SLM EXCLUDED FROM ABUJA WARN OF CIVIL WAR

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PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICAN WATCHERS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (ADDED SIGNATURE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SU
SUBJECT: SLM EXCLUDED FROM ABUJA WARN OF CIVIL WAR
IF SIGNING OCCURS


Classified by: POL SMCRAMPTON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: As peace negotiations enter an
extra 48-hour inning in Abuja, three Chad-based
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) representatives
told the Ambassador during a May 1 meeting that
their delegation had been effectively excluded
from the Darfur peace talks in Abuja by the AU,
which instructed them to join one of the two SLM
factions holding a seat at the negotiating table.
Senior SLM members Dr. Sharif Harir, Adan Shogar
and Khamis Abdullah told the Ambassador that the
proposed peace agreement is "debatable" but needs
to be amended in some important ways, and they
will not be bound by any outcome unless they are
allowed to participate independently (as a third
SLM faction) in the negotiations. They warned that
if the proposed Darfur peace agreement is signed
by the three parties negotiating with the GOS, it
could lead to civil war among the parties involved
as the SLM representatives in Abuja no longer
represent the field commanders in Darfur. They
have asked the African Union to set a new round of
negotiations after the movements have had an
opportunity to organize themselves and pick a new
leader. The SLM representatives claimed not to be
aware of SLM forces fighting alongside the Chadian
army against Chadian rebels or of the SLM's
recruitment in refugee camps, despite reports to
the contrary. End summary.

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Third SLM Faction at our Doorstep?
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2. (C) Three SLM Chad-based representatives,
Dr. Sharif Harir, Spokesman Adam Shogar, and
"Acting Chairman" (formerly Vice-Chairman)
Khamis Abdullah told the Ambassador in a May 1
meeting that their 17-member delegation
remains in Abuja, but had been excluded from
the Darfur peace talks by the AU, which cited
guidelines outlined by the AU Peace and
Security Commission (PSC) obligating them to
join one of the two SLM factions holding a
seat at the negotiating table (that of Abdul
Wahid Mohamed Nour or Minni Arkou Minawi).
They informed the AU that as long as they are
excluded from participating independently in
the negotiations, they will not be bound by
any outcome that might be reached. They warned
that if the proposed Darfur peace agreement is
signed by the movements' representatives
involved in negotiations, many of SLA fighters
in the field would reject it, which could
trigger a civil war.


3. (SBU) Dr. Harrir asserted that although "the
world would be disappointed in us," it would be
better to have no agreement signed. Abdul Wahid
Mohamed Nour had established back channels with
Khartoum without the consent of the SLM coalition
and was intending to sign an agreement with
Khartoum that would be unacceptable to them. They
said Abdul Wahid had consequently been placed
under an "executive freeze" for going beyond his
mandate, essentially preventing him from
committing the SLM to any peace agreement. Khamis
Abdullah is now the acting Chairman of the SLM.
As the highest ranking SLM member after Abdul
Wahid and Minawi, Khamis is known as a unifier
among the SLM political factions, they asserted,
and is well respected by SLA commanders in the
field. They noted, however, that some commanders
only recognize Jamoah Haggar (phonetic). While
acknowledging good relations with the JEM, they
ruled out the idea of falling in line behind JEM
leader Khalil Ibrahim. Khamis will continue as
acting Chairman until the next congress can be
held to name a new Chairman.

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Why the Agreement Cannot Be Signed
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4. (C) Dr. Harrir said Abdul Wahid and Minawi were
too willing to appease the Arab government and

that their negotiation efforts were primarily
motivated by their desire to secure "good jobs"
for themselves in Khartoum. The proposed peace
agreement is "debatable" and "discussable" but
should not be passed in its current form, Dr.
Harrir said. The three men said the proposed
agreement does not adequately address some of the
root problems of the Darfur conflict, including
how to deal with refugees. Some of the major
points of contention for the three men are the
provision allowing President al-Bashir to select
or appoint members of the movements to fill
certain government positions and the allocation of
too much power (including veto power over anyone
in the movements) to Abdul Wahid, Khalil, and
Minawi, the latter of whom Dr. Harrir said is
"becoming another Bashir." The three men
underlined the need for the movements to have
their own standing force (a la CPA, in the event
the government went back on its word) and deemed
unacceptable the provision that would integrate
the movements' forces into the Sudan Armed Forces
("the worst army in the world") and other security
services (NOTE: Dr. Harrir said Minawi is under
significant pressure to reject the agreement
because of this provision alone. END NOTE).


5. (C) Reminding the Ambassador that Khartoum
has thus far refused to disarm the janjaweed
armed militia, Dr. Harrir also emphasized that
the provision entrusting the Arab government to
"neutralize" the janjaweed is problematic to say
the least. By "asking for a job" as a Senior
Assistant to the President (essentially a VP in
all but name, as outlined by the proposed
agreement),the movements weakened their
negotiating position, Dr. Harrir added: the
ideal would have been to discuss fundamental
"principles" rather than a specific position.
They noted that the President still had the
authority to appoint Governors of the three
Darfur regions, and therefore a "Senior
Assistant" to the President would have no real
power. According to Dr. Harrir, Khalil recently
said the proposed agreement needed "major
overhauling" and would not sign it. He added
that Abdul Wahid was "scared now" and lacked
confidence in his ability to make good
decisions, and that Minawi is under pressure
from and having problems with his followers, who
are reminding him constantly that he will be
responsible for whatever he might decide to
sign. What is needed, they said, is for the AU
to program a new round of talks after the
movements have had an opportunity to hold a
Congress and pick new leadership.

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The AU's Misteps: The Doctor Has Become More
Important than the Patient
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6. (C) On the current situation in Darfur, Dr.
Harrir lamented the weak mandate held by the
AMIS force of approximately 7,000 men, which
does not provide for the protection of
civilians, and said the transition to a UN force
of 14,000 would be a very positive development.
Nevertheless, he said he was very disappointed
in the work of the AU and its chie mediator
Salim Ahmend Salim, who had unwisely wrked to
produce what was essentially an agreemen
between the AU and the GOS--one that had
negleted totake into account the key demands
of the movements. Evidence of the AU's
inexperience and lack of wisdom in the
negotiations was the fact that the 17 delegates
representing the three men were essentially
excluded from the talks but still allowed to
remain in Abuja, spending per diem and running
up hotel bills on the AU's tab; "Only in
Africa!" he exclaimed. The exclusion of their
faction and the misguided actions of mediators
such as the Nigerian president was a clear "case
of where the doctor has become more important
than the patient." Calling the movements and the
people of Darfur "guinea pigs" in an AU
experiment, Dr. Harrir underlined the need for
more direct involvement from the USG and other
members of the international community to ensure
an adequate level of competency in the ongoing
mediation. It is taken for granted that the AU
mediators have an adequate understanding of
human rights and democracy, said Dr. Harrir, but
largely undemocratic and have poor human rights
records.

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SLA: Deby's Ally in time of Need?
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7. (C) On the anti-Deby rebellion and the
upcoming elections in Chad, Dr. Harrir predicted
that the rebels would "try again." Although they
might not make it to N'Djamena, they would
attack other towns in Chad. Underlining the
differing agendas of the FUC and SCUD rebel
groups, he called their alliance temporary.
Nour's FUC is a "front for Arabs," he said, and
if the group were able to topple President
Idriss Deby Itno, it would show a completely
different face after the victory, one that
closely resembled the Khartoum regime. Dr.
Harrir said he was not aware of SLA efforts or
plans to fight alongside Chadian armed forces
against the Chadian rebels and did not think the
SLA fought alongside the Chadian armed forces in
Adre on April 13. However, he said the janjaweed
had attacked SLA positions in Darfur a week ago
and said it was possible that SLA forces might
be forced to fight Chadian rebels if similar
incidents occurred.


8. (C) Responding to the Ambassador, Shogar said
after meeting with and keeping in close contact
with the UNHCR, he did not think SLA forces were
recruiting combatants from refugee camps. If the
UNHCR confirmed that recruitment activities were
being conducted by the SLA in refugee camps, he
said he would visit the Adre area and that the SLM
was prepared to halt its activities if such
recruitment was occurring. Asked if they were
aware of Chadian recruitment in the refugee camps,
they responded that this was not happening as far
as they knew.


9. (C) Dr. Harrir mused that after 15 years, Deby
had finally "discovered that al-Bashir was a
dictator." Although the SLM had not met Deby in "a
while," the SLM now enjoyed much freer freedom of
movement in Chad, Dr. Harrir said, noting that even
members of JEM were now allowed to come to Chad
(whereas in the past they were sometimes
imprisoned).

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Signing Not the End of the Crisis
--------------


10. (C) Apologizing for his broken English,
Khamis Abdullah spoke only briefly through a
translator. He thanked the Ambassador and the
USG for being the first government to recognize
that genocide had been perpetrated in Darfur.
After assuring the Ambassador that the SLM's
interests were in Sudan, not in Chad, he
acknowledged the need to establish greater
cohesiveness within the SLM and committed
himself to seek unity, peace, and democracy. In
closing, the three men lamented that any signing
of the proposed peace agreement would not bring
an end to the crisis but said they were
committed to establishing peace in Darfur.
WALL