Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA591
2006-04-23 17:34:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

DARFUR REBEL LEADER COMFORTABLY HOUSED IN CHAD

Tags:  PREL CD SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO1625
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0591/01 1131734
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231734Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3609
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0602
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1155
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1323
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2626
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1711
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1110
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0711
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0690
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000591 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL LEADER COMFORTABLY HOUSED IN CHAD

REF: NDJAMENA 300

NDJAMENA 00000591 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000591

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL LEADER COMFORTABLY HOUSED IN CHAD

REF: NDJAMENA 300

NDJAMENA 00000591 001.2 OF 003



1. (SBU) Summary: Darfur rebel leader Khalil Ibrahim
received the Ambassador April 22 at his temporary quarters in
Ndjamena (home belonging to President Deby's half-brother)
and expressed unhappiness at the negotiations in Abuja and,
in particular, the close relationship between the Americans
and rebel leader Minni Minawi. He dismissed reports of JEM's
involvement in supporting Chad in its fight with Chadian
rebels or in recruiting in the Sudanese refugee camps in
Chad. He said JEM would accept a UN force in Darfur once a
peace agreement was in place. He sought to dissociate
himself from impressions that he was close to Turabi. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Wall called on Khalil Ibrahim, leader of
the Justice and Equality Movement, April 22. He had moved
out of the Meridien Hotel into a large house (in the
up-scale, "Zaghawa" part of Ndjamena) owned by Timan Deby,
Sultan of the Bideiyat Zaghawa in Bahai and half-brother of
President Idriss Deby Itno. A large number of white-robed
men milled about in the courtyard, presumably Zaghawa
followers of Khalil or the Sultan or both. (Comment:
Khalil's presence in this comfortable house speaks volumes to
his metamorphosed relationship with Deby, as well as to the
apparently close relationship he enjoys with the larger
Bideiyat community. Khalil fled Sudan to Ndjamena in March
2001, only to be told to leave Chad in July 2001 in advance
of a state visit by Sudanese President Bashir in August 2001,
and Khalil was not allowed to return to Ndjamena until
January 2006. He has made up for lost time. End Comment.)


3. (SBU) The Ambassador asked when Khalil had left Abuja,
when he was going back, and how negotiations were going in
Abuja, considering that the peace agreement was to be
concluded by the end of April. Khalil said he had come to
Ndjamena only in recent days from Abuja and he might or might
not return to Abuja soon, depending on whether there were any
progress there. Since he had last seen the Ambassador in
February (reftel) he had traveled to Libya, Ethiopia, and

Congo-Brazzaville, but he had mostly been in Abuja. In fact,
he said, he did not perceive that there had been much
progress in the negotiations since he had last seen the
Ambassador. On several vital issues there had been no give
on the part of the Sudanese government (Darfur as one region,
Darfurian vice-president, Darfurian role in the Khartoum
regional government, adequate Darfurian participation in the
Cabinet, adequate compensation for the Darfurian people,
reconstruction of Darfur, increased revenues to regions,
paying Darfurian soldiers' salaries and logistics).


4. (SBU) Khalil said that fixing a date (end of April) and
trying to force an agreement would not bring peace. The list
constituted a bottom line not merely for JEM but for the
Darfurian people. If the agreement did not give the
Darfurians the minimum they required, they would turn on the
rebel movements and condemn them, asking, "You started a war
for this meager result?" Khalil said the fighting men in the
field would not accept such an agreement. The way the
negotiations were heading, he said, would give the Darfurians
no clout in Khartoum with which to enforce the terms of the
agreement. Look at the trouble the Southerners were having
enforcing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, even with a
First Vice President. Khalil commented that everyone was
overestimating Taha's role. He had seen Taha in Tripoli and
was surprised at how much lesser a man he was. "The Ali
Osman of today is not the same as the one of Naivasha. The
government in Khartoum then was more coherent, today it is
divided."


5. (SBU) Khalil complained that the United States was
putting too much reliance on SLM leader Minni Minawi. Minni
had previously been the most powerful rebel leader "in the
camps," but times were changing and he was no longer as
powerful. The Americans were wrong to concentrate on one
rebel leader, because a peace agreement with one rebel leader
would not produce actual peace on the ground. Meanwhile,

NDJAMENA 00000591 002.2 OF 003


Khalil claimed that rival SLM leader Abdel Wahid had no power
base remaining in Darfur and nowhere to go (no relations with
Eritrea, Libya, or Chad),so he was just hanging on uselessly
in Abuja.


6. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether the JEM were assisting
the Chadian forces in combatting Chadian rebels based in
Darfur. Khalil said that, no, JEM had not helped Chad in
fighting. However, if Deby now requested such help, JEM
would provide it. In fact, next time, the JEM would not wait
to help out. Any prospect of the fall of Deby's Chad to
Sudan and its allies would be disastrous for Darfur. Khalil
had seen Deby the day before to congratulate him on the
victory April 13 (when a rebel force made its way all the way
into Ndjamena). Khalil said that Sudan had underestimated
the capability of the Chadian armed forces. It had thought
it could use Mahamat Nour to do the "rough work" after which
Arab fighters would come in to clean up and take over. Sudan
had already set the janjaweed in motion to clear out
"Africans" from the Chadian border area and resettle there.
It had pulled together a force for this invasion of Ndjamena,
mainly from Chadians long settled in Sudan (including Masalit
and Tamas that had settled in the Gezira generations ago).
It now had a large force of Arabs at Wadi Saleh south of
Zalingei, ready to follow if Mahamat Nour could pave the way
into Chad. However, the failure at Ndjamena had set Sudan to
thinking again. Deby had not fled and his forces had not
folded. And the JEM would help as necessary.


7. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether JEM had been engaged
in recruiting soldiers from the refugee camps in Chad.
Khalil said JEM did not need to recruit, as it had soldiers
enough already. The Ambassador asked his version of events
when JEM entered the Sudanese embassy in Ndjamena two days
previously. Khalil said that the newspaper accounts,
suggesting a violent confrontation, were entirely wrong. JEM
had entered the compound peacefully and met the outgoing
Sudanese ambassador, talked to him in a normal manner, and
did no one any harm.


8. (SBU) The Ambassador asked Khalil's view on a UN force to
impose a peace in Darfur. Khalil said that JEM would accept
a UN force, but only if peace were first established.
Darfur, in fact, needed an international force, to protect
the IDPs and enforce the peace agreement. Most of the land
was still controlled by the janjaweed, especially in the
Masalit domain, and a UN force would be essential to getting
them their rights to land. However, so long as Sudan
continued to block a peace agreement, it would be a mistake
to bring in a UN force. (Note: Khalil's language was
markedly less violent against a UN force than it had been two
months ago -- but the bottom line remained the same. End
Note.)


9. (SBU) One of Khalil's aides strongly complained to the
Ambassador that the United States was not doing enough to put
pressure on Sudan, and he lamented that JEM did not have a
good enough relationship with the United States. Indeed, JEM
did not have enough friends. Chad was coming along, and
Libya was "reasonable," but JEM needed more. Khalil angled
for an invitation to the United States.


10. (SBU) Khalil regretted that the United States had got
the idea that he was close to Hasan al-Turabi. Once such
ideas took hold, they were difficult to uproot and he had
been slow to recognize the problem. In fact, once peace was
achieved, JEM's next battle would be with Turabi. People
from all the marginalized corners of Sudan would flock to the
JEM, and Turabi and the rest of the old dragons (Sadiq
al-Mahdi, Mirghani) would see JEM as a huge threat. In fact,
JEM would definitely rule Sudan. Sudan was not a majority
Arab country but a majority African country, and JEM would
meet the aspirations of the marginalized African majority.
Khalil said that his agenda was not religious. He sought a
liberal democracy that would deemphasize the army and
emphasize development. It would seek equal distribution of
resources as had been done in Cuba. Turabi's language was of

NDJAMENA 00000591 003.2 OF 003


religion and nationalism, a nationalism that had subjugated
the African majority.


11. (SBU) Khalil lamented that there was inadequate
international attention given to the Darfur crisis. The
international community had given much more support to
resolving the crisis of Southern Sudan, to include even a
meeting of the UNSC in Nairobi to ensure finalization of the
comprehensive peace agreement. The Ambassador said that in
its much shorter span, the Darfur crisis had engaged the
international community, and certainly the United States, as
intensely as the Southern crisis had. Poloff pointed out
that mediation of the Darfur crisis had engaged the Afican
Union (vice IGAD),and the main problem lay in the absence of
a figure comparable to John Garang on the rebel side. Khalil
made no riposte, but rather repeated his complaint that the
United States was putting too much emphasis on Minni Minawi.


12. (SBU) Comment: Khalil has the air of someone who has
been pushed aside in the negotiations and is debating how to
regroup. He may have damaged his relations with Libya over
the affair of the Sudanese embassy (now overseen by the
Libyans),but it does not appear that he has damaged the
rapidly improving relations with Deby. He has cottoned on to
the fact that being seen as being close to Turabi is not good
public relations. He is eager for closer contacts with the
United States, though he has not quite mastered the
vocabulary to please the American ear. He harbors what
appears to be a serious, if ridiculous, national ambition.
End Comment.
WALL