Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA305
2006-02-28 10:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM CD 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000305 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, D, DRL, INR, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION


Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000305

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, D, DRL, INR, DS/IP/AF, DS/IP/ITA;
LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: ROLE OF THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION


Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Idriss Deby's opponents are
trying to capitalize on his unpopularity and a heightened
level of general discontent to push for a political
transition. However, since coming to power, Deby has stacked
the political arena against his opponents, cleverly buying
off, exploiting weaknesses of, and undermining various
enemies. Deby's ruling party controls the legislature and
local government positions. In addition to the absence of a
level playing field, Chad's political parties also are
handicapped by their own numbers, divisions, and regional
ethnic bases. Departures and desertions of family members
and military officers continue, prompting the political
opposition to reach out to the disaffected family members,
particularly Timan Erdimi. A level of collaboration between
Chad's political and armed opposition groups has developed.
We are concerned that French analyses underestimate the ties
between and capabilities of Deby's opponents that have
developed over the past year. While we must be careful not
to exaggerate the opposition's role and capabilities, their
participation in the elections is critical to the legitimacy
of the process. Without it, Deby's re-election will be
tainted and the French will find it increasingly expensive
and difficult to prop him up. To move forward, it will be
important to determine if Deby is interested in a genuine
political transition. If he indicates that he is, the
international community must immediately take steps to engage
the opposition, mobilize donor resources to solidify the
electoral process, and be prepared to accept a delay in the
elections. If not, then we need to be prepared to condemn a
fraudulent election and deal with the insecurity created by
an increasingly alienated political and military opposition.
End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
POLITICAL PLAYING FIELD
- - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) A key difficulty in identifying capable individuals
or groups with sufficient nationwide appeal is that Chad's

political arena remains limited. Deby has effectively
weakened or coopted those individuals who might challenge
him. He has reportedly not stopped at killing those
individuals who might challenge him. Years of government
heavy-handedness and ruling party domination of key
institutions of democracy coupled with the disengagement of
Chadians from the political process have stunted thedevelopment of political parties and provided limied
opportunities for government experience. The situation in
eastern Chad, continued desertions ad deections, and Deby's
poor health are key facors shaping the calculations of
Chad's political players. Many family members, former ruling
party members, or close Deby associates prefer to leave the
country and join opposition-in-exile because they have become
convinced that Deby has no intention of leaving power. Given
this conclusion, no one is willing to participate in an
election expected to be fatally flawed. The press and
opposition political parties function relatively free of
harassment because the government does not judge them to be
able to put up a credible threat to Deby.


3. (SBU) The Government states that it wants consultation
with the opposition. However, the Government's track record
is poor on this front, and its heavy-handed style of
consultations discourages genuine dialogue. We have observed
first-hand the Government's behavior at so-called
consultative meetings. In general, the Minister convokes a
meeting, presents the Government's position with a heavy
press presence, sometimes allows others to state theirs, and
then ends the meeting for "private" discussions which never
take place. A communique is then issued that is written in
advance or on which not all parties agree. Other types of
"consultations" involve money or other inducements and -- on
occasion -- harassment. For the oil revenue law change, the
Prime Minister announced to the assembled diplomatic
community that the Government had held consultations with
political party leaders and human rights groups. In fact,
party leaders and human rights groups did not participate in
hastily arranged meetings on the issue because they feared
the government would issue press communiques saying that they
agreed with the law change.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
KEY SOURCES OF POLITICAL OPPOSITION
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Opposition Parties. Given these conditions, the
political opposition will continue to be weak, while at the
same time remain an important group whose participation is
needed to give legitimacy to any election. Recognizing their
own shortcomings, some of the opposition parties are working
together on election and political transition issues and
contingency plans in case of an irregular change in power.
The political opposition, with over 80 political parties,
remains highly fractionalized, ineffective, and unable to
mobilize the public to take action. The Coalition of Parties
for the Defense of the Constitution (CPDC),formed in early
2004 to oppose the amending of the constitution, is a group
of 20 opposition parties. There are a handful of core
members within the CPDC: Ibni Saleh Oumar (former Minister),
Lol Mahamat Choua (former President),Wadal Abdelkader
Kamougue (former National Assembly Speaker),Salibu Ngarba
(former Minister),and Jean Alingue (former Prime Minister).
Although these leaders have national name recognition, their
power bases are limited to their home areas. Within the
group, there were differences over participation in the
electoral registration process, but recently, there seems to
be more solidarity on boycotting the election and options
concerning a political transition. Among themselves, they
have divided up responsibilities with certain members
maintaining regular communication with the armed opposition.


5. (SBU) In September 2005, after months of trying to get
an appointment to begin dialogue with the President on the
elections, Deby granted an audience to the CPDC. The group
proposed a dialogue committee consisting of three members of
the Government, five members of the CPDC, five members of the
ruling Pariotic Salvation Movement (MPS) and its allied
parties, two members of other parties, and three members of
civil society. The committee was to be headed by the Prime
Minister. Technocrats, military, and representatives of the
armed opposition would be welcome, according to the CPDC.
The election committee's mission was to exchange views on the
current situation and examine ways in which to improve the
organization and conduct of elections in 2006, which would
permit their participation and allow international donors to
support a transparent electoral process. To date, Deby has
not responded to their proposal or communicated directly with
members of the CPDC.


6. (C) Disgruntled Zaghawa, family members, and military
deserters. These are, from Deby's perspective, the greatest
threat to his power and re-election. They have had the
greatest access to Deby and since September have been
expressing their disillusionment with his regime through
military desertions and defections across the border and into
political exile. The list grows, but includes former
Ambassador to the United States Ahmat Soubiane, former
presidential advisors and cousins Tom and Timan Erdimi,
generals and cousins Seby Aguid and Issaka Diar, former
Minister of Defense Djibrine Dassert, Yaya Dillo and his
followers, and members of the Tolli and Haggar families. The
Government has sought revenge against some of these former
government allies by giving orders for the security forces to
loot their homes and for local government authorities to
destroy the dwellings as a sign of what happens when you
cross the President. Of this group, the ambitious Timan
Erdimi has been the most active in trying to construct an
alliance among various ethnic groups within the deserting
camps. This week's ruling party congress will be a good
indicator if powerful Zaghawa families, such as the Haggars,
are ready to participate in a sham electoral process or if
they will become more vocal in their concerns with another
term.


7. (C) Armed Opponents. To Deby, the armed Chadian rebel
movements in Sudan present a threat, but with differing
ethnic bases and political agendas, Deby may judge them as
unable to affect the regime change that they are seeking
through military means unless they coordinate their actions.
The Government's response to these groups is to reinforce its
borders. Deby also continues to acquire weapons and vehicles
to beef up security along the border. The Chadian Government
views these elements as Sudanese-government backed with
actions controlled by the Government of Sudan. Chadian
Foreign Minister Allam-mi, as well as other contacts, have
told us that it appears that Khartoum has warned the Chadian
rebels in Sudan to hold back for now. Chad's political
opposition has contacts with some of the armed groups'
leadership in exile, like Acheikh Oumar, in France. CPDC
claims to have contact with groups such as Mahamat Nour's
and have told poloffs that Nour's political platform strongly
reflects the CPDC's thinking on transition. Some members of
the Chadian political opposition do not discount the
possibility of an irregular change of power just after
elections -- and are keeping their lines of communication
open with the various armed groups for just this eventuality.


- - - - - -
WHAT'S NEXT
- - - - - -


8. (U) The Electoral Commission has announced that
presidential elections will take place on May 3. The
Government's attempt to repair the electoral lists consists
of allowing anyone who did not register to do so with the
next two weeks. The lists are to open to public scrutiny on
March 16. The list of candidates for the election must be
released 30 days prior to the election. Campaigns will begin
on April 2. Given the problems associated with the previous
electoral list, the next list could be even more
unacceptable. Later this week, the ruling MPS will meet and
gear up for the elections. This includes replacing the
party's general secretary and presumably announcing Deby as
its candidate.


9. (SBU) UNDP's Country Representative Kingsley Amaning is
prepared to facilitate a dialogue between the Government and
opposition, but first wants to speak with Deby to determine
whether he genuinely wants dialogue or is still only paying
lip service to the idea. If satisfied, Amaning is willing to
host a meeting of the CPDC and Yorongar's Federalist alliance
with several government ministers to see if there is a way
out of the impasse. If UNDP takes on such a dialogue, it
will need our support.


10. (SBU) If no dialogue is started, then Deby will likely
follow through with the elections as planned. The opposition
will not participate, will probably call for a stay-at-home
strategy on election day, and Deby will be re-elected with an
overwhelming majority of votes and a reported high turn-out
(similar to that of the public referendum.) France will
organize election observers from neighboring francophone
countries and will accept the results and congratulate Deby's
victory. We can anticipate that French Ambassador Bercot
will (at least privately) criticize opposition parties for
any upcoming election failure because they refuse to
participate. We will be expected to make a public
pronouncement on the elections.

- - - - - - - -
RECOMMENDATIONS
- - - - - - - -


11. (C) If a credible dialogue begins, we need to be
prepared to be flexible regarding the timing of the elections
and would be expected to provide financial and technical
support, probably through UNDP. A key issue is whether
changing the August 8 date for a hand-over constitutes a
technical change of the rules which can easily be done or
whether it would require National Assembly approval. A key
issue -- if this scenario evolves -- is whether or not Deby
runs for re-election. The opposition would prefer that he
does not run, but a UNDP-run election may instill enough
confidence in the process to ensure their participation. In
this case, the opposition tells us that they would back a
single candidate, but for security reasons will not reveal
the name until they are assured of a credible election
process.


12. (C) We need to be careful not to fall for French
prognostications that Chad will fall apart without Deby. The
situation will continue to deteriorate with Deby in power.
The French need to encouraged to articulate their own view of
what a managed transition could look like, rather than solely
focusing on individuals. We need to urge the French to speak
with Deby concerning the election and options for a possible
delay or agreement to step down.


13. (C) We must also be cognizant that Deby forging ahead
with this electoral timetable can open him up for an
assassination or coup attempt and that the game does not
necessarily end if Deby successfully pushes through the
elections. Reports of desertions continue on a daily basis.
There may be triggers in the process that we do not yet know
about, and it is not clear how much support Deby actually
needs to stay in office. His health, as always, remains a
wild card. His re-election in flawed elections will likely
spur on the deserters and others. He may also undertake
initiatives to woo some of the dissenters back. We need to
be prepared in the event an irregular change happens after he
is re-elected in a fraudulent process.
WALL