IMPLEMENTING THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: TROUBLES

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000748

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL SU CD
SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTING THE DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT: TROUBLES
IN BIRMAZZA

REF: NDJAMENA 706


1. (SBU) Summary: Differing reports are coming in about a
clash between SLM forces near Birzamma in Sudan across the
frontier from Chadian border town of Bahai. SLM leader Minni
Minawi accused opponents of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)
of initiating the attack with some Chadian supporters
complicit in the action. JEM leader Khalil denied
involvement or even awareness of the engagement. President
Deby's half-brother Daoussa Deby as well as SLM breakaway
members blamed it on Minni's efforts to use force against
groups who refuse to join the agreement. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Shortly before his departure from N'Djamena for
Tripoli early on May 24, SLM's Minni Minawi called the
Ambassador to report that at least 20 vehicles were on their
way into Darfur to attack his forces near Birzamma. He said
the convoy had crossed the border at Bahai and was preparing
to launch their attack later on May 24. In a subsequent call
from Tripoli later in the day, Minni confirmed the arrival of
the vehicles near Birzamma. He said he had told his forces
not to attack But if they were the ones attacked, he warned,
there could be civil war.


3. (SBU) According to Minni, the operation was organized by
the JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and the SLM splinter faction
under Dr. Sharif Harir, with support from Daoussa Deby,
President Deby's influential half brother. He said he had
confronted Daoussa Deby about the matter and was told by
Daoussa that his forces would be attacked because Minni had
signed an agreement with the Sudanese government. Minni
believed the offensive against his positions was part of a
campaign to keep the Zaghawas fighting against Khartoum.
Minni said he had raised his concerns with President Deby and
that President Deby had said he would give orders to stop it.
In reality, Minni believed, President Deby was playing a
double game and was actually complicit in the operation.


4. (SBU) Over the next 12 hours, the Ambassador raised the
matter with Chadian Foreign Minister Allam-mi, Dr. Khalil
Ibrahim of JEM, and Dr. Sharif Harir of the SLM splinter
group that has refused to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement
(DPA). Foreign Minister Allam-mi disclaimed knowledge of the
reports. He said President Deby had urged JEM's Khalil
Ibrahim to sign the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). He
shrugged his shoulders when asked if Deby's family was fully
behind the agreement, but commented that mistrust over
Sudan's intentions made it difficult for Chadians to believe
Sudan was serious about implementing the DPA.


5. (SBU) In a two-hour meeting largely concerning his views
on the DPA (septel),Khalil claimed he was not aware of
reports of any problems near Birzamma. He said he would have
no interest in attacking Minni's forces in the area. He
argued, however, that JEM would defend itself if attacked.


6. (SBU) Daoussa Deby was aware of clashes involving Minni's
forces, but attributed them to a mutiny involving supporters
of the SLM factions close to Abdelwahid and Khammis. He said
the conflict arose from Minni's declaration that his forces
would serve as the police for Darfur. Daoussa claimed that
Minni should be encouraging the non-signers to cooperate with
the DPA, rather than threatening them with force. He
dismissed claims of any Chadian involvement or support in the
fighting near Birmazza.


7. (SBU) SLA faction leaders Sharif and Shogar described a
clash outside Birzamma the morning of May 24 between Minni's
and Khammis's forces which had resulted in defeat for Minni's
forces. According to Sharif, the fight was provoked by
Minni's intention to use force against non-signers of the
DPA. Sharif denied that the GOC was assisting SLM groups
against Minni. However, he feared that Minni's strong-arm
tactics would lead to violence among the Zaghawa and civil
war in Darfur for years to come.


8. (SBU) Comment: It is virtually impossible here to sort
through the credibility of these differing versions of this
event. They nonetheless underline sharply the mistrust among
the parties and the challenges facing efforts to implement
the DPA. End Comment.
WALL