DPKO STILL FORMULATING PLAN FOR EASTERN CHAD

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001383

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL SU UNSC CD KPKO
SUBJECT: DPKO STILL FORMULATING PLAN FOR EASTERN CHAD
DEPLOYMENT

REF: N'DJAMENA 01378

NDJAMENA 00001383 001.4 OF 002



1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Ambassador and Poloff met with the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) on December 1 and 2,
before and after a meeting between the TAM and President
Deby. The TAM reported that Deby had agreed in principle to
deployment of UN forces in eastern Chad, but raised
fundamental questions about the nature and mandate of the
force. The TAM will depart Chad December 3 without having
visited the eastern border region and will accordingly make
only preliminary recommendations to the Security Council for
an eventual UN presence in eastern Chad and Central African
Republic (CAR),pursuant to paragraph 9(d) of UN Security
Council Resolution 1706. DPKO Assistant-Secretary-General
(A/SYG) Hedi Annabi posited that any force in Chad and CAR
would be "separate yet integrated" into the eventual Darfur
operation. Annabi did not offer much insight into DPKO's
thinking on the mandate of the Chad force beyond warning that
the more involved in border security the force was intended
to be, the heavier the UN footprint that would be required.
The diplomatic community present at the December 1 briefing
stressed that no sustainable security solution in Chad was
possible without a parallel political process, a point agreed
between the Ambassador and Annabi in their private December 2
meeting. END SUMMARY.

TAM'S WORK IN CHAD IS DONE FOR NOW
--------------

2. (SBU) DPKO A/SYG Annabi told a December 1 gathering of the
diplomatic community that the TAM's work in Chad would be
incomplete on account of recent instability in the eastern
border region, which had prevented the team's travel there.
Annabi admitted that the recommendations the TAM planned to
present to the Security Council before the end of December
for an eventual UN presence in Chad and CAR would be only
preliminary and that another assessment visit would
eventually be required to develop a proper concept of
operations.


3. (SBU) Annabi reported a productive meeting with CAR
President Bozize, who had confirmed that anti-government
rebels re-captured the northeastern town of Birao. Annabi
noted that Bozize had been unambiguous in his support for a
UN presence in CAR, despite equivocation on the part of
President Deby.


4. (SBU) In a private meeting December 2 with the Ambassador,
Annabi described his 90-minute discussion earlier in the day
with President Deby on the TAM's visit. Annabi expressed
frustration at what he speculated was either Deby's "lack of
knowledge about how the UN works" or his "not wanting to
upset le guide (COL Qadhafi)" during their conversation about
a UN presence in Chad. First, Deby had insisted, as he had
in a November 29 meeting with the Ambassador (reftel),that
the most urgent priority in ensuring security in the east was
to immediately re-locate the refugee camps away from the
border. Deby had then raised the possibility of deploying
the same type of hybrid force in Chad as was being
contemplated for Darfur, a possibility which Annabi
dismissed. Deby went on to ask if the UN envisioned
integrating its presence with the Chadian armed forces under
a single Chadian commander, again dismissed by Annabi.
Finally, Deby had raised concerns that the eventual
deployment would infringe upon GOC sovereignty and
territorial integrity.

5. (SBU) While Annabi acknowledged Deby's comments were
reminiscent of those made by Sudanese President Bashir
regarding UN deployment in Darfur, Annabi deemed that Deby
understood his message by the end of their meeting and took
Deby's agreement in principle to UN forces as a positive sign
of GOC support. Nevertheless, he recommended that "pedagogic
work" remained to be done to ensure Deby remained engaged on
the process of UN deployment in Chad. Annabi tried to broach
the topic of political dialogue with President Deby to no
avail. The diplomatic community present at the December 1
briefing stressed that no sustainable security solution in
Chad was possible without a parallel political process, a
point agreed between the Ambassador and Annabi in their
private December 2 meeting.

MANDATE OPTIONS
--------------

NDJAMENA 00001383 002.8 OF 002



6. (SBU) Annabi described two possible goals for UN
deployment in Chad: one, to contribute to the creation of an
environment that would improve the security situation in the
refugee camps and internally displaced persons (IDPs) zones;
or two, to establish a highly mobile border force along
principal access routes that would deter cross-border
attacks. To accomplish these goals, Annabi outlined three
major options for a UN presence in eastern Chad and CAR. The
"light" option envisioned by DPKO would station unarmed
monitors on the ground. Annabi warned that this option would
provide only a limited number of personnel, would be
insufficient to protect affected populations and would run
the risk of suffering reduced credibility as had AMIS in
Darfur. The "medium" option would station troops in three
principal locations in Chad's eastern border region, as well
as in one location in northeastern CAR, and would also
include a police contingent to assist local authorities in
protecting civil society. The "big" option would be an
ambitious peacekeeping operation geared at stopping by force
cross-border attacks and weapons flows. To carry out such a
preventative mission would require a Chapter VII mandate, as
well as significant personnel and financial resources, none
of which were assured, Annabi admitted.


7. (SBU) Annabi acknowledged that even the "medium" option
would require time to stand up, noting deployment of 10,000
UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) forces in southern Sudan had
taken over one year to complete. Annabi added that another
Security Council resolution would be necessary to articulate
force size and mandate of the Chad operation. Annabi
mentioned the traditional difficulties associated with
generating Francophone troop contributors. He also flagged
the absence of political stability in Chadian as an
additional impediment to troop-contributing countries'
commitment and as a less-than-ideal condition under which a
UN operation could deploy, given no clear indication of an
eventual exit strategy.


8. (SBU) In his private meeting with the Ambassador, Annabi
sought our input on what an eventual UN presence in Chad and
CAR could look like and our analysis of the current security
situation in eastern Chad. Annabi noted that the UN
typically made up for what it lacked in military
sophistication by putting more "boots on the ground," which
he suspected would be the case if the Security Council were
to eventually authorize a heavy UN presence on the Chad-Sudan
border. Annabi was firm that any force be highly mobile and
come equipped with air assets. He speculated that a
quick-reaction capability would be useful for intervening in
the face of inter-ethnic conflicts in the southeast border
region, were the force's mandate to assign it this
responsibility. Annabi was concerned about the issue of how
a force would be perceived by Chadian rebels, stressing that
it would need to make clear to all parties within Chad -
government and rebel alike - the provisions of its mandate so
as to be seen as neutral.
WALL