Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA143
2006-01-31 15:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: REBEL SCORECARD

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #0143/01 0311541
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 311541Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3030
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0449
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1137
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2413
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1518
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0874
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0598
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0610
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000143 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: REBEL SCORECARD

REF: A. 04 NDJAMENA 1020

B. 04 NDJAMENA 658

C. NDJAMENA 57

D. NDJAMENA 95

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NDJAMENA 000143

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: REBEL SCORECARD

REF: A. 04 NDJAMENA 1020

B. 04 NDJAMENA 658

C. NDJAMENA 57

D. NDJAMENA 95

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Chad is bracing for more rebel attacks
along the border. Chadian authorities firmly believe that
the Government of Sudan is supporting Mahamat Nour, and
possibly others, in their efforts to overthrow the regime of
President Idriss Deby Itno. This perception, coupled with
Chad's interests in Darfur, has prompted Deby to forge
stronger alliances with Zaghawa Darfurian rebels, purchase
weapons to fortify his border, and confront the World Bank
over the use of Chad's oil revenues. Chadian officials, like
the Darfur rebels, also believe that Sudan is waging a proxy
war through Nour and other Chadian rebels in order to justify
the deployment of Sudanese troops into Darfur. In Chad,s
view, the Sudanese are seeking to destroy the Darfur
movements on the ground or at the very least, cut off their
access to Chad. Finally, the Chadian Government also
speculates that Sudan is intent on relocating jandjaweed into
Chad in the event of a peace deal which requires their
disarmament. From this side of the border, it is difficult
for us to judge the Sudanese Government's intentions.
Nonetheless, in assessing the complexities of the evolving
situation, Chadian and Darfurian rebel perceptions of GOS
intentions may have a greater impact on the calculations and
actions of key actors than do realities. END SUMMARY

- - - - - -
BACKGROUND
- - - - - -


2. (C) The Chadian Government has publicly accused the
Government of Sudan of supporting Chadian rebels since June
2004 (Refs A and B). At that time, then-presidential advisor
for international relations Ahmad Allam-mi said that there
were Chadian rebels in Sudan. In April 2005, the Chadian

Government stated that there were some 3,000 Chadian rebels
concentrated in Sudan near Makjar, near El Geneina.
Specifically, Chad accused the GOS,s &special services" of
continuing to "maintain, arm, and finance Chadian opponents
that have established themselves in Sudanese territory8.
Allam-mi said that he confronted Sudanese Intelligence chief
Salah Gosh directly about his support for the rebels. Gosh
denied the allegations. Chad also lodged a protest with
Sudan for a jandjaweed incursion at Modeina on September 26,
2005 that killed at least 36 people. Meanwhile, throughout
the year, humanitarian organizations and traditional leaders
in the East report numerous cross-border incursions by
thieves, jandjaweed, and suspected Chadian rebels,
particularly in the area south of Abeche.


3. (C) The Chadian Government tried to resolve the issue
through diplomatic means, but became increasingly convinced
that the GOS would not rein in the Chadian rebels. Last
October Deby intensified his efforts to repair poor relations
with the Darfur rebel movements, leaders. Prior to this,
Deby was criticized for not consistently assisting his
Zaghawa brothers from Sudan and, in the case of the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM),for trying to destroy the
movement. Meanwhile, his half-brothers, Daoussa and Timan,
were pursuing their own efforts with various factions of the
Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and JEM, as was his security
service with the National Movement for Reform and Development
(NMRD). The visits of SLM leaders Abdelwahid Nour (October,
November),Minni Minawi (December, January),and Justice and
Equality Movement,s representatives in October, and then
JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim himself in January represent a
significant change of strategy for Chad.


4. (C) Deby's need for money increased as his domestic
position also became increasingly vulnerable in 2005, the
result of his quest to remain in power, increasing
corruption, and growing isolation from his support base.
Deby has not been able to repair the divisions within the

NDJAMENA 00000143 002 OF 005


family that brought about the May 2004 coup attempt. Over
the past year, many family members and colleagues who helped
put Deby in power have left his side for reasons that range
from his desire to stay in power, corruption and
mismanagement, and increasing heavy-handedness. The military
desertions in October were a severe blow because close
relatives were involved and the debate over whether to attack
or negotiate with them blew family rifts wide open. Several
generals and close family members have tried to reason with
Deby to convince him to allow a power transition, especially
after the military desertions from within his own clan in
October. These &last ditch8 efforts were made by
well-regarded cousins, such as the Erdimi brothers, Abakar
Tolli, the Chadian Ambassador to Sudan Sagour Youssef Itno,
and Gen. Sebi Aguid. The Erdimi's, Tolli and Aguid have all
left Chad.

- - - - - - - - -
PREPARING FOR WAR
- - - - - - - - -


5. (C) Deby is forging alliances, seeking funds, and
purchasing weapons to defend his regime. His government
pushed the recently announced &alliance8 between SLM,s
Minni Minawi and Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and their largely Zaghawa
forces. The Darfur rebel movements can help Deby by keeping
the so-called &liberated areas8 free from Chadian rebels.
Minni himself told Ambassador Wall that SLM does not have
much to offer Deby. Second, Deby began the process of
changing the oil revenue management law to increase the
percentage of oil funds flowing directly into government
coffers and to count security among the priority sectors
eligible for projects financed by oil revenues. The change
in the law was promulgated in early January and has sparked a
row with the World Bank, which has frozen Chad,s escrow
account. Chadian officials also have reportedly traveled to
Taiwan in search of financial support, allegedly for the
upcoming elections. Finally, since the military desertions
in October, we receive regular reports about arms purchases
and deliveries, including plans to replace the helicopters
lost at the attack at Adre. Sources of the purchases include
Kazahkstan, other former Eastern Bloc countries, and the
United Arab Emirates. The French admit that they are
reinforcing Abeche and provided logistics support to the
Chadian military during the Adre attack.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
PERCEPTIONS OF THE ENEMY
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (C) Mahamat Nour. Chadian Government officials view the
Government of Sudan as the enemy and Nour and others as mere
proxies. Widely believed to have the backing of the Sudanese
intelligence services, Nour has been on the scene for years.
An ethnic Tama, he may be the spearhead for Sudanese
Government efforts, but some members of the Sudanese
delegation in Abuja tell us that the GOS intends to place an
ethnic Arab in power in Chad, not a Tama. Nonetheless,
previous reporting indicates that Nour and other Chadian
rebel leaders have forged ties with the jandjaweed, many of
whom are Chadian Arabs. Nour's group (Rassemblement pour la
Democratie et les Libertes - French acronym RDL) is based
near El-Geneina.

7 (C) On December 29 RDL joined with eight other groups to
form the United Front for Democratic Change (Front Uni pour
le Changement Democratique - French acronym FUC). The FUC
reportedly includes the SCUD of Deby relative Yaya Dillo, the
CNT of Hassan Salleh Al Gadam, FIDL of Abbelwahit About, the
FNRT of Babikir Ismails, the 8 December Group of Abakar
Tollimi, the CNR group of Hissein Koty Yacoub and the FRRRT
of Yaya Batit Ali al Mahoumoudi. These groups may in the
short-term attempt to take advantage of insecurity caused by
Nour, but it is not clear that they share the same view of
post-conflict Chad and may not want to submit their
aspirations to Nour, a Tama. Nour's political platform speaks
specifically of having elections after a political transition
period; the joint FUC communique only refers to one common
aim: removing Idriss Deby from power.

NDJAMENA 00000143 003 OF 005




8. (C) Military deserters. According to several Deby family
members and two former Ministers, Deby felt he could pay off
military deserters and bring them back into the fold even
after he gave orders to have the military attack them.
However, the presence of Mahamat Nour and other Chadian rebel
groups inside Sudan provided them with potential allies. Two
Zaghawa ministers said that Deby believes that if an all-out
clash began, the Zaghawa-led SCUD would ultimately defend
Deby. These ministers said that Deby,s belief in Zaghawa
solidarity is misplaced because the deserters know that Deby
gave orders to kill them. They claim that, since the
desertions and defections of family members from Chad, Deby
has had family members and associates rounded up and killed.
Bodies are being found in groups far outside N'Djamena,
according to human rights groups. These groups also believe
that Deby revenge against other Zaghawa has violated the
cardinal tribal rule against shedding blood of other clan
members. Defections to the Sudanese side of the border
continue, including prominent retired General Sebi Aguid and
some of those around Mahamat Saleh Kaya. Deby's uncle,
former Nomadic Guard Commander Mahamat Saleh Ibrahim, has
allegedly encouraged Nomadic Guard members to join with
renegade commander Ali Rozi.


9. (C) China. The discovery of Chinese-made weapons at the
battle of Adre is whipping up suspicions that China, with
Sudan,s blessing, is backing Nour. China,s interest
reportedly is to gain favor with a new government in Chad or
to scare Deby into turning his back on Taiwan. According to
several business sources and JEM's President Khalil Ibrahim,
Chad may be rethinking its Taiwan recognition, depending on
what it can get from Taipei in terms of electoral assistance
for the upcoming elections or funds to purchase arms. Some
speculate that Deby may consider nationalizing the Doba Oil
Project and selling it to China or Taiwan, whichever offers
the highest bid. (Comment: Chad recently signed an oil
exploration agreement with the Taiwanese "Chinese Petroleum
Agency" but we have no evidence that the GOC sees Taiwan as a
potential operator of the oil consortium. End comment).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
GOOD FRIENDS ARE HARD TO FIND
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) France. French Ambassador Jean-Pierre Bercot has
often shared with us France's concerns that the Government of
Sudan intends to install an Islamic regime in N,Djamena as
part of a larger effort to put similar governments in power
across the Sahel. It is in the interest of both France and
the United States to prevent this, according to Bercot.
Recently, Bercot told Ambassador Wall and DCM that France
will not permit rebel forces to occupy Chadian territory (Ref
C). This would significantly tilt the balance of forces
against the Sudan-backed Chadian rebels. Previously, the
French here have spoken of limiting their support for the
Chadian military to logistics and surveillance.


11. (C) Darfur Rebels. Deby and the Darfurian rebel leaders
share the same perception of the Sudanese Government's
support for Nour and criticize the African Union for allowing
the military build-up in West Darfur. All three key SLM and
JEM leaders have met with Deby and described their similar
preoccupations. The resulting common ground allowed Deby to
patch up relations with key Darfurian rebel leaders Minni
Minawi, Khalil Ibrahim, and to some extent Abdelwahid Nour.
Abdelwahid has promised Deby help in October, but has not
seen Deby since November. He is angered by Minni,s signing
of the alliance with Khalil, but has told us that he believes
the Government of Sudan intends to overthrow Deby and destroy
the Darfur rebel movements. For his part, Minni,s reported
weakened position on the ground made the alliance with Khalil
and better relations with Chad attractive. Besides ethnic
solidarity, Minni and to a minimal extent, Khalil, control
the area of Darfur north of Tine to the Libyan border. This
allows the Chadian military to concentrate its forces and
attention to Abeche and parts south. Khalil, in our view,
can offer Deby financial connections to Dubai and other
Middle Eastern sources of weapons.

NDJAMENA 00000143 004 OF 005



- - - - - - -
WHAT'S NEXT?
- - - - - - -


12. (C) Chadian military and public officials are gearing up
for additional attacks on Chad. Chadian military forces have
reinforced the Adre-Abeche and Goz Beida area. As a result,
many observers here speculate that the Chadian rebels will
not attempt another large-scale attack at Adre. Instead,
Nour and the Chadian deserters may instead opt for smaller,
more frequent assaults on lightly defended targets, such as
Guereda and Iriba or small towns along the border south of
Abeche in order to draw out Chadian units from Abeche. Other
observers see a three-pronged attack coming, in which attacks
on Kulbus-Guereda-Iriba-Tine, Adre-Abeche, and Tisi-Goz Beida
are launched simultaneously.


13. (C) Our contacts within the political opposition in
N,Djamena believe that there will be a more coordinated set
of attacks in the near future. Members of the Coalition of
Parties for the Defense of the Constitution (CDPC) have
regular contact with the Sudanese rebels, SCUD, the Erdimi's,
former Minister of Defense Djibine Dassert and his group of
deserters in central Chad, the Movement for Democracy and
Justice in the Tibesti (MDJT),and opposition members in
exile in France and Benin Republic. According to several
CDPC members, Abakar Tolli, reportedly a frequent caller from
Sudan, said on January 24 that every day that passes allows
Deby to acquire more weaponry. As a result, time is on
Deby,s side, not the side of the rebellion. For this
reason, most of the political opposition believes that an
attack is imminent. A key question is whether or not a
rushed operation will be more successful than the Adre attack
on December 18.


14. (C) The political opposition is more and more open about
its attempts to coordinate with the armed movements. The
CDPC is concerned that a Mahamat Nour-led rebellion will not
bring about the type of political transition necessary to
support stability to Chad. Their transition plan is a
national dialogue or round table that would bring together
the political opposition, the armed opposition, the ruling
party, religious leaders, the military, and technocrats under
the leadership of someone who would help manage an
internationally-backed political transition. Over the past
two weeks, various CDPC members have met with the Ambassador,
DCM, and P/E officer to give their assessments of upcoming
events. They foresee several offensives on the rebel fronts,
in the east by Nour, SCUD, and others and in the north by the
MDJT in Faya Largeau and Bardai. They claim that once these
attacks happen, Dassert's forces will begin moving toward
N,Djamena from the south. Within N,Djamena, the labor
unions will be joined by the opposition in the streets. They
also claim that there will be additional military desertions
from military garrisons in N,Djamena. The CDPC also
believes that these actions will cause the regime to collapse
or at a minimum enter into negotiations for a transition.

- - - - - - -
IMPLICATIONS
- - - - - - -


15. (C) The deterioration of the Chad-Sudan border situation
could seriously destabilize the region. Instability
resulting in an irregular regime change in Chad undermines
efforts to promote a peaceful political transition (Ref D).
Worse, we could be confronted with a strongman and
potentially Islamic Government installed with support from
Khartoum. Attacks along the Adre-Abeche-Goz Beida or the
Guereda-Iriba-Tine axis and potential ethnic violence could
lead to the displacement of Sudanese refugees who sought
protection in Chad and creation of large numbers of
internally-displaced Chadians. The potential involvement of
jandjaweed in collaboration with Chadian rebels and/or
displacement of jandjaweed into Chad could start another
Darfur-like situation on this side of the border.
Reverberations would be felt in Sudan, Central African
Republic, Cameroon, and possibly northern Nigeria.

NDJAMENA 00000143 005 OF 005


Cameroonian authorities have already expressed to Emboffs
their concern of the impact of a crisis in Chad on regional
stability.


16. (C) Further instability on the border will also hurt
peace talks on Darfur in Abuja. Darfur rebels groups
interpret the Sudanese-backed Chadian rebellion as targeting
them. They also allege African Union complicity by allowing
the build up of Sudanese force in contravention of the
cease-fire. Both JEM and SLM have told us that if Sudan
should launch operations against Chad, they will walk away
from the peace talks, in which their confidence is already
waning. Finally, if Chadian suspicions about Sudanese
intentions of seeking a military solution in Darfur are
correct, the ability to reach an agreement in Abuja may be
inextricably tied to success or failure of Chadian rebel
border operations.


17. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL