Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA57
2006-01-18 07:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

PROMOTING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN CHAD

Tags:  EFIN EPET KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL CD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNJ #0057/01 0180709
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180709Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2921
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0036
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1487
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000057 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, E, S/P, S/CRS, AF, EB, DRL, PRM, INR
TREASURY FOR OASIA
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AF
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2010
TAGS: EFIN EPET KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL CD
SUBJECT: PROMOTING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN CHAD

REF: A. 05 NDJAMENA 1761

B. 05 NDJAMENA 1615

C. 05 NDJAMENA 1134

Classified By: Ambassador Marc M. Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000057

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D, P, E, S/P, S/CRS, AF, EB, DRL, PRM, INR
TREASURY FOR OASIA
SECDEF FOR USDP/ISA/AF
NSC FOR SENIOR AFRICA DIRECTOR
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2010
TAGS: EFIN EPET KDEM PGOV PHUM PREL CD
SUBJECT: PROMOTING A PEACEFUL TRANSITION IN CHAD

REF: A. 05 NDJAMENA 1761

B. 05 NDJAMENA 1615

C. 05 NDJAMENA 1134

Classified By: Ambassador Marc M. Wall for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: As we define a strategy for advancing our
growing interests in Chad, it is important that we work to
convince President Deby to arrange for a peaceful handover of
power. Our interests would be damaged by the spread of
violent civil unrest, a prospect that is becoming dangerously
more likely as a result of his refusal so far to consider
such a transition. The way we best pursue our interests on
Darfur, counter-terrorism, refugees, and oil is not by
protecting Deby from the backlash against his bid for another
term in power, but by encouraging him to step aside. We urge
consideration of pro-active diplomatic efforts, including
high-level contacts, speeches, engagement with the French and
the Africans, and robust support for democratic
institution-building. We also hope the timing of the next
round of TSCTI training and the message in a possible SECDEF
visit will take into account concerns about appearing to
embrace Deby on the eve of elections that cap an electoral
process most Chadians see as brazenly manipulated. END
SUMMARY


2. (SBU) As Washington seeks to shape a strategy for
dealing with the increasingly precarious situation in Chad,
we would like to throw in our two cents worth. Ref A and
previous reporting provide full accounts of President Deby's
current mindset, his position within his family and clan, and
his dealings with Khartoum and the Darfur resistance groups.
Ref B presents a strategy for promoting democratic change.
Ref C looks in detail at scenarios for political change.
This assessment updates that reporting and offers further
analysis of the case for encouraging a peaceful transition.


--------------
Deby's Position Today
--------------


3. (SBU) Deby has entered the new year cornered, but still
standing and resolved to fight. The decisive actions by the
World Bank have checked for now his plans to use oil revenues
to buy weapons and votes in defense of his regime. Reports
of arms shopping expeditions in Eastern Europe and aircraft
arriving with crateloads of rifles nonetheless continue to
filter in. Tensions with Sudan are mounting. Both sides are
reinforcing troop positions on their border. Deby's Foreign
Minister has returned from an extended trip to Europe and the
United States aimed at drumming up support for Chad's
position against its neighbor. Deby received a lukewarm
response to his own salesmanship at the summit he hosted for
CEMAC leaders. Deby's support within his army appears secure
at this point. He has avoided so far a violent rupture
within his own clan and extended family, though key members
who could have helped manage a transition have left the
country. Daily life in the capital remains as dysfunctional
as ever. N'Djamena's always fatalistic residents grumble
about salary arrears and the state of political paralysis,
but for the most part are not taking to the streets in
protest.

--------------
Scenarios for Change
--------------


4. (C) The uneasy calm that prevails now could continue for
months or even years to come. Deby may succeed once again in
fighting his way out of the fix he finds himself in. He
would have to keep his army together, avoid a violent family
feud, reach out to other groups, mobilize international
support, fend off rebels, keep Khartoum at bay, and stay
healthy. But most observers here are convinced that sooner
rather than later this "more of the same" scenario will give
way to a "violent change" scenario. One possibility for
Deby's demise is by a palace coup led by insiders in his
family or his army. Another is a victory by an armed rebel
group, possibly backed by Sudan's military. Still another is
his death caused by the combination of a bad liver, war
wounds, and reckless lifestyle catching up with him. However
Deby goes, the aftermath would be ugly. If the National
Assembly President were ever able to take over, as is
stipulated in the constitution, his tenure would be
short-lived. Civil war would erupt as warring factions vied
for power, as has been Chad's experience in every other
presidential succession.


5. (C) A better, if now far from likely, course of events
would be a "peaceful transition" scenario (see ref C). This
would involve Deby taking the lead in putting in place a
credible transition plan. He would announce before the
ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation party congress in
March that he does not intend to seek another term in power.
He would work to find a candidate acceptable to his family,
the army, the ruling party, and the opposition groups.
Alternatively, he could agree to step down at the end of his
term and cede power to an interim council drawn from the key
ethnic groups, the security forces, and opposition groups.
This council would be charged with preparing the way for
internationally supported elections to be held within a year
or two. It would be led by a figure-head president with
national stature who would agree not to run in the elections.
Former President Goukouni, now in exile in Algiers, has been
mentioned as a possible candidate. Although his opponents
would have a hard time accepting it, even Deby might be able
to play this role, if this was necessary as part of a package
giving him a face-saving way of leaving power.

--------------
Our Interests
--------------


6. (SBU) The United States has important and growing
interests in Chad. Deby's regime works closely with us on
counter-terrorism and is set to receive substantial
assistance under the Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism
Initiative. It encourages religious tolerance and moderate
Islamic practices. It has played until now a generally
constructive role in pursuing peace in Darfur. It has
welcomed over two hundred thousand Sudanese refugees, backed
over the last two years by USD 130 million in U.S.
humanitarian assistance. It hosts a USD 4 billion oil
investment led by Exxon Mobil. It put in place, with our
support, a path-breaking plan for managing oil revenues
transparently and using them to reduce poverty. It has
largely tolerated opposition parties and an outspoken
independent press.


7. (C) The "violent change" scenario would hurt our efforts
to work with Chad in pursuing these interests. Civil unrest
would make Chad more vulnerable to terrorists and religious
extremists, complicate the Darfur peace efforts, disrupt
refugee relief, hinder oil production operations and
exploration plans, further undermine transparent management
of oil revenues, and force Deby or whatever warlord emerged
after him to crack down on dissent. Deby's internal security
problems are already starting to damage our interests. He
appears to be funneling money and perhaps weapons to Darfur
rebel groups drawn from his fellow Zaghawa clan in a bid for
support in his increasingly dangerous rift with Khartoum.
Desperate for funds to pay for arms and even mercenaries, he
has defied his commitments to the World Bank by pushing
through changes in the oil revenue law that effectively gut
the scheme. His oil minister has privately threatened to
shut down oil production in retaliation for the remedies
imposed by the World Bank.


8. (C) If there was a reasonable chance that the "more of
the same" scenario could pan out for long, our safest bet
perhaps would be, like the French, to side with Deby. But no
one here, not even the French, believes that Deby can look
forward to staying in power much longer. The harder he
fights to hang on, the more visible he becomes as a target
for his many enemies and the more disruptive will be his
inevitable fall. There are many reasons for the security
problems Deby is facing, but the root cause is his refusal to
put in place -- or at least acquiesce to -- a transition
mechanism broadly accepted as legitimate. The fraudulent
referendum overturning presidential term limits last June
destroyed any remaining hopes that he would step down. The
tensions this has provoked is why he needs so desperately to
obtain arms to defend himself, why he was driven to get his
hands on oil revenues in defiance of his commitments to the
World Bank, why he is arming Zaghawa-based rebel groups in
Darfur, and why he is now so vulnerable to pressures from
Khartoum aimed at exploiting his internal weaknesses. Deby
is responsible for destabilizing Chad with possible
repercussions for Darfur in his determination to be
president-for-life.


9. (C) We are convinced that our interests lie in doing
what we can to help realize the "peaceful transition"
scenario. While in a country such as Chad that has never
experienced a peaceful transition, the odds of succeeding are
not good. The French are wrong, however, in concluding that
we should therefore try to prop up Deby's regime. That
alternative only prolongs the agony. And the consequences
that would follow its collapse are more likely to be even
worse for Chad's internal stability and thus for our own
interest in working with Chad on Darfur, refugees,
counter-terrorism, oil, and democratic change.


--------------
Shaping the Future
--------------


10. (C) Promoting the "peaceful transition" scenario will
require pro-active diplomatic engagement. Ref B and C
describe our ideas in more detail. In outline, among steps
we should consider taking are:

-- bolstering our programs aimed at strengthening Chad's
democratic institutions and supporting military reform;

-- articulating more explicitly in speeches and in other
statements our policy on Africa's "big men" who seek to
perpetuate their hold on power, i.e., our non-support for
Deby's bid for a third term;

-- increasing high-level contacts, possibly including a
presidential letter, visits by senior officials, and under
certain circumstances the offer of a White House visit;

-- approaching the French, likely including President
Chirac, as well as other African leaders;

-- crafting a message that acknowledges Deby's
accomplishments, but also underlines our hopes for his
leadership in working toward a peaceful transition and our
commitment to supporting such efforts.


11. (C) Such a strategy also requires attention to avoiding
measures that might make us complicit in propping up his
regime. The World Bank's decisive actions have denied Deby a
free hand at using oil revenues to buy weapons and
mercenaries. It will be important not to let Deby use our
interest in cooperation on counter-terrorism in the TSCTI
framework to protect him against his domestic enemies. We
will need to look carefully at the timing of the next round
of TSCTI training, now due to start in April, to avoid
appearing to embrace Deby on the eve of fraudulent
presidential elections expected to be held later in the
spring. Similarly we would urge using Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld's proposed visit in March to deliver a clear message
in his private meetings and public statements on the role of
the military in a democracy and the need for a peaceful
transition.


12. (C) Success of this strategy will require buy-in from
the French, who so far have not been willing to consider such
a plan. Any further escalation of tensions on the border
with Sudan will stymie progress. We should not overlook
Deby's vulnerability to international prosecution once he
steps down, an issue that no doubt haunts him. Thus we
should not hold out false hopes that Deby will be receptive
to our overtures. We will need to maintain cooperative
relations with his regime, even as he fights to hold on to
power. We nevertheless need to establish benchmarks with him
and the Chadian people where we stand. There is a
possibility he may be more open to considering other career
options after his inauguration for a third term in August,
assuming he makes it that long. We should then be looking
for opportunities to encourage him to support efforts toward
a peaceful transition later in the year.
WALL