Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA853
2006-06-19 16:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:
CHAD/DRFUR: AU-UN JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION BRIEFS
how-toVZCZCXRO3700 RR RUEHTRO DE RUEHNJ #0853/01 1701647 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 191647Z JUN 06 FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3945 INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1176 RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0792 RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0660 RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1095 RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0243 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1443 RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0574 RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2713 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1837 RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1233 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0736 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0799 RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0245
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000853
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
NAIROBI FOR OFDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/DRFUR: AU-UN JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION BRIEFS
ON IMPRESSIONS FROM EASTERN CHAD, GOC
REF: KHARTOUM 1402
Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).
SUMMARY:
---------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000853
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
NAIROBI FOR OFDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/DRFUR: AU-UN JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION BRIEFS
ON IMPRESSIONS FROM EASTERN CHAD, GOC
REF: KHARTOUM 1402
Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).
SUMMARY:
--------------
1. (C) UN U/S General for Peacekeeping Operations reported in
N'Djamena that expectations of the impact of a UN PKO in
Darfur are unrealistic on both sides of the Chad/Sudan
border. He called the logistical challenge of standing up
the force "a nightmare", and cautioned that it would be at
least January 2007 before the force could be stood up. END
SUMMARY
--------------
UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
--------------
2. (C) Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations (U/SG DPKO) briefed members of the
N'Djamena diplomatic community June 16 on the activities of
DPKO's technical assessment mission to Darfur. Guehenno
stressed his impressions from his June 13-15 meetings in El
Fasher, El Geneina, and Nyala. He said that the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) is a positive step, necessary to allow a
transition toward peace, but vulnerable to being used to
polarize attitudes among refugees and IDPs on both sides of
the Chad/Sudan border. He said he had heard IDPs express the
expectation that a UNPKO in the region would supplant the
Government of Sudan, expectations which he called completely
unrealistic. On the other hand, Arab peoples had called any
deployment a "UN invasion" to be feared.
3. (SBU) Regarding his June 16 meetings in N'Djamena,
Guehenno called them useful for getting a regional
perspective. The DPKO/AU mission had met earlier in the day
with Chadian President Deby, and the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and of Territorial Administration. They had been
briefed at the French Embassy, and at France's military base
in N'Djamena. Guehenno said it was clear from these
conversations that the Darfur conflict "interferes and
intersects with Chad's domestic political schisms". He said
he had seen considerable evidence that armed groups opposed
to President Deby were established and active in Western
Darfur.
--------------
PKO FOR DARFUR -- NOT CHAD
--------------
4. (C) The U/SG said President Deby had expressed strong
support for a PKO, but again, expectations were out of line
with reality. Guehenno said that managing the transition
from AMIS to a UNPKO in Darfur would be enormously complex,
and there would not be room for this force to become
"integrated into the Chadian conflicts."
5. (C) Ambassador Wall raised the questions of (a) any role
for a UN PKO in the Chad border region in providing
protection for refugees and IDPs, and (b) what the U/SG may
have learned about reports of Chadian support for groups
opposing the DPA. Guehenno called getting a PKO into Darfur
"a logistical challenge -- more like a nightmare", and
cautioned that providing security for the region's refugees
and IDPs was equivalent to trying to police several cities of
20,000 to 30,000 people. He stressed that there could be no
expectation that a PKO could "lock up" 1,000 kms of
Chad/Sudan border, although the technical assessment mission
was trying to come up with ways to maximize visibility and
monitoring capabilities. He noted that the affected areas in
Chad along the Sudan border amounted to region of roughly 250
NDJAMENA 00000853 002 OF 002
kms by 800 kms, an area the PKO would not be able to take on.
He urged his audience to entertain no illusions about what
would be possible in Chad from a UN presence in the region.
Last, he gave the date of January 2007 as the soonest any
troops would be on the ground in Darfur.
6. (C) Regarding DPA spoilers, Guehenno confirmed having
received reports of Chadian support for elements opposing
Minni Minnawi's faction of the SLA/SLM. He noted observing
increasing fragmentation between Zaghawa and Fur elements,
and within the Zaghawa clans. He said that while it was a
positive thing that Minnawi had signed on to the DPA, we must
not lose sight of the fact that Minnawi himself does not
command full spport.
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) U/SG Guehenno was straight-forward and direct in his
commentary regarding how the technical assessment mission is
looking at its probable impact on and involvement in Chad.
He stressed repeatedly the need to control and reduce
expectations. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER
NAIROBI FOR OFDA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD/DRFUR: AU-UN JOINT ASSESSMENT MISSION BRIEFS
ON IMPRESSIONS FROM EASTERN CHAD, GOC
REF: KHARTOUM 1402
Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).
SUMMARY:
--------------
1. (C) UN U/S General for Peacekeeping Operations reported in
N'Djamena that expectations of the impact of a UN PKO in
Darfur are unrealistic on both sides of the Chad/Sudan
border. He called the logistical challenge of standing up
the force "a nightmare", and cautioned that it would be at
least January 2007 before the force could be stood up. END
SUMMARY
--------------
UNREASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
--------------
2. (C) Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN Under Secretary General for
Peacekeeping Operations (U/SG DPKO) briefed members of the
N'Djamena diplomatic community June 16 on the activities of
DPKO's technical assessment mission to Darfur. Guehenno
stressed his impressions from his June 13-15 meetings in El
Fasher, El Geneina, and Nyala. He said that the Darfur Peace
Agreement (DPA) is a positive step, necessary to allow a
transition toward peace, but vulnerable to being used to
polarize attitudes among refugees and IDPs on both sides of
the Chad/Sudan border. He said he had heard IDPs express the
expectation that a UNPKO in the region would supplant the
Government of Sudan, expectations which he called completely
unrealistic. On the other hand, Arab peoples had called any
deployment a "UN invasion" to be feared.
3. (SBU) Regarding his June 16 meetings in N'Djamena,
Guehenno called them useful for getting a regional
perspective. The DPKO/AU mission had met earlier in the day
with Chadian President Deby, and the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs and of Territorial Administration. They had been
briefed at the French Embassy, and at France's military base
in N'Djamena. Guehenno said it was clear from these
conversations that the Darfur conflict "interferes and
intersects with Chad's domestic political schisms". He said
he had seen considerable evidence that armed groups opposed
to President Deby were established and active in Western
Darfur.
--------------
PKO FOR DARFUR -- NOT CHAD
--------------
4. (C) The U/SG said President Deby had expressed strong
support for a PKO, but again, expectations were out of line
with reality. Guehenno said that managing the transition
from AMIS to a UNPKO in Darfur would be enormously complex,
and there would not be room for this force to become
"integrated into the Chadian conflicts."
5. (C) Ambassador Wall raised the questions of (a) any role
for a UN PKO in the Chad border region in providing
protection for refugees and IDPs, and (b) what the U/SG may
have learned about reports of Chadian support for groups
opposing the DPA. Guehenno called getting a PKO into Darfur
"a logistical challenge -- more like a nightmare", and
cautioned that providing security for the region's refugees
and IDPs was equivalent to trying to police several cities of
20,000 to 30,000 people. He stressed that there could be no
expectation that a PKO could "lock up" 1,000 kms of
Chad/Sudan border, although the technical assessment mission
was trying to come up with ways to maximize visibility and
monitoring capabilities. He noted that the affected areas in
Chad along the Sudan border amounted to region of roughly 250
NDJAMENA 00000853 002 OF 002
kms by 800 kms, an area the PKO would not be able to take on.
He urged his audience to entertain no illusions about what
would be possible in Chad from a UN presence in the region.
Last, he gave the date of January 2007 as the soonest any
troops would be on the ground in Darfur.
6. (C) Regarding DPA spoilers, Guehenno confirmed having
received reports of Chadian support for elements opposing
Minni Minnawi's faction of the SLA/SLM. He noted observing
increasing fragmentation between Zaghawa and Fur elements,
and within the Zaghawa clans. He said that while it was a
positive thing that Minnawi had signed on to the DPA, we must
not lose sight of the fact that Minnawi himself does not
command full spport.
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) U/SG Guehenno was straight-forward and direct in his
commentary regarding how the technical assessment mission is
looking at its probable impact on and involvement in Chad.
He stressed repeatedly the need to control and reduce
expectations. END COMMENT.
8. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL