Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA787
2006-06-05 14:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: WISE MEN'S CHAIR MALLOUM SEEKS GUIDANCE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8085
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0787/01 1561411
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 051411Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3867
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1158
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0778
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0649
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 1078
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1425
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2700
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1817
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1209
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0785
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0234
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000787 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: WISE MEN'S CHAIR MALLOUM SEEKS GUIDANCE

REF: NDJAMENA 778

Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

SUMMARY:
---------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000787

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF, AFC, DRL, PRM, S/CRS
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: WISE MEN'S CHAIR MALLOUM SEEKS GUIDANCE

REF: NDJAMENA 778

Classified By: POL/ECON OFFICER MICHAEL P. ZORICK, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND
(D).

SUMMARY:
--------------


1. (C) The Chair of President Deby's Committee of Wise Men on
political dialogue does not see any indication from the
President or his opposition of the political will necessary
for compromise and reconciliation. He hopes that
international pressure will bring Deby to understand the need
for real reform, but fears that a vacuum in confidence will
will keep the various sides from even being able to launch
any serious dialogue. END SUMMARY


2. (C) President Idriss Deby Itno told AF DAS Yamamoto May 30
that he had created a 30-person Committee of Wise Men (Comite
des Sages),under the chairmanship of the former Chadian
President, General Felice Malloum, that would present him as
soon as 2 June with proposals for structuring a political
dialogue (reftel). Ambassador met with Malloum on June 3 to
find out what the eminent Chadian politician believed could
be accomplished by the committee he chairs.

NO REAL INSTRUCTIONS
--------------


3. (C) Malloum made it clear that he had essentially no idea
what President Deby expected of him or the Wise Men's
Committee. Deby had received Malloum roughly a week before,
apparently at Malloum's request for a discussion of what Deby
might intend coming out of the May 3 election. Malloum said
Deby had charged him at that meeting to head up "a small
organ" to propose political initiatives. Malloum stated
that, far from giving the President any proposals at the end
of the previous week, he had met only a few of the other
committee members, whom he called "MSP (ruling party) cadres."


4. (C) Malloum stressed that, at this time, there is simply
no vestige of confidence left among the politically active
Chadians that must be part of a national dialogue. He
pointed out that, in such a climate, it would be irrelevant
what Deby claimed to be willing to undertake in terms of
reforms or policies -- his interlocutors simply would not
believe him. Malloum asked whether a dialogue would be
possible when the starting point -- a willingness to accept
each others' legitimacy, and to compromise -- is out of
reach. He said that, although the President had asked for
his recommendations, he has made no commitment to accept them
-- "If he refuses our ideas, what then?"

CORNER SUDAN WITH PEACEKEEPERS
--------------


5. (C) Discussing Chad's external security situation, Malloum
noted that Chad's 45 years of unstable nationhood had always
been linked to "unfriendly neighbors". He viewed the USG's
new relationship with Tripoli as potentially helpful, calling
Sudan Chad's most dangerous influence, and pointed to China's
support for Khartoum versus N'Djamena's relationship with
Taiwan as a problem in UN Security Council deliberations on
Darfur and Chad. Malloum noted three important elements in
dealing with Eastern Chad and Darfur: (a) obtaining Sudanese
acceptance of a UN PKO in Darfur; (b) providing real
political support to the AU's efforts; and (c) understanding
where Chadian elements in rebel groups destabilizing Darfur
ended, and Sudanese elements in rebel groups destabilizing
Chad began. Malloum returned repeatedly to the need for
strong external pressure on Sudan to halt its interference in
Chad, as well as on Deby to pull back from his
winner-takes-all attitude to politics.


6. (C) Ambassador made it clear that, while the USG and the
international community were ready to help where they had
value to add in Chad's internal political process, it would
require first a clear indication of political will on the
part of Chadians. Malloum responded that he did not see

NDJAMENA 00000787 002 OF 002


indications of that will, and hoped that it would be the
international community that would encourage Chadians to
cooperate with each other.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Malloum came off as a true wise man -- certainly wise
enough to know when he has been set up to fail. We do not
see much coming from his committee. We are especially taken
by his point that, in a confidence vacuum, there is no
starting point for political dialogue that can lead to the
kinds of reforms needed for a peaceful future in Chad. END
COMMENT


8. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL