CHAD: INTERIOR MINISTER SEES DEBY AS "LEAST BAD,"

UNCLAS NDJAMENA 000462

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: INTERIOR MINISTER SEES DEBY AS "LEAST BAD,"
EXULTS IN BATTLE VICTORY



1. (SBU) Summary: Close Deby advisor and fellow Zaghawan
Interior Minister Mahamat Ali described Deby as the "least
bad" option for Chad, in conversation with Ambassador March

28. Claiming total victory in the March 20 battle against
the Chadian Zaghawa rebels, he downplayed anxieties over
intra-Zaghawa bloodletting, poohpoohed the importance of
other Chadian rebels, and dismissed the likelihood of direct
Sudan attack. End Summary.


2. (SBU) Ambassador Wall called on Minister of Territorial
Administration Mahamat Ali Abdallah Nassour March 28.
Mahamat Ali is one of Deby's closest advisors, a fellow
Zaghawan but not of the same clan (Mahamat Ali is a Kobe from
Iriba rather than Bideiyat from Bahai),who as a military
leader was instrumental in Deby's original conquest of power
in 1990 and has served in key postings ever since. Mahamat
Ali had just returned from the East, where he accompanied
Deby in overseeing the March 20 battle at Hadjar Marfaine.

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Deby the Least Bad
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3. (SBU) Taking a line on the internal political situation
sounding strikingly similar to the views regularly purveyed
by the French, Mahamat Ali three times, at different points
during the conversation, emphasized that President Deby was
the "least bad" option realistically available to Chad, a
country he described as extremely difficult to govern and
hold together. He said he hoped for the understanding of the
international community, at a time when rebellions were
flaring in the East and even the South, to bear with Chad
during its present election, however imperfect the electoral
process was. For all the flaws of Deby's governance, Mahamat
Ali said, he had maintained stability and brought some
progress to Chad, when compared to where Chad had been when
Deby came to office. The political opposition had, he said,
been enticed into a stubborn boycott partly by the prospect
of a Zaghawa rebellion and a hope that the international
community would put pressure on Deby not to go forward with
the election. The opposition's demands were unrealistic.
The government had always been prepared for dialogue, within
reasonable limits, and the door remained open. In fact, if
Deby won the coming election overwhelmingly, he would still
want to associate the opposition in realistic improvements to
the electoral system. Mahamat Ali was unfazed by the
opposition's call for obstructing the election.


4. (SBU) The Ambassador said that the United States had
hoped there would be a more credible election. We would have
liked to provide assistance for the upcoming election, as
requested by the Prime Minister, but the organization of a
credible election, as set forth in recommendations made a
year previously by the United Nations Development Program,
would have required more time than was now available. The
government not having taken the required measures, it was too
late now for support from the international community. The
Ambassador said that President Deby deserved credit for
maintaining a period of relative stability and some economic
progress in Chad. The United States was grateful for Chad's
cooperation on combatting errorism. In the Ambassador's
view, however, Dey would enhance prospects for Chad's
continued sability and be widely viewed as a great African
hief of state if he put in place in Chad a credibleprocess
of peaceful transition.


5. (SBU) Mahmat Ali said that he "fully shared" the
Ambassadr's view. Chad could have done better. However, f
Deby resigned or passed the scene, the result would be war,
not enhanced democracy. It was essential for the
international community to take an understanding attitude and
accompany Deby in this mandate so the country would not fall
into the abyss. After some time, Deby contemplated an
alternation of power. Mahamat Ali was certain that Deby
thought in this way. He did not have limitless ambition.
Deby understood the need to associate the opposition in
governance. One area for improvement was voter
registration. Mahamat Ali said he had proposed to Deby and
the Prime Minister a new voter census, indeed, a new general
census. The present figure of 5.5 million registered voters
was indeed very high for a country projected to have only
nine million inhabitants; however, Mahamat Ali suspected that
Chad's population was actually much higher, more than 12
million, just as N'djamena's estimated 600,000 population was
likely also well over one million.

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Zaghawa Rebels Smashed, Others Do Not Matter
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6. (SBU) Mahamat Ali said that the battle of Hadjar Marfaine
on March 20 was a clarifying, watershed event. Sudan had
poured in arms, vehicles, and money into various Chadian
rebel groups in Darfur -- Bideiyat Zaghawa, Borogat Zaghawa,
Arab, and Tama --, hoping they would mount a unified force
that could overthrow Deby and undermine the Darfur rebellion.
Sudan would now have to think again. The most important of
the rebel groups was the Bideiyat group under Yahya Dillo
(SCUD) which had set up a forward base at Hadjar Marfaine
(just inside Chad, north of Adre). The battle of March 20
totally obliterated that base and the SCUD was now in
complete disarray. The Ambassador asked about the likelihood
of further Zaghawa defections and reprisals, given that this
battle was the first instance of intra-Zaghawa killing, and
about the danger presented by other Chadian rebels such as
Tama leader Mahamat Nour. Mahamat Ali dismissed Mahamat Nour
as "no problem at all." If the Sudanese were banking on him,
they were banking on the wrong man. Deby well knew where the
real danger had lain -- the SCUD -- and he had gone after it.
Other rebels, Borogat, Tama, and Arab, would remain
disunited and ineffective. Sudan wanted Mahamat Nour to lead
them but they would not follow him. The intra-Zaghawa
fighting was not mortal to the Zaghawa community. The great
majority of that community knew full well that they needed to
stick together behind Deby, help him remain in power, lead
the country to greater democracy and better governance,
combat corruption and build a truly national army.


7. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether Mahamat Ali saw a risk
now of a direct attack from Sudan. Mahamat Ali said there
was "very little likelihood" of it. Sudan's strategy was to
work through the rebels. Chad held to its right to pursue
Chadian rebels into Sudanese territory, which could lead to a
Sudanese reaction, but he doubted that a direct attack formed
part of Sudan's general plan. And as of March 20, the
Sudanese plan would have to be re-written.
WALL