CHAD: DEBY ON DARFUR, DEMOCRACY, AND OIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NDJAMENA 000482

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: DEBY ON DARFUR, DEMOCRACY, AND OIL


NDJAMENA 00000482 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: P/E OFFICER HAYWOOD RANKIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B,D).


1. (C) Summary: President Deby, in a meeting with Ambassador
Wall March 30, said that Islamic fundamentalism and the
deteriorating situation in Darfur threatened the stability of
the entire Sahel region, and he asked for more forceful
action from the international community. He reacted equably
to the Ambassador's expression of regret that the upcoming
election, in the absence of electoral reforms long
recommended by UNDP, would not receive American assistance.
He dodged the Ambassador's question of whether he
contemplated a democratic transition in the future. Noting
nostalgically the closer bilateral relations that had existed
in the 1980's, Deby renewed his wish for a visit to
Washington. He regretted that the World Bank had singled out
Chad for strongarming, insisted he would not budge on issues
of principle or sovereignty, but said he was willing to
negotiate the management of oil revenues on the basis of
partnership. He claimed that instability in the Central
African Republic had the potential for spilling over into
Chad and harming the oil facilities in Chad's deep South.
End Summary.


2. (U) President Idriss Deby Itno received Ambassador Wall
for the first time in several months March 30, for an hour's
meeting at his residence adjacent to the presidential office
complex by the Chari River. Deby was cordial and relaxed
throughout the meeting, sometimes light-hearted, always
focused and, to superficial appearance, in good health. He
was accompanied by his acting cabinet director, Mahamat Saleh
Adoum, and a notetaker. Ambassador Wall was accompanied by
DCM and notetaker.

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Opening Remarks
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador opened by congratulating Deby on his
recent marriage (note: his sixth) and on the success of the
military actions March 20 against rebels in eastern Chad. He
noted that the American people had gotten to know Deby a
little better now, as he had appeared on American television
in an NBC interview. He noted the importance of the recent
exchange of letters between Deby and President Bush on
Darfur. He handed Deby a six-page summary of American
assistance to Chad, covering military, security, commercial,
humanitarian, economic, legal, civic, political, and
intellectual cooperation and exchange programs.

--------------
Peace Corps in Chad
--------------


4. (U) The Ambassador said that one particularly important
area of cooperation was the work of the Peace Corps in Chad.
There were now 29 Peace Corps Volunteers across the breadth
of Chad, most of them living in isolated villages, for whom
satellite telephones were a vital need. A recent decree
appeared to direct that all satellite telephones in Chad be
surrendered. The impact on the Peace Corps would be severe.
Deby responded that the decree was not meant to affect the
operations of organizations such as the Peace Corps. The day
before, he said, he had instructed the Prime Minister to
clarify the misunderstanding and ensure that no humanitarian
or nongovernmental organizations (including those working
with refugees) be affected by this decree. Deby said that
ninety percent of the satellite telephones being used in Chad
had come from Sudan. There were many Sudanese agents, in the
refugee camps and elsewhere, that were using these telephones
as instruments of destabilization along the border. The
decree was intended to deal with that problem, not affect the
work of organizations such as the Peace Corps.

--------------
An Exchange on Issues:
--------------

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5. (C) The Ambassador sought Deby's perspective on three
important questions: 1) the management of oil revenues in
connection with the World Bank; 2) the situation on Chad's
border with Sudan, especially after the military action of
March 20; and 3) the May 3 presidential election, his
priorities for a third term, and his plan for eventual
transition.

--------------
...Oil Revenue Management,...
--------------


6. (C) Deby said that, on management of oil revenues, he
wanted complete transparency. He supported the work of the
supervisory body ("College"). He claimed he had only sought
to make one change in the operative law, necessitated by the
mounting precariousness of Chad's economic and security
situation, particularly the military threat in the East and
deepening salary arrears. He had had no intention of
reducing the transparency in the management of the oil
revenues. All the supervisory mechanisms that had been put
in place would continue, while the existing priority sectors
would be increased, to include assisting the judiciary and
civil security forces and the reorganization of the armed
forces. The World Bank had not properly understood the
limited scope of the modification of the law, which was a
sovereign act by the National Assembly. Chad had had good
relations with the World Bank for 40 years. The World Bank
needed to adapt to African reality, see the needs of the
people of Africa and not make decisions in the isolation of
Washington. Deby said he was not against the World Bank, he
wanted to continue discussions, but such discussion had to be
on the basis of equal partners looking at Chad's real needs.
Concerning the fund for future generations, Deby postulated
that it might be reinstated after a number of years --
depending on the circumstances.

--------------
...Darfur,...
--------------


7. (C) On Darfur, Deby said that worsening instability there
would soon destabilize the entire region. The international
community would find that it would have to spend many more
billions of dollars if Darfur were not soon brought under
control. Chad, in particular, was under great stress because
of Darfur. It now had to cope with 300,000 refugees, if
southern Chad were included. Sudan was pouring in arms to
Chadian rebel groups, and Sudanese-backed militias were
violating Chad's border on a daily basis. The AU had failed
in its mission to bring peace to Darfur. The international
community, especially the United States, had to act now,
forcefully, and impose peace on Darfur, or else there would
be no solution. He beseeched the United States to hear his
cri de coeur. He feared for Chad and for the whole region.

--------------
...Elections,...
--------------


8. (C) As for the coming presidential election in Chad, Deby
regretted the lack of support from the international
community. The situation in Chad was normal, or better than
normal, compared to much of Africa. While he deplored the
fact that Chad's political class refused to participate,
boycotts of elections were common in Africa, as opposition
parties often preferred boycotting to participation. This
election would go forward, and nothing would disturb it. He
would not accept a legal void. The opposition in Chad had
its armed branch in the East, which was inadmissible. The
opposition could choose to boycott, and such was its
democratic right. What did he foresee for the future? He
referred to the Millennium Development Goals in explaining
his objectives for Chad, to include education, agriculture,
infrastructure, communications, and transport.

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--------------
...and Threat of Islamic Fundamentalism
--------------


9. (C) But he said that the future was clouded, particularly
by the specter of Islamic fundamentalism. Chad was caught
between the Muslim world and Africa. Darfur was a festering
base from which fundamentalism was being spawned. Chadians
had turned up at Guantanamo Bay, some had died in Iraq,
arrests of Chadian fundamentalists had been made in Chad.
Young Chadians, some with Arab/Saudi lineage, were being
proselytized and taken to Saudi Arabia for brainwashing.
Saudi nongovernmental organizations, financed by Usama bin
Ladin, were springing up across the Sahel. Northern Nigeria
was a source of fundamentalist teams sent into the Sahel.
Deby said he had just sent an emissary to the president of
Cameroon to warn of the threat. It was essential that
anti-terror cooperation with the United States be deepened.
One unit had been formed already and provided with vehicles,
another was being formed, and more needed to be done.

--------------
An Official Visit?
--------------


10. (C) Deby said that he recalled the close relationship
that had existed between the United States and Chad in the
1980's. In those days, the two countries had worked as one
team to promote the greater security of the region. Now a
new threat was emerging in the form of Islamic
fundamentalism, which required coordinated combat, with the
United States at the head. Chad was the central point around
which many vital interests in the region revolved. It was
essential to take hold of Darfur and to block Sudanese and
rebel inroads in the East. Meanwhile, instability was
mounting in the Central African Republic, which could soon be
a direct threat to the oil installations. Deby said, in
connection with this urgent need to consolidate bilateral
cooperation, he had often expressed his wish to go to the
United States. He had not yet made an official visit. He
hoped one day that it would occur.

--------------
Ambassador Responds
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador thanked Deby for sharing his
perspectives on these subjects. Chad was indeed at the
center of several issues directly touching American
interests, including coping with terrorism, oil production,
management of oil revenues, economic development, promoting
good governance, and developing democracy, in Chad and the
entire region. In regard to relations with the World Bank,
the Ambassador was happy to note the President's desire to
pursue dialogue.


12. (C) Deby said that he was angered that he had been
forced into an unequal combat with the World Bank, which had
acted toward Chad in the manner of a hammer to hit a fly.
The World Bank had other more important business to take care
of, rather than to strongarm Chad. The World Bank's actions
were regrettable and unjust. However, the World Bank was a
long-time partner, and Chad hoped to negotiate an entente
with the World Bank team present in Chad. The Ambassador
said he hoped that the parties could come to an agreement
that responded to Chad's needs and conformed to the
engagements undertaken by the World Bank and Chad concerning
transparency and management of revenues. Deby repeated that
there would be "total transparency" in achievement of poverty
alleviation, keeping in focus the Millennium Development
Goals. But there could be no going back on questions of
principle and no infringement of Chad's sovereignty. Chad
should not be thrust forward as the World Bank's lesson to
the world, but Deby said he sought a constructive dialogue
between partners.

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13. (C) On Darfur, the Ambassador recalled that in a press
conference two years ago Deby had expressed doubt about the
AU's capacity and had predicted that the international
community would have to impose a peace arrangement. He
assured Deby that the United States was determined to work
with all parties, Sudan, the rebels, and the international
community, to achieve security in Darfur with a significantly
reinforced international force and to bring about a
negotiated settlement in the Abuja talks. Deby said that
resolute action that had been taken by the international
community in the Balkans showed the way forward on Darfur.
He said he had, indeed, insisted from the beginning of the
conflict that the only solution was direct intervention by
the international community.


14. (C) On elections, the Ambassador said that the United
States would always be ready in the future to work with Chad
toward consolidating a base on which to build a democratic
system. He would have liked to be able to recommend to
Washington to assist the holding of the coming presidential
election. Unfortunately, the letter from the Prime Minister
requesting assistance for this election had come too late.
Nearly one year had elapsed since UNDP had made its
recommendations on the requirements for electoral reform,
including a reconstituted electoral commission and a new
voter registration, but no start had been made on
implementing those recommendations and it was too late for
the United States to be able to help. Deby laughed and said
it was never too late. He said that Chad was always the
"demandeur" seeking assistance on electoral reform.

--------------
Expressions of Friendship,
Hopes for Dialogue
--------------


15. (C) The Ambassador said that he looked forward to
maintaining a dialogue. He hoped Deby would see him as a
friend and partner of Chad. It was important that their
dialogue be maintained even when -- indeed, especially when
-- there were areas of disagreement, because there were many
interests in common. Deby noted favorably reports on
television of the Ambassador's frequent trips around the
country and his visits to projects receiving U.S. assistance.
Deby said that traditional good friends, such as Chad and
the United States, could not always be in agreement. Chad
would not waver on questions of principle, but Chad needed
help from the United States, including help on reinforcing
its democracy. Deby perused again the summary of bilateral
cooperation that the Ambassador had given him. He noted that
he had not always been adequately informed of all that the
United States was doing. He recommended that the Ambassador
provide him such a list on a recurrent basis. He said that
he would be disposed to see the Ambassador whenever the
Ambassador wished. No subject, he said, would be considered
taboo.


16. (C) Comment: The atmospherics of this exchange were
excellent. Notably, two of the most sensitive issues
broached in the exchange were not answered, i.e., Deby's
expression of interest in an official visit and the
Ambassador's request for Deby's views on plans for an
eventual transition. We look forward to opportunities to
pursue those issues in the future.
WALL