CHAD: FRANCE ON POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000779

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM KCRS CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRANCE ON POST-ELECTION STRATEGY

REF: NDJAMENA 775

Classified By: LUCY TAMLYN, DCM, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)


1. (C) Summary. In a meeting with Ambassador Wall, French
Ambassador Bercot outlined the Paris-blessed strategy for
expanding a political dialogue and establishing the
foundations for better economic and political governance in
Chad after elections. He cautioned that the regime's ongoing
efforts to buy off individual members of the opposition (and
their willingness to be bought off) threatened any serious
political dialogue. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Wall met with French Ambassador
Jean-Pierre Bercot at his request on June 2. DCM (notetaker)
also attended. Ambassador Bercot was eager to relay
information from his most recent meeting with President Deby
(which had taken place after the visit of AF Deputy Assistant
Secretary (DAS) Don Yamamoto),and also to explain France's

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post-election strategy.

President Deby Reactions to U.S. Visit
--------------


3. (C) Ambassador Bercot said that President Deby had been
surprised that DAS Yamamoto had publicly raised the issue of
naming an opposition Prime Minister in his meeting with
President Deby. Deby acknowledged that this had been
discussed between him and Ambassador Bercot, but noted that
this had been done one-on-one. If he subsequently named an
opposition Prime Minister, President Deby complained, he
would be seen as acting on the recommendation of the United
States, and this would "expose him to his enemies."
Ambassador Bercot reported that he had assured President Deby
that he should take advantage of the fact that the United
States was now focused on Chad. He reported that President
Deby had described DAS Yamamoto's visit overall as positive,
and confided to Bercot that he hoped to be invited to the
United States next year for a visit -- even a short one.


4. (C) As far as protection of refugees, Ambassador Bercot
reported that President Deby was open to an international
force, on the condition that he would be able to vet the
selection of troop-contributing countries. On the subject of
such an international force, Ambassador Bercot pointed out
that having French gendarmes (in such a mission) next to
French soldiers stationed in Chad would be extremely
confusing, and he would prefer not to confuse France's
mandate in Chad. Bercot noted in passing that President Deby
believed that the United States was "manipulated" by SLM
leader Minni Minawi, and reiterated that President Deby
believed that the recent skirmishes in Darfur had been the
result of Minni's attacks on JEM positions. President Deby
reported that in his three meetings with Minni last week,
threats from SLM breakaway groups or JEM had never been
brought up. Ambassador Bercot commented: of course, (Deby's
half-brother) Daussa Deby and (Minister of Territorial
Administration) Mahamet Ali "have a gun at his back."

France's "Road-Map" for Chad
--------------


5. (C) Ambassador Bercot explained that Paris had now
formally blessed a proposed political road-map for Chad
(described reftel) which included 1) naming an opposition
prime minister, who would be allow to name his government,
and who would stay in place for at least a year; and 2)
implementation of a plan for reform of the army, the
electoral system, the justice system and economic reform.
Bercot showed Ambassador two letters from French President
Chirac and French Prime Minister de Villepin in which Deby
was congratulated on his election, but was also directed to
commence a political dialogue. Ambassador Bercot reported
that he understood that some in the President's office might
be in touch with former Prime Minister Jean Alingue. Bercot
explained that the thinking was that Alingue would be allowed
to pick his own government as long as President Deby retained
control over defense issues. Bercot reported that he had
told President Deby that insisting on leaving the current
Minister of Finance, Abakar Tolli, was equally important in
terms of maintaining continuity and good relations with
donors.


6. (C) The Ambassador clarified that DAS Yamamoto had only
mentioned naming an opposition Prime Minister as one of
several possible steps that President Deby could take to show
an opening. Other options, including reform of the electoral
system, were mentioned. Furthermore, the idea of an
opposition Prime Minister was not a new one. He noted,
however, that the meeting did not leave the impression that
President Deby was looking to the international community to
facilitate the process. True, commented Ambassador Bercot,
but the international community has an important role as a
"verifier."


7. (C) Turning to the opposition groups which make up the
CPDC, Ambassador Bercot noted with concern that practically
all of the smaller parties therein could be bought -- and
some for a fairly low price. He was concerned that the
President's political party, the MPS, would be systematically
picking off the CPDC, thereby corrupting the process. He
agreed with the Ambassador that the significant members of
CPDC (i.e, Kamougue, Garba, etc) were not seen as having a
price, but he also noted that the opposition groups were
still holding out in the hope that the donors would deny the
results of the elections, rather than taking the initiative
to put forward concrete proposals.
WALL