DARFUR/CHAD: JEM'S KHALIL SKEPTICAL ON UN FORCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000300

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JOHN YATES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: DARFUR/CHAD: JEM'S KHALIL SKEPTICAL ON UN FORCE

Classified By: P/E Officer Haywood Rankin for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: In February 25 conversation with Ambassador
Wall, JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim lamented the international
community's focus on mounting a UN force in Darfur, when
security, he claimed, was better than at any time since the
rebellion began, even with intra-Sudan Liberation
Movement/Army (SLM/A) fighting. The international
community's emphasis, he said, needed to be on getting a
peace agreement. He said that his effort to push disparate
elements of the SLM to work together had been a long and not
yet successful slog; but he put the blame for failure of the
negotiating process entirely on the government of Sudan, and
faulted the U.S. for inadequate pressure on Sudan. He said
that the Darfur rebels wanted only regional autonomy not
independence, but a genuine autonomy for a united Darfur with
significant power for its leaders in Khartoum. He dismissed
SPLM's Salva Kiir as a bush fighter without Garang's stature,
incapable of holding his own in Khartoum and focused on
southern independence. He dismissed Turabi as old and
discredited. He said Sudan was sending in more troops into
western Darfur, with a focus on Chad, not Darfur. It was
pushing the janjaweed into Chad while restraining the Chadian
rebels for the moment. Khalil thought that Sudan expected to
fail in its objective of overthrowing Deby and removing Chad
as rearguard area for the Darfur rebels but that it had its
augmented forces there on defensive in case events in Chad
turned in Sudan's favor and they could go on the offensive.
Khalil regretted that heretofore Deby had not been more
helpful to the Darfur rebels, but believed now there was a
welcome mat in Ndjamena. End summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Wall and poloffs called on JEM leader
Khalil Ibrahim at his suite at the Meridien Hotel on February

25. Khalil and his entourage had arrived a few days
previously from northern Darfur, where he had been patching
up relations with SLA factional leader Mini Minawi. He was
ready now to go on to Abuja, although he was "not sure why"
he was going, since the government of Sudan was not willing
to deal. "One hand cannot clap", he noted. Much time had
been wasted in Abuja. The key problem in the negotiations
lay in the power-sharing arena, while wealth-sharing was
pretty well wrapped up. How to ensure genuine autonomy? Per
Khalil, Darfur had to be self-governing within a unified
Sudan, a single entity, not three small states. Its governor
would have to be Darfurian, freely elected after an interim
period. Darfur would participate in national power (including
senior cabinet and military positions) and wealth
proportional to its percentage of the population (45 percent,
Khalil claims).

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WHITHER SUDAN
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3. (C) In response to the Ambassador's question, Khalil said
that there would be a Darfurian vice president who would be a
vice president for the whole nation, unlike Salva Kiir. If
he had lived, John Garang would have insisted on a key role
in governance of the whole nation, but Salva Kiir was only a
bush fighter with little comprehension of the complexities in
Khartoum. The SPLM came to Khalil for his guidance, Khalil
claimed, but the SPLM under Salva Kiir was only fixated on
the south and the referendum for independence. Khalil
expressed skepticism that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
would survive or that the referendum would ever take place.


4. (C) Asked about the future role of Hasan al-Turabi,
Khalil said Turabi was now too old to play an effective role.
Only in the event that Ali Osman Taha and President Bashir
fell out would Turabi be able to step forward, but in fact
the whole leadership group in Khartoum, to include Sadiq
al-Mahdi, was discredited. (Comment: Khalil did not
volunteer any characterization of his own present
relationship with Turabi. End Comment.)

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RELATING WITH THE SLA

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5. (C) Khalil said that his recent contacts with SLA
factional leaders, including meetings in N'Djamena, had
produced an improved relationship. Khalil claimed that the
Sudanese government had paid SLM factional leader Abdelwahid
50 million dollars and offered him a position in the
government, which had spurred him to announce
nonparticipation in Abuja, which in turn spurred a revolt
within his faction and a move to oust him. There had been
fighting between SLA and JEM in certain contained areas, but
the government of Chad had been helpful in setting the basis
for negotiations. SLA factions had always evinced an
aggressive attitude and spent much time fighting among
themselves, but Mini Minawi gradually seemed to be maturing
and was beginning to listen to Khalil. The balance of forces
on the ground, Khalil claimed, was now sufficiently in JEM's
favor that Mini was obliged to listen. Khalil recognized the
vital importance of bringing all the rebel factions together.
Even if they were not yet united, they seemed to be on the
road to better coordination.

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CRITICISMS OF REHATTING
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6. (C) Khalil launched into a criticism of the move to
create a UN force. He noted the irony that the rebels had
wanted a UN force at the very beginning, when severe fighting
was occurring. But the ceasefire was holding well.
According to him, the security situation in Darfur was better
than it had been since 2003, better than in 2004 or 2005.
All the talk about a UN force was a distraction from the
vital issue at hand, which was a peace agreement. It was
also very expensive. Bring peace not troops and use the
military money to rebuild Darfur, Khalil urged. Poloff
FitzGibbon remarked that JEM may have been ready for peace,
but the SLA had not been. Ambassador Wall said that it was
wrong to speak of "improved security" in Darfur when
Darfurian displaced persons so plainly lived in fear; the
mandate for UN forces would likely be stronger than for the
African Union forces, permitting the UN to act against any
violators whether government of Sudan or rebels.


7. (C) Khalil said that an infusion of foreign troops would
only prompt the SLA to be more war-like. The Darfurian
populace would not feel enhanced security no matter what the
mandate of the UN forces was. They would not return to their
villages under supposed protection of AU or UN until there
was a full peace. An effort to carve out tranquil sectors
would fail. In fact, the populace would actively oppose the
UN, all the more when that effort comes now when security was
considerably improved in Darfur. This move to bring in the
UN had not convinced and would not convince the local people,
the resistance fighters, or the government of Sudan -- i.e.,
no one in the field. Ambassador Wall said that there was no
dispute that UN troops were no substitute for a peace
agreement. Promoting such a force in no way diminished the
intent to achieve a peace agreement. It was essential that
Khalil and the other rebel leaders go to Abuja as soon as
possible precisely in order to finalize a peace agreement.

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KHARTOUM TAKES AIM AT N'DJAMENA
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8. (C) Khalil said the government of Sudan was sending in
more troops into western Darfur but Sudan's rationale was not
Darfur but Chad. Sudan sought to overthrow Deby, Khalil
thought, as the only way to defeat the rebellion in Darfur.
In recent weeks, Sudan had pulled back the Chadian rebels
from the border and put its augmented force in the Geneina
area in a defensive posture. Meanwhile, it was pushing the
janjaweed into Chad. Sudan seemed to expect to fail in this
strategy of overthrowing Deby, but it had the Chadian rebels
and its own forces ready in the event a favorable trend
developed. Meanwhile, Darfurian unrest was spreading into
Chad and stood to become increasingly worse in the East.

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9. (C) Khalil said his relations with Deby had much
improved. He took credit for "saving" Deby and said he would
continue to help him. He thought Deby was now over the hump
of internal dissension and would survive. Dissension in
Deby's home tribal area had eased. Deby had only lost "a
part of a part of a faction" -- only a few of Deby's clan
(the Bideiyat of the Zaghawa) had turned against him. The
names of the deserters were big -- Sebi Aguid and Issaka Diar
-- but not many had followed them in flight and some of those
who had, had already returned to Chad.


10. (C) Ambassador Wall asked Khalil's view on a recent UN
report that arms had come to the rebels via Eritrea, Chad,
and Libya. Khalil responded, in the first place, that an
emphasis on arms was wrong, since the ceasefire had been
largely respected. Khalil contested the assertion by some
observers that the rebels had respected the ceasefire only
because they were small and weak. As for the source of arms,
it was not necessary to speak of governments providing arms,
but of money. The nature of the sahelian region was such
that if one had money, one could purchase weapons and
vehicles (but not tanks). One of Khalil's aides added that
the Sudanese armed forces were an important source of arms
for the rebels. Libya mainly acted on behalf of the
government of Sudan, even if it also helped the rebels in an
effort to maintain open channels. Chad should have done more
than it had so far, but the atmosphere was much better now,
with the arrival of Khalil's group in N'Djamena. Eritrea had
been a substitute for Chad but it was too far away. Eritrea
was now improving its relations with Sudan, while Chad was
putting out the welcome carpet for the rebels, though Chad's
actual help remained at a minimal level.

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ERITREA, CHAD, LIBYA
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11. (C) Khalil repeated that the peace agreement was the
essential matter at hand. Without a peace agreement, even if
he and other rebel leaders disappeared, others would rise up
to continue the fight. He acknowledged that the great
suffering of the Darfurian people hung in the balance with
these political negotiations, though he said nothing about
his own role in starting the rebellion, criticized U.S. and
other international players for inadequate pressure on Sudan
and wrong-headed emphasis on a UN force, and predicted that
any UN force, with or without an agreement, would have its
hands full in Darfur for the foreseeable future.


12. (C) Comment: Khalil's arguments against the deployment
of UN troops is curious and could be an indication of Libyan
influence over him or that the UN sanctions report struck a
raw nerve. Libya has long-argued against Western troops in
Darfur. Khalil's arguments also go against earlier rebel
calls for such a deployment. We note that Khalil and SLM
leader Minni Minawi's accounts of what they were doing on the
border near Bahai differ somewhat. Minni claims Khalil did
not go into Darfur. And finally, despite Khalil's claims to
be helping Idriss Deby, there are a number of indications
that the Chadian Government does not trust Khalil and that he
may be playing a double game. For example, we have recently
heard from a government source that a group of Chadian
deserters from Bardai were assisted by Libya to reach Khalil
near Bahai.
WALL