million Darfurians, with one million living in
Libya, and a majority of the population in the east are
Darfurians.


11. (C) Khalil said that the wealth-sharing commission needs
to secure free education, services, and basic infrastructure
for all of Sudan in order to alleviate poverty and
marginalization. The so-called red line for the movements is
the reconstruction of destroyed villages, including better
quality housing than previously existed, clearly delineated
in a plan that includes budget allocations and a timeline.
He said that the movements will not fight for a specific
percentage of oil revenues if they can achieve reconstruction
and assurances of improved infrastructure and services to the
region.


12. (C) Regarding security arrangements, Khalil said that
the movements must be able to keep their armies during the
transition period, that the GOS must pay for the upkeep and
logistics support for these troops, and that the jandjaweed
question must be answered.


13. (C) The Ambassador asked Khalil when he would be going
to the Abuja talks. Khalil said that he has a competent,
empowered team in place. He said he would go to Abuja when
it was clear that the GOS was serious about negotiating a
final deal.

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JEM SEEKS BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES
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14. (C) Another key theme of Khalil,s meeting with the
Ambassador was to improve JEM,s relationship with US
officials. Khalil categorically stated that JEM is an
independent movement and does not belong to former Sudanese
Minister Turabi. Khalil expressed his desire to send a
delegation to the United States to dispel widely-held
misperceptions of JEM that it is relatively small movement,
interested in an Islamic agenda.

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COMMENT
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15. (C) From Khalil's perspective, the GOS is under no
pressure to make a deal with the Darfurian movements. In
subsequent meetings, he told us that the international
community appears unwilling to pressure the GOS so the
movements must reconsider their options. Khalil also
believes that the framework for the peace deal will not be
made in Abuja, but delivered to the negotiations. He also
appears satisfied with his return to N'Djamena and better
footing with the Chadian Government. Khalil deftly avoided
discussing the formation of a Zaghawa coalition or the
importance of demonstrating Zaghawa solidarity with Deby.

WALL