CHAD: ANXIETIES OVER REFUGEE PROTECTION

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000577

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: ANXIETIES OVER REFUGEE PROTECTION



1. (SBU) Summary: UN Resrep agrees with the fears of the
Chadian government it will be unable adequately to protect
refugees and IDPs if, as he thinks likely, there are
increased attacks over the next month before the rainy
season. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Kingsley Amaning, Resident Coordinator of the
United Nations System in Chad, met the Ambassador April 18,
on his return from New York, where he had been during the
dramatic events of the previous week. He complained that he
had not sensed a level of urgency at UN headquarters that he
believed conditions in Chad merited.


3. (SBU) Amaning said that the ultimata handed out by the
Chadian government April 15 on oil and refugees were, he
believed, a reflection of desperation. Deby feared that his
shambolic forces would not be able to meet the external
military threat without rapid and expensive arms purchases
(even with the presence of the French military) -- which
meant immediate freeing up of oil revenues. By the same
token, he feared, all the more correctly, that his forces,
overextended on regime survival, would not be able to cope
with attacks on refugee camps and on Chadian tribes in the
East.


4. (SBU) Amaning said that Deby's decision to take on
Khartoum, Esso, the World Bank, and the United Nations all at
the same time -- while insisting on maintaining the election
on May 3 -- was "mind-boggling" and seemed self-defeating.
However, Amaning said that he shared the worry about the
capability of the Chadian armed forces to ensure survival of
the regime, not to mention protect the populace of the East.
If what had taken place last week -- the incursion into
Ndjamena -- were multiplied three-fold, as seemed likely from
reports from across the border, assistance from the French
would likely not be enough. The French had no coherent plan,
while the United Nations and the rest of the international
community had tagged along behind the French. The French
Ambassador was not happy with the situation. Frustrated with
the lack of strategy and pilloried on all sides, the French
Ambassador (a former military officer) had told Amaning that
he preferred the military career to diplomacy and was eager
for the end of his assignment on July 14.


5. (SBU) Amaning said that, while it was difficult to get a
handle on what was happening along the border east of Goz
Beida and Goz Amer, he was worried that more and more
janjaweed (note: Arabs from Darfur but typically originally
from Chad and still viewed as Chadians) were moving into the
zones vacated by the now thoroughly terrified local populace
(note: mainly Dadjo ethnicity). Attacks were bad enough, but
if these vacated areas were now being settled in the weeks
before the commencement of the rainy season, the difficulties
were multiplied. First, there was the diminishing prospect
that these Dadjo IDPs would return home. Second, there was
the prospect that the new settlers, in need of food to get
through the rainy season and in need of fuel and vehicles to
effect their continued attacks, would find the large depots
of food, fuel, vehicles, and communications equipment held by
the UN in the area irresistible. Finally, there was the
prospect that they would find attacks on the refugee camps,
as recruiting centers for the Darfur rebels, also
irresistible.


6. (SBU) Thus, Amaning reasoned, Deby had a basis for
sounding the alarm on the refugees. Very likely he would not
be able to protect the refugees or assure the return of the
IDPs, and the international community would indeed have to
take greater responsibility. Amaning said he particularly
wanted to see if the French would be willing to expand their
mandate in the East.
WALL