Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA431
2006-03-20 11:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: FRENCH VERSION OF COUP ATTEMPT, DEBY'S

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM CD 
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DE RUEHNJ #0431/01 0791141
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 201141Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3375
INFO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0982
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0290
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0655
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0529
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0333
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0068
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0729
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1221
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2499
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1609
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0978
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000431 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRENCH VERSION OF COUP ATTEMPT, DEBY'S
PLIGHT

REF: A. A. NDJAMENA 351

B. B. NDJAMENA 418

C. C. PARIS 1680

Classified By: P/E Officer Haywood Rankin for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000431

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, INR, DRL, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: FRENCH VERSION OF COUP ATTEMPT, DEBY'S
PLIGHT

REF: A. A. NDJAMENA 351

B. B. NDJAMENA 418

C. C. PARIS 1680

Classified By: P/E Officer Haywood Rankin for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: According to the French Ambassador, the
March 14 coup activity involved another member of Deby's
extended clan and has made him more paranoid and less
amenable to reason. The supposed coup leader, commander of
an armored squadron in the presidential protective reserve
force, is a close relative of recently-defected General Seby
Aguid and fled east, after the opportunistic and
poorly-planned plot (which is being reported by the Chadian
government as an attempt to bring down the presidential
aircraft) was nipped in the bud. End Summary.


2. (C) The French Ambassador, Jean-Pierre Bercot,
accompanied by his DCM and defense attache, invited
Ambassador Wall, accompanied by DCM, DATT, and poloff, to the
French Residence for a briefing March 17 on the March 14 coup
activity (refs B, C).

--------------
French Account of the Coup Actions
--------------


3. (C) The French defense attache recounted that President
Deby had departed Chad on the morning of the 14th for a
meeting of Central African presidents in Equatorial Guinea.
That same morning an officer of the armored squadron of the
new presidential protective reserve force (DGSSIE),based six
kilometers north of Ndjamena (near the airport and French
base) and commanded by Colonel Ramadan Bakhit, made a request
at the central ammunition depot for munitions necessary to
secure the airport. The personnel at the depot asked whether
the request had been authorized by the Presidency. When no
such authorization was provided, the depot notified the
Presidency of what seemed a suspicious request. The
Presidency alerted President Deby in Bata, Equatorial Guinea;
and Mahamat Saleh, Deby's uncle and head of the new force,
took action to intercept the plotters. Colonel Bakhit, with
30 colleagues, fled Ndjamena eastwards; five were captured in
the East, in the area of Biltine. In the defense attache's

analysis, the plotters had not elaborated a careful plan.
Colonel Bakhit was, he noted, a cousin of recently-defected
General Seby Aguid and a member of the clan of the Erdimi
twins, who had defected in December.


4. (C) Bercot took over the presentation, providing further
detail. He said that Colonel Bakhit, the supposed
mastermind, had ordered his deputy to make the request for
the ammunition for his squadron's armored vehicles. When
the deputy had made the request at the depot, officers at the
depot came back to Bakhit asking about the absence of
approval from the Presidency. Bakhit fingered the deputy as
behind a coup plot. The innocent deputy was detained and
beaten, while Bakhit and co-conspiritors made their escape
from Ndjamena. Deby was informed at 2:30-3:00 in the
afternoon in Bata, and at first communicated with no one.
Then Deby contacted his commanders in the East to see if
rebel forces were coming across the border, and then he told
his fellow heads of state at the CEMAC meeting, where he was
supposed to be elected new chairman, of his need to return to
Ndjamena immediately. Gabon's Bongo offered his personal
airplane and contacted the French, who asked that Deby not
return until dark, when the French, using night-vision
equipment, could secure the Ndjamena airport without drawing
undue attention to the French role. Deby returned at 9:00 pm
on Bongo's plane to an airport fully secured by the French
military.

--------------
Deby Under Siege
--------------


5. (C) Bercot said that this coup plotting came in the

context of heightened supply of the Chadian rebels by Sudan.
Within the past five days, the Sudanese government had
supplied 30 Toyota Land Cruisers to the rebels -- it was not
clear whether to Yahya Dillo's Zaghawa group or to Muhammad
Nur's Tama group but Bercot suspected the latter, since he
believed that Salih Ghosh, Sudan's key official in matters of
supplying such groups, had little trust in the Chadian
Zaghawans and would prefer to deal with Muhammad Nur.
(Bercot believed the picture of supply of the rebels was
complicated further by strong opposition among Sudan's Arab
allies in Darfur to any arming of Chadian rebels of any
stripe.) Meanwhile, Bercot said he was informed of contacts
between Chad's opposition figures (Yorongar specifically)
with the Erdimis. The opposition were shamelessly calling
for Deby's overthrow by force. Bercot warned that, while he
personally did not believe there was an American connection,
there had now developed an article of faith among the
opposition that the United States government and Exxon were
actively supporting Tom Erdimi (living in Houston).


6. (C) Ambassador Wall said that, as Bercot well knew, the
presence of Tom Erdimi in the United States and a single
contact by the State Department with him did not constitute
support. The United States had no "preferred candidate" in
Chad but rather emphasized the need to encourage a peaceful
transition of power in Chad. He recalled Bercot's proposal
in an earlier conversation (ref A) of discussing with Deby
the idea of his committing to stand down after serving one
further year, during which he would be treated with full
honor.


7. (C) Bercot said that he would have to cut short the
conversation as he was expected momentarily for yet another
meeting with Deby. It was not the moment to propose ideas
to Deby. Deby was in a distracted state. The coup attempt
had further diminished Deby's confidence and standing,
weakening an already weakened president. Bercot was afraid
to push him into a corner. Every defection and coup attempt
increased Deby's psychosis and made it harder to reason with
him. Deby was now given to making outlandish requests, such
as for helicopters and anti-tank weapons, to which of course
France had to say no. The previous two days had destroyed
all that Bercot had hoped to be able to accomplish with Deby.
Now Deby was insistent on going to Abeche and staying there
to take command of his forces against what he expected to be
a double-pronged attack by the rebels -- exactly when and
where Deby did not know. Bercot had tried to reason with
Deby that his problem lay not in Abeche but in Ndjamena. The
French base in Abeche stood as an incontrovertible obstacle
to any group of rebels, who could hold no territory in the
East for longer than 24 hours, unless the Sudanese army
crossed the border, which would be an act of war.


8. (C) Ambassador Wall commented that Bercot's analysis
seemed to suggest that Deby was not open to influence when he
was weakened, while at the same time he was not open to
influence when he was strong. Bercot was not sure how
rational he would find Deby and whether Deby would be open to
any advice. Part of Deby's malaise at present was that he
was torn between two camps of advisors. On the one hand, he
had his new wives and the Arab, Gorane, and Southern advisors
around him, on the other there was the Zaghawa clique.
Ambassador Wall pointed out that the latter seemed to be fast
diminishing, to which Bercot demurred, saying that there was
still a substantial core of Itno Bideiyat Zaghawans who were
close to him. The two groups were constantly vying, leaving
Deby torn between them.
WALL