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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA579
2006-04-20 16:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: PRESIDENT DEBY THANKS U.S. FOR SUPPORT

Tags:   PREF  PREL  PGOV  EPET  ENRG  CD 
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VZCZCXYZ0018
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0579/01 1101612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 201612Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3584
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 1058
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0706
RUEHJB/AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY 0038
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0149
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1303
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 2606
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1691
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY 1090
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0693
						C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000579 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BUJUMBURA FOR DAS YAMAMOTO; PARIS AND LONDON FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS, TREASURY FOR OTA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2017
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV EPET ENRG CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: PRESIDENT DEBY THANKS U.S. FOR SUPPORT


Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASON 1.4 (B)



1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Ambassador Wall on April
20, President Deby thanked the United States for condemning
Sudan's role in the recent attacks on Chad. He shared
information on what he feared would be a new attack in the
East in the coming days, and stated that Sudan was also
arming Central African Republic rebels. He hoped for a
positive telephone conversation with World Bank President
Wolfowitz but said he preferred to be without oil than to
have Chad's money blocked. End Summary.



2. (C) President Deby called Ambassador Wall to a meeting on
Thursday, April 20, at the Presidential Palace. Also present
at the meeting were DCM (notetaker), Personal Secretary (and
First Lady) Hinda Itno, and a Chadian notetaker. President
Deby explained that he had hoped to see the Ambassador on
April 19, but had learned that the Ambassador was traveling
in the East to visit Sudanese refugee camps. He explained
that he wanted to tell the Ambassador that Sudan was
continuing to equip rebels, and that he had information that
Sudan was assisting forces from the Central African Republic
(CAR) to meet up with the Chadian rebels and Sudanese
mercenaries.



3. (C) President Deby explained that the CAR forces were
supporters of the former CAR President, and that their aim
was, after taking Chad, to take the CAR. President Deby
continued that they had information that some 30 vehicles
were preparing to enter Chad and were aiming to attack Adre
and Abeche. The GOC expected this assault to take place
sometime between today (April 20) and Sunday, April 23.



4. (C) The second motive for the meeting was to convey
President Deby's thanks to Ambassador Wall and to President
Bush for firmly condemning the Government of Sudan for its
role in the rebel attacks. The United States was, according
to the President, the only country that had done so, and he
was particularly touched by this. He reiterated again that
Chad owed sincere thanks to Ambassador Wall and to President
Bush.



5. (C) Turning to the issue of the impasse between the
Government of Chad (GOC) and the World Bank, President Deby
referred to the upcoming visit of Deputy Assistant Secretary
(DAS) Don Yamamoto and the U.S. request to delay the shutdown
of oil production. He noted that he had agreed to delay the
oil shut down until the end of the month. He hoped that
before that date agreement could be reached. President Deby
mentioned that he would be speaking with World Bank President
Wolfowitz at 10:30 a.m.



5. (C) Ambassador Wall explained that one reason for his
visit to the east of Chad had been to call attention to the
situation on the border in the company of a large group of

journalists (both Chadian and international press). He had
called on Sudan to stop the violence in the border area and
to support international efforts to defuse tensions.
Ambassador Wall noted that DAS Yamamoto's visit had been
scheduled for some time, and that he would be raising a
number of issues with the President. Ambassador Wall
explained that DAS Yamamoto would not be mediating but that
he did want to encourage efforts to reach agreement.



6. (C) President Deby stated that he was open for a
dialogue on all questions -- and especially for finding a way
out of the World Bank impasse. He explained that Chad had
waited four months for a solution. He had agreed to postpone
the shutdown as a result of the State Department letter, but
he earnestly hoped that a solution would be found. He
affirmed that he would prefer to be without oil than to have
Chad's money blocked. Continuing in this vein, he stated
that it was inadmissible for the World Bank to block Chad's
resources, given Chad's poverty. The money was needed in the
2006 budget. Ambassador Wall interjected that Chad could
stand to lose hundreds of millions in tax receipts next year
if it shut down production. President Deby dismissed this by
saying that he did not know anything about that. What he
knew was that right now they were supposed to be finishing
health clinics, opening schools and paying salaries, and this
wasn't possible because the funds were blocked.



7. (C) In conclusion, Ambassador Wall noted that the press
was likely to produce a number of stories relating to the
previous day's visit to eastern Chad, and he wanted to make
sure that President Deby knew what points Ambassador Wall had
made to the press. He passed President Deby the press points
which the Public Diplomacy section had prepared for the visit
from press guidance and statements by Department
representatives. President Deby expressed appreciation for
the points, and once again thanked the Ambassador and
President Bush for U.S. support.

Comment:



8. (C) President Deby's comments highlight his appreciation
for the strong U.S. statements on the border situation and
his worries about more attacks to come. We hope this meeting
helped dampen his expectations for U.S. involvement in
breaking the impasse with the World Bank over oil revenue
management, but we remain concerned that he still hopes for
more than we intend to try to deliver. Once the points
raised in the Department's guidance and the Ambassador's
remarks about the need for political dialogue have had time
to sink in, we look forward to pursuing them with him. We
await his reaction with great interest, but he has given
little indication in the past to suggest he would be open to
such an exchange. End comment.
WALL