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Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA517
2006-04-08 09:08:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD/SUDAN: DADJO BITTERNESS

Tags:   PGOV  PHUM  PREF  ASEC  CD  SU 
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VZCZCXRO8106
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0517/01 0980908
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 080908Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3501
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0585
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1136
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1260
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2564
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1648
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1044
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0668
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0670
						UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000517 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD/SUDAN: DADJO BITTERNESS

REF: NDJAMENA 492

NDJAMENA 00000517 001.4 OF 003




1. (SBU) Summary: The Dadjo, probably the most populous
tribe in Eastern Chad, have taken the brunt of Arab
cross-border attacks and are, according to one of their
leaders, angry toward Arabs on both sides of the border and
also at the regime for leaving them unprotected. They could
align with rebel leader Mahamat Nour, but only in the
(unlikely) event he forswore the Arabs. Meanwhile, Nour
remains planted on a sliver of Chadian (Dadjo) territory,
after his victory March 30, while the Chadian armed forces
are regrouping 30 miles away in Ade. Dadjo leaders are
concerned that their people will not be able to return to
their lands to plant before rains begin in May. End Summary.



2. (SBU) DCM and poloff on April 4 met Yacine Bakhit
Abdelkadir, nephew of the Sultan of the Dadjo in Goz Beida,
leader of a small political party aligned with the ruling
party, former Minister of Interior under Habre, and former
special advisor to Deby. He said he was in daily telephonic
contact with his brother, district chief in the Ade-Koloy
border area, and his relatives in Goz Beida.



3. (SBU) Yacine confirmed that the Chadian armed forces, as
widely believed, suffered a defeat at the hands of Mahamat
Nour's rebel group on March 30. As indicated reftel, Mahamat
Nour's RDL began occupying the now largely abandoned village
of Modohyna (aka Modoyna, Madeina) four days before the
battle, and moved westward across the trapezoid-shaped
Chadian territory across the Wadi Kadja, occupying other
largely abandoned villages. The RDL was equipped with 52
all-terrain vehicles, and had 1000 men. Mahamat Nour's force
had moved into the area from Habilah, in Sudanese territory
20 miles east of Modohyna. The fighting on March 30 took
place at or in the approaches to Modohyna. The region is
relatively forested, and the rebels used forest cover to
effect their ambush. The Chadian force lost more than 300
killed, including Deby's nephews General Abakar Youssouf Itno
and Colonel Bahar Sinine. The survivors fled in disarray
back to the subprefectural center, Ade, 30 miles to the west.
The Chadian armed forces are reinforcing themselves there,
with the arrival of 200 all-terrain vehicles. Yacine's
informants anticipate a repeat attack.



4. (SBU) Yacine said that the Dadjo had traditionally good
relations with the Tama, the ethnic group (centered north of
Adre) to which Mahamat Nour and most of his rebel group
belong. There were some Dadjo in the RDL. The problem for
the Dadjo was that Mahamat Nour had brought Arabs into his
group and had aligned himself with the "janjaweed." Dadjos
in the area had observed that mounted Arabs had followed the

Toyota-wheeled RDL into Modohyna. Mounted Arabs had
depopulated the trans-Kadja zone in January and February, and
the janjaweed accompanying the RDL in its occupation of the
zone beginning March 26 stripped whatever was left of food
stores in the area. Yacine believed that Sudan had promoted
this alignment of the Arabs with Mahamat Nour, wanting to put
itself in a position to claim to the international community
that the janjaweed came from Chad and were now at least
partially based in Chad.



5. (SBU) In fact, Yacine said, there was a Chadian dimension
to the janjaweed, both in the historical sense of Chadian
Arabs who had displaced themselves in recent decades to
Darfur, where it was greener and had been less violent than
Chad, and in the sense of Arabs living still in Chad who had
recently joined or cooperated with the Arabs in Darfur.
There were, moreover, senior Arab figures in Ndjamena --
including several government ministers (Defense, Economy,
Livestock) -- who Yacine identified as the Chadian Arabic
"political leadership." The Dadjo had been particularly
outraged in the wake of a large janjaweed attack on Modohyna
in February, when the Chadian armed forces had staged their
only reprisals and captured twelve janjaweed, among whom were
four Arabs from the Nuwayba Jamul, a Chadian Arab nomadic
group who had traditionally grazed in the trans-Kadja. The
Dadjo were angry that these Chadian Arabs, who had lived

NDJAMENA 00000517 002.4 OF 003


among the Dadjo and migrated through the trans-Kadja for
years, had now proved to be among their attackers. (ICRC
recently confirmed that these "Chadian janjaweed" remained
under "house arrest.") Yacine also cited the names of five
Chadians who had fled to Darfur in the past year or two,
joined the janjaweed, and now had been aligned to the RDL (by
Sudan).



6. (SBU) Yacine said that the predominant Arab tribe in
eastern Chad was the Mahariyya, traditionally centered in
Arada and Abu Gudam, near Am-Dam, but with a large presence
also in Darfur. A week previously, the shaykhs in Abu Gudam
had proposed a meeting after the May 3 presidential election
with the Sultan of the Dadjo in Goz Beida, to offer their
apologies for the Arab attacks on the Dadjo. Yacine said
that so far, the Dadjo notables were inclined to refuse to
meet the Arab shaykhs. In recent years the Arabs had been
progressively encroaching on their farmlands, with population
increase and the drying up of the northern areas which were
the Arabs' home base. Now had come the attacks of January
and February, with proven Chadian participation. The
Mahariyya had traditionally moved through the Dadjo terrain
during the dry season October to May. Henceforward, the
Arabs would not be welcome to return; if they did, they would
be killed. Yacine predicted a civil war between the Dadjo
and the Arabs.



7. (SBU) Yacine said that the Dadjo were now active
purchasing arms and ammunition and had formed a militia with
500 men, including 180 soldiers from the Chadian armed
forces. The Minister of Interior (Territorial
Administration) had condemned these militias as outlaws and
rebels. For purchase of arms, the Dadjo had been asked to
make payments (women 5000 Sudanese dinars, men 10,000,
merchants 50,000 - Sudanese dinars being the currency in use
on both sides of the border, though not in Goz Beida itself).
This militia had been present in the trans-Kadja when the
RDL began moving into the area March 26. However, it did not
confront the RDL, but rather evacuated to Koloy on the other
side of the Kadja. The point of this militia was to defend
villagers against Arabs.



8. (SBU) Yacine said tht the Dadjo would sound out Mahamat
Nour on his ntentions. The Dadjo wanted good relations with
Mahamat Nour and might even align with him, but onl on
condition that he clearly cut all relations ith Arabs. It
was not clear to what extent Mahaat Nour was able to act
independently from the gvernment of Sudan, which appeared to
be forcing te RDL-Arab alignment. The Dadjo were bitter
against Sudan. Increasingly, they were also bitter against
the Chadian government. They now saw that they would get no
help from the Chadian government. They had repeatedly
requested help from the government to protect them from
janjaweed depredations, but there had been very little
response, except the one pursuit of the janjaweed by the
armed forces in February. The government had concentrated on
protecting the area to the north, especially the Zaghawa
area. There had been no janjaweed attacks on anyone but the
Dadjo (and Masalit), who had caused no problems to anyone and
were the most numerous ethnic group in eastern Chad (also
with a large presence in Darfur). Yacine said that he would
be traveling to the Dar Sila (the region based in Goz Beida,
with 70 percent Dadjo population) in three days with a Dadjo
delegation; although he headed a political party that was
formally allied with the MPS, he would not help the regime to
turn out the vote for Deby, nor did he expect the Dadjo would
vote for him.



9. (SBU) Yacine said he did not have exact figures on
numbers of IDPs, but he thought that the ICRC probably had as
accurate figures as existed. He said (as indicated by the
ICRC) that there had been an up-and-down trend of IDPs moving
from the border to the greater safety of Goz Beida. Some of
these IDPs were slipping into refugee camps. The fighting on
March 30 did not appear to have spurred a great jump in the
trend of movement to Goz Beida, but he would soon get more
specific information. Further fighting could change the

NDJAMENA 00000517 003.4 OF 003


picture considerably. Yacine was worried about the IDPs,
because the rains would start as early as May and people
needed to get back to their farms for planting. Even if they
were able to get back to their farms, they would have
difficulty feeding themselves until the harvest in October,
because the janjaweed had destroyed their food stocks and
livestock.



10. (SBU) Asked whether there was a Libyan role in
instability along the border, Yacine said that he was
informed that a delegation of Chadian Arabs had recently gone
to Tripoli seeking Qadhafi's assistance. There was concern
among the Dadjo that Qadhafi's promise to pay for a 3000-man
force to patrol the border was a ploy to ensure Arab
domination over the area.
WALL