JEM'S KHALIL IBRAHIM VISITS CHAD

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SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: JEM'S KHALIL IBRAHIM VISITS CHAD

REF: EMAIL EXCHANGE BETWEEN AMBASSADOR WALL AND
AF/SPG DIRECTOR LANDIS OF DECEMBER 4 AND 5

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Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Instability in Chad is a result of the
Government of Sudan's plans to destabilize the Deby regime,
destroy indigenous populations, and permit the migration of
Arab communities to these areas, according to Justice and
Equality Movement's Khalil Ibrahim. Khalil would not openly
admit that the JEM had military assets in Chad, but stressed
that it opposed the overthrow of the Deby regime by force.
The JEM and other Sudanese rebel commanders of the National
Redemption Front, he noted, had demonstrated that they can
soundly defeat the Sudanese Armed Forces. The NRF, according
to Khalil, was ready to negotiate with the GOS and regional
actors, but the international community must step up efforts
to provide an alternative to the Darfur Peace Agreement.
While he did not oppose an international peacekeeping
presence in Darfur, Khalil expressed concern that the lack of
a comprehensive peace plan would make any peacekeeping
operation extremely difficult. END SUMMARY.

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SUDANESE REBELS NOT IN CHAD, BUT OPPOSE THE OVERTHROW OF DEBY
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2. (C) On December 5, Justice and Equality Movement's
Chairman Dr. Khalil Ibrahim met with the Ambassador to
discuss perspectives on current relations with Chad and Sudan
as well as prospects for peace in the region. Khalil said
that his visit to Chad was part of a wider trip to meet with
JEM representatives in Europe and other African countries, as
well as government officials from countries that directly
bordered Sudan, such as Chad, Libya and Sudan. Khalil noted
that his meetings in Tripoli with President Qadhafi, Sudanese
authorities, and non-signatories were productive, even though
little concrete progress was made. Qadhafi, according to
Ibrahim, understood the need for dialogue and unity among
African and non-African leaders in the region. This made
Qadhafi the counterweight to President Bechir's plans to
create a gap between African Arabs and non-Arabs, with an
eventual intent to destroy indigenous African communities and
pave the way for the spread of Arabic influence from Sudan.


3. (C) The current threat against the Chadian regime was
part of Bechir's master-plan, according to Khalil. By
overthrowing the Chadian regime, and destroying ethnic
Chadian communities in the process, Sudanese Arabs would be
able to expand into Chadian territory, establish communities
and prosper off the lands that originally belonged to the
indigenous peoples. Khalil said that his organization could
not allow this injustice (which he equated to the suffering
against Darfurians at the hands of the Sudanese military and
Janjaweed militias) to take place, and was opposed to any
forceful overthrow of the government of President Deby. When
asked whether that meant military support, Khalil quickly
said that JEM forces were not in Chad helping the Deby
regime, and were focused only on fighting the Sudanese armed
forces in Darfur. Nevertheless, JEM did benefit from the
movement's normalized relations with Chad by having a
diplomatic ally that permitted travel and transit for
representatives of the rebel movement.

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NRF COUNTERING SUDANESE MILITARY
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4. (C) Khalil stated that the JEM and their allies in the
National Redemption Front were firmly in control of a large
amount of territory extending from El Geneina to the
Sudan-Libya border. He claimed that NRF forces outnumbered
any military elements loyal to Sudanese presidential advisor
Minni Minawi, and noted that the NRF had soundly defeated the
SAF in Kulkul, Um Sidr, and Kariyari in the past several
months. According to Khalil, the ability of the NRF to
militarily counter the Sudanese army should be an indication
that the GOS cannot bring peace through military means, which
was Bechir's original plan. He added that the NRF's military
victories should be an indication to the international
community that the NRF must be included in any plans to reach
a comprehensive peace in Darfur.

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NEW NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT NECESSARY
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5. (C) Khalil contended that the DPA was a failure, and that
new negotiations must take place to provide a lasting peace
for Darfur. He argued that rather than solving the external
complexities of the Darfur crisis (which appeared to be the

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original intent of the DPA),a lasting peace would have to
clearly address the root causes of the crisis. Specifically,
a new peace agreement would have to include clearer
indications of proportional representation for the Darfurian
people, individual compensation, and enhanced security
measures, such as clear timelines for the disarming of
Janjaweed militias. The JEM and NRF would accept being a
part of Sudan, and even accept the legitimacy of President
Bechir's regime, but would accept the current inequities that
existed on the ground. Khalil said that he would reconsider
a second stab at a peace agreement, so long as the JEM could
actively participate in the negotiations.


6. (C) The JEM chairman continued to say that the rejection
of the DPA by the Sudanese refugee and IDP populations was
another sign that a new agreement must be negotiated. Khalil
stated that the formulation of a new agreement should be
comprehensive, bringing in all non-signatories and splinter
groups of the Sudanese Liberation Movement. Excluding some
rebel groups and accepting others would only create further
discord and prevent the achievement of a lasting accord. In
addition, the mediation efforts should be dictated by
countries directly implicated by the conflict, which would
include Chad, Eritrea, Libya, Central African Republic and
Egypt, and be supported by the international community.
However, according to Khalil, the African Union should have a
limited role in the negotiations, as their role in the past
had been to manipulate agreements without allowing any input
from the negotiating parties.

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INTERNATIONAL FORCE ONLY WORKS WITH PEACE ON THE GROUND
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7. (C) Khalil said that the NRF would not oppose the
presence of an international force along the Chad-Sudan
border. However, he expressed concern that the lack of a
durable peace would impede the work of a peacekeeping force,
and threaten the lives of the peacekeepers themselves. For a
mission to be successful, a new agreement accepted all
parties would have to be in place. Khalil reiterated that
the JEM was willing to work with the rest of the rebel
movements, the United States, and the international community
to develop a new framework for a comprehensive agreement.


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ATTEMPTS AT INTRA-ZAGHAWA FENCE-MENDING
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8. (C) Khalil told the Ambassador on his way out that he was
working to encourage a rapprochement between President Deby
and Timan Erdimi, the leader of the main Zaghawa-based rebel
faction. He said that he was advising Deby to accept Timan
Erdimi's demands with the exception of Erdimi's insistence
that Deby steps down as president. Khalil was confident that
the feuding Zaghawa leaders could patch things up soon.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Khalil's obstructionist tactics in the Abuja peace
talks and since then have endeared him to virtually no one.
But like it or not, he remains the leading voice in one of
the key Darfur rebel movements. In this meeting, he stressed
his interest in constructive contacts with us and sought to
downplay any continuing associations with his Turabist past.
Special Envoy Natsios's visit to Chad next week may provide
an opportunity to pursue discussions with him, if we consider
them desirable. If so, we should keep that in mind before
moving forward now on travel bans or asset freezes against
Khalil.


10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL