CHAD: THE ROAD AHEAD

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2010
TAGS: EFIN KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL CH
SUBJECT: CHAD: THE ROAD AHEAD

Classified By: Ambassador Marc Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: President Deby's victories this spring
provide him an opening for reaching out to his opponents.
While their starting positions appear unbridgeable, and
neither side has manifested the political will for
compromise, at least Deby is making gestures in the right
direction and his opponents are mulling over
counter-proposals. We should work with the French and other
international partners to encourage any initiative that can
help advance a program of reconciliation and reform. END
SUMMARY

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Deby's Victories
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2. (SBU) During a few brief weeks earlier this spring,
President Idriss Deby Itno scored a string of victories
against his opponents. On April 13, he beat back an assault
by a column of armed rebels at the gates of N'Djamena. On
April 26, he reached a compromise agreement with the World
Bank on releasing oil royalties from the blocked escrow
account. On May 3, he held an election that, though badly
flawed, gives him the cover to claim a mandate for another
five years in power. And on May 5, he received word of the
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in Abuja and proposals
for a UN force that will help secure his volatile eastern
border with Sudan. Thus, in contests against the armed
rebels, the World Bank, his political opposition, and
Khartoum that threatened to undo his regime, he came out on
top in them all.


3. (SBU) His triumph may be short-lived. Skirmishes on
Chad's eastern and southern borders continue, and a major
rebel offensive before the onset of the rainy season in
coming weeks cannot be ruled out. Agreement still has not
been reached with the IMF and World Bank on the revised 2006
budget, a precondition for the release of the blocked funds.
The May 3 election did nothing to restore confidence of
Chadians in their political process. And at least from the
Chadian perspective, a durable peace backed by a robust
international force in Darfur remains a distant hope.


4. (SBU) Still, for the moment at least, Deby can look
forward to five more years in power with more confidence than
he has been able to for some time. He has won what he wants
most: control of the military, immunity from prosecution, and
access to oil revenues (to include the windfall of as much as
USD 2 billion in tax payments next year). He also has the
assurance that, thanks to the revisions in the constitution
lifting term limits, he will never have to worry about legal
restrictions forcing him to step down.

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Prospects for Reconciliation
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5. (C) Deby's victory gives him the opportunity to reach
out to his opponents. Little in his past suggests that he
has the willingness or capability to do so. Deby is a fierce
desert fighter, but a divisive political leader. He has
little stomach for managing coalitions, nurturing consensus,
or engaging in the give and take of normal democratic
politics. Instead, he rules by intimidating, buying off,
and, when necessary, exiling or even killing off his
opponents. He surrounds himself with sycophants and regards
dissenters with suspicion, if not outright hostility. He
puts up with criticism in the press and the National
Assembly, but only because he knows it does not threaten his
power. Even though many in his extended family have turned
on him, he has not succeeded in reaching out beyond his
immediate clan to establish a broader base of support.
Despite his best efforts in the recent presidential election
campaign, he failed completely at firing popular enthusiasm

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for his rule.


6. (SBU) Deby is nonetheless making gestures to respond to
calls for initiating political dialogue. He has instructed
his Prime Minister to organize a gathering with the
opposition political parties. He has also asked a committee
of wise men for its recommendations, even though its
chairperson, former President Malloum, has no expectation
that any significant progress is possible. Deby is hearing
out -- and at least not rejecting outright -- French ideas
for forming a new government under an opposition prime
minister and for holding real elections for the National
Assembly next year.


7. (SBU) From long and bitter experience in dealing with
Deby in the past, the opposition leaders are understandably
leery about his overtures. In their view, now that Deby can
claim a mandate for another term, any concessions he appears
to make are only for show, and they will have no part of it.
They have nevertheless moved beyond their position of
insisting on a postponement of the May 3 presidential
election as a precondition for talking with Deby, even if
their new proposals are non-starters (as far as Deby is
concerned). They talk now of a "non-exclusive dialogue" to
include the armed rebel movements and a broadly
representative council that would take over presidential
powers for running the government and implementing a "road
map."

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A Way Forward
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8. (C) The weeks leading up to Deby's inauguration on
August 8 offer the best chance we and other international
partners have had to influence Chad in a positive direction
since the initial sparring took place in early 2004 on Deby's
plans to overturn term limits and seek a third term. That
opportunity was missed then. Even now the positions staked
out by Deby and his opponents appear irreconcilable. The
positive voices they have been making recently appear
designed more to play to the international audience, than to
signal any serious willingness to compromise.


9. (C) But even if the political will necessary for
progress is hardly evident now, it is still worth the effort.
Implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement will ease
pressures on Chad, but it will not solve its problems.
Durable peace can begin to take root only if Deby and his
opponents can reach a political consensus on Chad's future.
Even launching a process seeking to achieve that consensus
could help tame the cross-currents threatening the country's
stability.


10. (C) We doubt that elaborating a detailed "road map"
with specific benchmarks and commitments would be useful at
this early stage. Our role is better directed at discretely
supporting French efforts to persuade Deby to appoint an
opposition cabinet and hold real legislative elections. We
should be ready to use our influence with the opposition
leaders to encourage them to explore any serious initiatives
in this direction. Although they will have to accept Deby's
sham election of May 3 and his mandate for another five
years, a political opening now can at least set the stage for
more credible presidential elections the next time around.


11. (C) For any plan to make a difference, we will need to
devote more than just token resources in support of
international efforts to assist Chad with political and
economic reform. This would involve working not only to fix
the electoral process, but also to strengthen political
parties, empower the legislative branch, and overhaul public
finance management. If progress on these fronts is made, we
should also be ready to invite Deby to Washington. He has
won his most recent round of fights, but he knows he still

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lacks what he most wants from us: our respect. We should use
that concern to reward him if he chooses to engage in a
serious program of reconciliation and reform.


12. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
WALL