CHAD-BASED SLM LEADERS URGED TO SUPPORT PEACE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000646

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ABUJA FOR DARFUR PEACE TALKS DELEGATION

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SU
SUBJECT: CHAD-BASED SLM LEADERS URGED TO SUPPORT PEACE
PROCESS

REF: N'DJAMENA 618 FITZGIBBON/WALL TELCON AND EMAIL

5/4/2006


1. (SBU) In a meeting May 5 with Chad-based SLM leaders Dr.
Sharif Hariri and Adam Shogar, the Ambassador urged them to
help keep the peace process on track -- and at a minimum, not
undermine it. Shogar and Hariri responded that they had been
sidelined by the African Union, but were not obstructing the
process. They returned to the objections raised in reftel,
stressing, in particular, that the Senior Special Assistant
to the President (SSA) needed to be established in the
Constitution. End summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Wall met with SLM leader Dr. Sharif
Hariri and spokesman Adam Shogar May 5 to discuss the ongoing
efforts in Abuja to bring peace to Darfur. Pol/Econ and DCM
(notetaker) attended. The Ambassador stated that the United
States was very serious about concluding a peace agreement
and determined to see it happen. To this end, we had sent
very high level U.S. Government representatives to Abuja.
The Ambassador urged Hariri and Shogar to help keep the peace
process on track, and at the very least, not undermine it.
He noted that the United States had worked to make the SSA a
serious, responsible position; that after three years
Darfurians would be able to vote in a referendum on making
Darfur a region. Most importantly, the Peace Agreement would
open up a political arena for Darfur leaders to have a
political role in Darfur.


3. (SBU) Dr. Hariri said that his people had been sidelined
for too long in Abuja. For the agreement to be a success,
they needed to be part of the process. However, they did not
seek to undermine the process. That was why, in fact, they
were keeping their distance. He explained that dissent was
important -- it helped illuminate the pitfalls and problems.
He stressed again that they did not seek to undermine the
process. However, Abuja excluded a large number of
Darfurians in the field. If they were not part of the
process, they would ignore the results. He expressed deep
appreciation for U.S. efforts, but noted that there were
certain essential conditions that needed to be met. First of
all, the SSA, to have authority, must be recognized in the
constitution. "To have power in Sudan, it has to be anchored
in the constitution" he stressed.


4. (SBU) Concerning integration of forces, Dr. Hariri
stated that this would require them to abandon the only means
they had to resolve the situation. The Movement's armies in
the field were bigger than people realized -- bigger in fact
than the national army. They would need a standing army for
at least three to four years. He noted that compensation was
a major issue as well: if it took USD 2 billion, then it
should be paid. When Ambassador Wall mentioned that there
was a donor's conference tentatively scheduled, Hariri was
dismissive. The problem with Africa, he stated, was that
donors paid for everything, and African leaders got to do
what they wanted.


5. (SBU) Spokesman Shogar brought up the question of
janjaweed disarmament. He noted that although the Government
of Sudan was already committed to disarming them, they had
not done so. Furthermore, the proposed Peace Agreement
referred to 8,000 Government of Sudan soldiers, but these
weren't soldiers, he explained, they were just militia or
public defense forces. The Movements could never join their
soldiers to these forces. He called the proposed referendum
on Darfur a "trick." The regions had been created by decree
-- why was there a need now to have a referendum?


6. (SBU) Ambassador Wall concluded by asking Shogar and
Hariri to recognize how hard the United States was working to
achieve a just peace in Darfur and to carefully consider the
points he had raised. He highlighted the sustained
commitment from the United States to achieving progress in
Abuja. He expressed hope that the SLM would find ways to
support that process and engage positively. Find ways to get
to Abuja, he urged, and help us reach a good agreement.


7. (SBU) Dr. Hariri responded that they could not go to
Abuja, because the African Union (AU) had set preconditions.
Salim Salim had said that he needed "guarantees". Shogar
added that they had asked the AU to let them come to the
talks with a mandate, but the AU had never recognized them.
As a result, "weak leadership by the AU has led us to the
current situation." Dr, Hariri reiterated that they were not
obstructing the talks, nor were they advocating cutting off
the process. They expected the deadline to be extended, and
they would keep talking.


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COMMENT


8. (SBU) The SLM representatives welcomed this exchange,
though they were hardly responsive to our message. They did
not hide their dissatisfaction with the AU, but recognized
the important role the U.S. has played and continues to play
in the Darfur peace process. End Comment.
WALL