CHAD: DAS YAMAMOTO MEETING WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000599

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SU FR
SUBJECT: CHAD: DAS YAMAMOTO MEETING WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR

REF: NDJAMENA 586

Classified By: P/E HAYWOOD RANKIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: In meeting with French Ambassador Bercot
April 25, DAS Yamamoto explained that he had urged President
Deby to delay the May 3 election and begin a dialogue with
the opposition. Bercot regretted this approach. He put
little store in political dialogue. He preferred to ask Deby
to announce before May 3 the appointment of an opposition
government. Bercot was also cool to the Ambassador's
suggestion that the only way to sell such an idea to the
opposition would be to promise new presidential elections in
a year, if May 3 went forward. With French elections coming
up in 2007, Bercot pointed out, there was not much time left
in which France could be depended on to retain an interest in
the subject of Chad, which was a thorn in its side. End
Summary.


2. (U) Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald Yamamoto met
French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot at breakfast for two
hours April 25 at the Ambassador's Residence. Bercot was
accompanied by his deputy, Francois Barateau, the Ambassador
by DCM and poloff (notetaker).

U.S. Message to Deby
--------------

3. (C) DAS opened with a review of his meeting the previous
day with President Idriss Deby Itno. He had delivered a
message, first, requesting that Deby delay the May 3 election
and, second, urging Deby to commence a constructive dialogue
with the opposition with a view to creating democratic
institutions in Chad. He said that he hoped the French would
be able to give the same message. He had recently spoken
with head of the Africa Division at the Quai, Bruno Joubert,
who had agreed with this approach but at the same time said
that it might not be effective. He would be seeing Joubert
later in the week. Deby had refused on the first point, but
had made what appeared to be a commitment on the second
point, and DAS hoped that the United States and France could
work together to hold Deby to that commitment. When the May
3 election took place, as Deby appeared to insist, the United
States would have to say that that election was deeply flawed
and that we were disappointed that the Chadian people were
deprived of a fair election. We would also say that we
expected Deby to abide by his commitment to engage in a
constructive dialogue.

Bercot Recoils at Delay and Dialogue
--------------

4. (C) Bercot responded that it was too late to talk about
delaying an election that was due to take place in eight
days. He preferred to take a positive approach with Deby
rather than threaten him. As he had suggested to the
Ambassador the previous week (reftel) and as he had discussed
with Joubert, Bercot's preferred approach was to press Deby
to announce before May 3 an arrangement for sharing power
with the opposition -- an opposition prime minister who would
name his own cabinet and have full power to govern for a year
until proper elections could be organized for the National
Assembly. A call for political dialogue would lead nowhere
useful. It would be a waste of precious time. The offer of
genuine governing power to the opposition would immediately
test its seriousness of purpose and immediately get the
country on the road to serious reform, while political
dialogue would only ensure bickering. As for the May 3
election, it was not likely to be "less correct" than most
others in Africa.

Deby as Flawed but Necessary Geostrategic Partner
-------------- --

5. (C) Bercot regretted that the international community had
played into the hands of a weak, divided, and
ethnically-based opposition by appearing to support their
boycott and giving them the illusion that it would oust Deby.
In fact, Deby had proved a reliable geostrategic partner.
He had stood up to Libya and Sudan, welcomed the refugees,
supported the idea of a UN force in Darfur, and stuck with
Taiwan instead of opening his door to China. No doubt Deby
had considerably lost ground in recent months, with
desertions and a rebellion that had carried to the gates of

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Ndjamena. No doubt he had a terrible governance record and
his state of health suggested he would not last out his next
term. In fact, France had tried to get him to retire to
Europe in 2003. Unfortunately, the Darfur crisis had erupted
and changed France's calculations. It was essential that
Deby open the door to better governance and greater liberty
in Chad, but he was the least bad leader for Chad and the
only one on the scene who could possibly be strong enough to
face down Libya and Sudan.

France Reducing Presence
--------------

6. (C) Bercot said that, after the French troops stationed
in Chad had been augmented by 150 coming up from Gabon at the
time of the attack on Ndjamena, he had asked that those
troops be sent back. Now he had also recommended that the
remaining number of troops be cut in half. The French media
had been very critical of French involvement in Chad,
Chadians had been vitriolic, and it was necessary to stop
giving the impression that the French troops were present to
interfere in Chad's internal affairs. France's military
relationship with Chad was not of the same order as with
Senegal, Gabon, or Djibouti, but rather more like the
short-term presence of French troops in Kosovo, Afghanistan,
or Cote d'Ivoire. Handling security in Chad had become too
great a responsbility for France, which had no economic
interest in Chad, and if matters continued to deteriorate,
French troops would be withdrawn altogether. It was high
time for France to stop being the tool of the international
community in Chad. Chad was no longer a French problem.

Ideas to Get One Side or the Other to Agree
--------------

7. (C) The Ambassador said that Bercot's idea of
power-sharing was interesting, but it did not appear that
either Deby or the opposition would agree to it. In DAS's
discussion with opposition leaders the previous day, they had
insisted that delay of the election was a nonnegotiable
precondition. They had been willing to retain Deby as
transitional president and had no problem with his running in
a properly-organized election. Bercot painted a gloomy
picture of absence of reform during such transitional period,
looting by the opposition of the treasury now full of oil
money, and chaos that would present France with an
intolerable security challenge. The Ambassador asked why
not try both Bercot's idea of power-sharing and delaying the
election. Bercot said Deby would certainly not buy in --
there could only be power-sharing if Deby got his election.
The Ambassador suggested, then, that the only way to get the
opposition to agree to power-sharing, if the present election
were not delayed, would be to offer another presidential
election at the same time as the National Assembly election
-- i.e., Deby would be elected May 3 for only a year or two.
Bercot said that such a proposal would also retard reform, as
the opposition would all have their sights on running for
president (each of them thinking he could be president)
rather than on governing the country and instituting proper
reforms. The result would be further radicalization of the
opposition and further manipulation of the international
community.

Agree on the Deeper Issue
--------------

8. (C) DAS said that the United States, like France and all
external parties, was poised at a decision about how to help
Chad, whether to engage more decisively or engage less and
whether it was possible to coordinate effectively. The
European Union was sending a delegation in a few days, the
African Union had a delegation now in Ndamena. It was not
clear how forceful either would be, given internal divisions.
Whether France, the EU, and the AU were on board with the
U.S. in its call to Deby for delaying the May 3 election, it
was to be hoped that all could agree on the need for Deby to
create democratic institutions that would promote long-term
stability. Indeed, our call for delaying the elections was
meant more to underline the deeper need to create
institutions that would promote stability.


9. (C) The Ambassador observed that Deby would undoubtedly
hold up his May 3 election as proof he was democratically
elected. Bercot said that France would probably follow suit,

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commending the election publicly. DAS said that our message
to Deby had made clear that we would see the May 3 election
as flawed and would have to make a statement to that effect.
However, Deby had responded positively to our request for a
commitment to start working on democracy, and it was
essential that France be on the same message on that point.

Thorn in the Side
--------------

10. (C) Bercot agreed it was necessary to have the same
message otherwise Deby would play both sides against each
other. But we needed to decide whether we really wanted
reform or whether we preferred to attack Deby's legitimacy.
We could all just decide to leave Chad, why not? In any
case, Chad had become a serious thorn in France's side. In
Paris (read, Chirac),there would be continued interest in
Chad only through the end of the year, as there would be
French elections next year, and Chad would interest "no one"
in Paris in 2007. It was necessary to find a way to put Chad
on an even keel quickly. He had put forward his idea of
getting a new government in place that would test the
opposition's seriousness of purpose on democratic reform, and
he did not see any better ideas on the table.


11. (C) Bercot agreed that there was no doubt that Chad
would change, probably for the worse. The gate to chaos was
at hand and likely would open, yet with luck we might be able
to guide it through nonviolent change. One essential
element, in Bercot's view, was rapid installation of UN
forces in Darfur, without which there would be no hope for
stability in Chad. Deby had now overtly thrown his lot in
with the Darfur rebels who would be more openly using the
refugee camps for recruiting and using Chadian territory as a
rear base, spelling greater Sudanese urgency to retaliate and
heightening the immediate need for blue-hatting. Bercot
concluded that the days around the May 3 election would
likely be hot, as the Sudanese had provided the Chadian
rebels with 300 vehicles. No doubt, he said, "the worst is
in front of us."
WALL