DASH ACROSS CHAD: FRENCH VERSION

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000545

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MOPS PGOV PREL SU FR CD
SUBJECT: DASH ACROSS CHAD: FRENCH VERSION



1. (SBU) Summary: The French, according to Ambassador
Bercot and his Defense Attache, only became aware two days
before the fight in Ndjamena on April 13 that the rebel force
was aiming at the relatively undefended city. The city and
government were saved, they say, because the rebels stalled
their advance just long enough for Chadian reinforcements to
arrive in Ndjamena. A key element was the discovery that the
Chadian army chief of staff was the mastermind. The rebels
were, they claim, largely Sudanese of Tama and Arab
extraction. End Summary.


2. (SBU) French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot gave a
briefing April 14 to the American, Russian, Egyptian, and
Algerian Ambassadors, and German Charge. He said that it was
inconceivable that a group of rebels could penetrate Chad
from Central African Republic in the remote southeastern
corner of Chad, sprint across 800 kilometers of rough tracks
in a few days, and threaten chaos in Ndjamena itself. He
turned to his Defense Attache, Col. Jean-Mark Marril to give
a day-by-day account.


3. (SBU) Col. Marril said that it had been known for some
days that rebels associated with Mahamat Nour's RDL had
infiltrated the Salamat region (far southeast Chad) around
Haraze Mangueigne, in the wake of the fighting at Modohina
(eastern border) at the end of March. The objective of this
infiltration into Salamat seemed to be directed toward
eastern Chad, where the Chadian armed forces were mainly
located, and the real intention -- of striking Ndjamena
itself -- was masked by the rebel attack on the refugee camp
at Goz Amir, after which an attack on the chief town of the
Dar Sila, Goz Beida, with its reinforced presence of Chadian
armed forces, was expected next. It was only on April 11,
when the rebel group arrived in Mongo in the center of Chad,
that the size of the force and its intention of moving on
Ndjamena were appreciated -- by both the Chadian government
and the French. Sixty-five rebel vehicles were counted in
Mongo, which had been nearly abandoned by the Chadian armed
forces, as had been all the roads and villages between Mongo
and Ndjamena. At that point, Ndjamena itself was very weakly
defended, as the Chadian armed forces had moved almost
entirely to the East and to a lesser extent to the Southeast,
around Am Timan, where they were vainly hunting down a rebel
force that had already moved on. On realizing the gravity of
the situation April 11, President Deby ordered the troops in
the Am Timan area and some of the troops in the East to
proceed immediately to Ndjamena.


4. (SBU) According to Col. Marril, if the rebel force had
maintained its momentum the story would have ended
differently. From Mongo to Ngama, the rebels continued at
high speed, but from Ngama westward on April 12 they slowed
down and lost precious hours. Chad's sole helicopter was an
important factor in this slow-down, as it began hitting the
convoy at Bili. At Massenya, the rebels took time to decide
what to do, dividing themselves into two groups, the smaller
one proceeding on a more northerly path. The Chadian armed
forces, reinforced by elements (25 vehicles) that rushed up
from Am Timan, were able late on April 12 to engage the
principal rebel column that arrived at Dourbali (100
kilometers from Ndjamena),in an action that was crucial and
inflicted heavy losses. At that point the rebels became
dispersed into small groups of two to three Toyotas, which
nonetheless maintained their movement toward Ndjamena through
the night of April 12-13. The Chadian armed forces attacked
these groups in the northeastern and eastern approaches and
suburbs of Ndjamena from daybreak on April 13, easily
destroying them. Rebel fighters abandoned their vehicles and
uniforms and tried to escape into the populace as civilians.
Most of the prisoners and wounded were Tama and Arabs from
Sudan who had been recruited and trained in Darfur. Of the
original 65 vehicles, seventeen were recovered and displayed
and approximately thirty were destroyed; the remainder were
used by rebels to flee or were stolen by the local populace.
The vehicles, Bercot added wryly, had no license plates.


5. (SBU) Bercot, taking the floor, said that an important
factor was the discovery on April 12 that the chief of
military staff, Ahmat Fadoule Makay, had been coordinating
the movement of the rebels toward Ndjamena and preparing the
scene for their welcome into the city. Bercot described
Makay as a "brilliant Tama," i.e., the same ethnicity as
Mahamat Nour, leader of the RDL. (Note: This conflicts with
our previous information that Makay was a Chadian Arab, but
we defer to the French. End Note.) Bercot said that it had
been a source of extreme perplexity to him that these rebels
could have come from so far, presumably come together from
different routes, evaded any Chadian armed obstacles along
the way, and suddenly manifested themselves as a significant
fighting force in Mongo. The secret lay in the very heart of
the Etat Major.


6. (SBU) From the moment of the discovery of Makay's role,
Bercot said, the French henceforward dealt directly and only
with President Deby himself. In the course of Bercot's
meeting with Deby during the night April 12-13, Deby outlined
the battle plan for engaging the remaining rebel elements on
the morning of April 13 and by 5:00 a.m. the plan was fully
in place. Deby assured Bercot that he would be able to
confine the battle in the eastern portion of the city, thus
sparing the better-off western parts of the city where the
foreigners lived and worked, and the battle took place almost
as Deby laid out. An hour and a half after the battle got
under way, the RDL attempted a strong attack in the East, on
Adre.


7. (SBU) Bercot said that "80 percent" (note: a favorite
number, for him) of the rebels captured were Tama and Arabs
from Darfur. They had been given very little training.
Every vehicle had been crammed with 15-20 of these recruits.
He had reasons to believe that Southern rebels were
implicated, in helping them get across the country.
Meanwhile, Bercot could not resist his customary dig at the
political opposition, who he said were "all for" the rebels,
even at the risk of the chaos they would have brought to
Ndjamena.


8. (SBU) Bercot said that, despite the heavy criticism in
Chad of the French role and, more significantly, the strong
criticism in the French media, France had not been involved
in any combat whatever. Its sole mission was to ensure the
safety of the French and international communities in the
country. France had provided logistical and transport
assistance to ensure the defense of Ndjamena. On one
occasion, a Mirage had fired a warning shot at the column
advancing from Ngama. France had also provided logistical
and transport support in the battle at Adre, including
transporting wounded to Farchana, and it had provided
logistical and transport help in reinforcing the garrison at
Sarh. Bercot warned that the larger conflict was far from
over. Major attacks were taking place in the East and more
were expected, and there were outbreaks in the South.


9. (SBU) Bercot said that the battle in Ndjamena put Deby in
the quandary of having to keep troops in the West that were
direly needed for the East, at a time when it was clearer
than ever that trouble could also come from the direction of
the Central African Republic. (Bercot, for his part, never
discounted the prospect of trouble from Libya, too.) It
became all the more imperative for the international
community to secure Darfur, otherwise it was going to become
ever more difficult to guarantee the safety of the Darfur
refugees. There was the prospect of massacres in the refugee
camps, as the attack on the Goz Amir camp on April 10 could
be a prelude of worse to come. Deby could not permanently
assure the security of the camps. It was wrong to see the
French forces in Abeche as being there to protect the camps.
These forces had no mandate as a peace force but were there
purely as part of a bilateral Chad-France agreement, under
which France undertook to prevent any external attempt to
take power by force in Chad.


10. (SBU) Comment: The story the French tell presents a
gripping account of the events over the last week. The spin
they put on it reveals their concern to counter perceptions
here of their involvement in stopping the advance of the
rebel force. They neither intervened directly in the fight
nor had they any other mission than assuring the safety of
the French and international community, they are at pains to
stress. They have an uphill battle convincing many Chadians
of this version of the events.
WALL