CHADIAN ELECTIONS IN 2007

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 NDJAMENA 001382

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM CD
SUBJECT: CHADIAN ELECTIONS IN 2007


1. (SBU) Summary. The Chadian
government estimates that the 2006
communal elections and the 2007
legislative elections will cost
around $11.65 million; and it has
requested financial assistance from
the US, France, Germany, the European
Union, and the United Nations
Development Program. The GOC has
accepted the EU's offer to provide
Euros five million toward
reconstituting the electoral lists,
revamping the independent election
commission, and reworking the
electoral code, along with a one-year
experts' mission to establish an
electoral timetable and benchmarks.
President Deby is unlikely to want an
independent legislature holding him
to account as he fights for his life.
The ruling party is comfortable with
the perks of power. The political
opposition detests Deby and does not
believe there can be a fair election;
convincing them otherwise will be a
hard sell. Unresolved rebellion and
communal violence in the East will
militate against credibility.
Nevertheless, the GOC's early start,
the EU's plan, and the arrival of an
activist EU ambassador give Chad a
slim hope for a plausible legislative
election. We should support these
efforts. End Summary.

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The Election Request
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2. (U) In a letter dated October 5,
2006, Chadian Prime Minister Pascal
Yoadimnadji requested aid from the
United States, France, Germany, the
European Union and the UNDP to
conduct communal (local) elections at
the end of 2006 and legislative
elections sometime in 2007, estimated
to cost in excess of CFA 6 billion
($11,650,000 at $1 = CFA 515). The
PM's aid estimate is based on costs
for logistics, materials, equipment,
documents, civic education, training
for officials, redefining urban
district boundaries, and updating
voter lists.


3. (U) Separate studies funded by
the UNDP and the EU concluded that
the electoral process is broken;
virtually no one outside the ruling
party has confidence in it. Even the
ruling Patriotic Salvation Movement
(MPS) acknowledges "problems".
According to the studies, Chad needs:

--a population census (the last one
dates from the early 90s) to which we
plan to contribute $150,000 in ESF;

--a complete reworking of the
electoral lists (voter registration);

--new voter identification
procedures;

--redistricting;


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--revamping of the electoral code;

--a permnent, trained, and truly
Independent National Elction
Commission (CENI);

--comprehensive training for election
officials down to the precinct level;
and

--comprehensive and fair voter
education.

The PM's request includes some, but
not all, of these items.


4. (U) CENI is currently
reconstituted for each election on an
ad hoc basis. The government--which
tends to install its partisans--
controls the membership; and there is
no permanent staff. There are
competing proposals on how to reform
the Commission, but all include
representation by opposition parties
and concerned civil society groups,
as well as the creation of a
permanent, "neutral" staff to provide
expertise and continuity.


5. (U) There are also competing
proposals for reform of the election
code; but most independent observers
agree that a revised law must include
provision for a permanent CENI,
provision for outside observers, an
effective appeals procedure, and a
ballot preservation/recount
procedure.

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The Donor Response
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6. (U) The European Union,
including the bilateral French and
German missions, responded to the
Prime Minister on October 12 with an
offer of five million Euros to redo
the electoral lists, overhaul the
electoral code, and reconstitute
CENI. The EU-proposal, which the GOC
accepted on November 3, would focus
on the 2007 National Assembly
elections and ignore the 2006
communal elections. (Although the EU
believes that the time is too short
to organize successful communal
elections before the end of 2006 and
sees merit in postponing them, it
also does not consider them
significant given the predominantly
rural character of the Chadian
population.) Upon acceptance of its
proposal by the Prime Minister, the
EU would dispatch an "experts team"
to Chad to determine an electoral
calendar, establish milestones, and
monitor reform progress.


7. (SBU) In a November 3 meeting
with the US, German, and French
embassies, the EU mission, and the
UNDP, former French Ambassador Jean-
Pierre Bercot explained EU (plus
German and French) thinking on
Chadian election reform.

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Essentially, the EU would fund
reforms on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. The opposition would be
encouraged to accede, but the reforms
would go forward whether they bought-
in or not. This yes/no approach
represents a break from earlier
attempts to craft an electoral system
acceptable to both the government and
the opposition. Previously, there
was hope to gain acceptance of each
step in the process by both sides.
The EU's current approach can be read
as dissatisfaction with both the
Chadian government and the political
opposition, a frustration palpable in
the former French Ambassador's
forceful presentation. The EU urged
the donor community to support its
approach and not allow the GOC to
play the donors against each other.


8. (U) In a letter dated November 3
to the EU, the Prime Minister
accepted the EU's proposal.

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The Chadian Players
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9. (U) President Deby's Patriotic
Salvation Movement controls 123 of
the 155 seats in the National
Assembly (NA). Allied parties
control 6 seats. Three opposition
groupings control 26 seats.

THE PATRIOTIC SALVATION MOVEMENT
(MPS)
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10. (SBU) The MPS assures Deby's
dominance of the legislative branch
of the Chadian government. While the
NA may occasionally question a
minister, it never challenges Deby
himself or his priority programs and,
in the end, never seriously threatens
a minister. The Chadian legislature
under the MPS is the quintessential
rubber-stamp.


11. (U) With backing from Libya and
Sudan, President Deby founded the MPS
in 1989 as the vehicle for his revolt
against Hissene Habre. Today, the
MPS has transformed into Chad's most
diverse political party, garnering
representation and support from all
regions of the country. While
Muslims form its backbone, the party
has a solid cadre in Christian areas.


12. (SBU) Virtually all observers
agree that President Deby and his MPS
are unwilling to risk losing control
of the National Assembly. While the
party's national base would almost
guarantee its continued control of
the legislature, the national power
structure is probably unwilling to
risk any significant diminution of
its power, especially with the regime
facing rebellion in the East.
Additionally, MPS adherents may
simply not be prepared for a stiff
contest in a transparent environment.

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UNDP Director Kingsley Amaning posits
Chad's MPS as an amalgamation of
three groups:

--Warriors. This group stems from
the ancient and pragmatic tradition
of desert warfare. The warriors
would accept political and electoral
reforms but would insist that they
(the MPS) retain power, despite the
reforms.

--Semi-activists. This is the second-
level power structure, the
secretaries general, the party's

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water carriers. They lack a culture
of competition. They know that they
are next in line to feed at the power
trough, and they do not want to
gamble their future fortunes on the
whims of an electorate.

--Techno-bureaucrats. These are the
militants who hold the patronage
jobs, and want to keep them. They
have never faced any real competition
and are clueless about running a
competitive political campaign. They
are risk-averse and comfortable with
the status quo.

In essence, the MPS has no interest
in free, fair, and transparent
elections.

THE OPPOSITION
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13. (U) Chad's 36 opposition
parties have two things in common: a
profound distrust of President Deby
and a desire for power. In the
estimation of many of these leaders,
Deby has variously destroyed the
Chadian state, fomented the Darfur
crisis, plundered the treasury, and
repressed the masses. He can do no
good, according to them; and he will
steal the National Assembly in 2007.


14. (U) Many of the political
opposition parties are regionally or
ethnically based. Some are formed
around a particular individual who,
in many instances, has previously
served in the Deby regime. Most have
no vision for Chad other than to
begin a national dialogue among the
various actors, including the eastern
rebels. The goal of such a
conference, they say, would be to
develop a framework for transparent
elections, reform the military and
security services, and reform the
justice system and public sector
finance.


15. (U) The opposition can be
separated into two groups: Those who
competed for the National Assembly in
the 2002 elections and those who
boycotted.

--The joiners. Five parties split
the 26 opposition seats with ten
going to the Rally for Democracy and
Progress (RDP),nine to the Front for

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the Action Forces for the Republic
(FAR),two to parties allied to FAR,
and five to the National Union for
Democracy and Renewal (UNDR). The
leaders of the RDP and the FAR (19
seats) have indicated that they are
dissatisfied with the NA, calling it
a useless and powerless institution.
As things stand, both leaders plan to
have their parties boycott the 2007
elections. At this time, the UNDR
appears ready to compete. The views
of the two one-seat parties are
unknown.

--The boycotters. The Coordination
of Political Parties for Defense of
the Constitution (CPDC) is the
umbrella organization for 28
opposition parties (including the non-
boycotting UNDR). With the exception
of UNDR, it currently appears that
most of the CPDC members plan to
continue their boycott in 2007. Like
the RDP and the FAR, the leaders of
these parties see the NA as nothing
more than a rubber-stamp for
President Deby; and they are
convinced that Deby and the MPS will
steal their way to victory.

OPPOSITION PARTICIPATION IN THE 2007
ELECTIONS?
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16. (SBU) At least some of the
opposition party leaders, however,
might be open to eventual
participation in the upcoming
legislative election, should "real"
reform take place. Poloff spoke to
the major party leaders individually,
away from their opposition homologues
and the shell of the CPDC, and asked
them if EU-type proposals would
encourage them to participate.
Salibou Garba of the National
Alliance for Democracy and
Development and Lol Mahamat Choua of
the RDP (currently in the NA)
indicated that they would consider
taking part in the 2007 contest if
the international donor community
could guarantee meaningful reforms
along the lines posed by the EU.
They would want to examine the
reforms, however, before they
committed; and they would want to
scrutinize the international
community's transparency guarantees.
In the end, they believe that Deby
will find a way to steal the
election; and convincing them
otherwise will be a hard sell.


17. (SBU) Other parties indicated
openness to participation but
attached conditions exceeding the EU
proposals. A national dialogue in
advance of the elections was the
favorite. A guarantee of Deby's
retirement at the end of his current
term was another. Demonstrating that
it was impossible for Deby to
circumvent the reforms was a third.
In essence, profound distrust of Deby
may negate any goodwill generated

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from international donor community-
backed reforms. FAR leader Yorongar
simply stated "[participating] is not
worth the trouble".

THE PRESIDENT
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18. (U) President Deby is the locus
of politics in Chad and the "bete
noir" of the opposition. He has held
power for 16 years and has been
elected three times. He changed the
constitution to permit himself a
third term, a tarnished election in
the view of most international
observers. The international
community, the political and rebel
oppositions, and probably most
Chadians believe that President Deby
intends to remain president for life.


19. (U) According to observers,
President Deby views himself as a
desert warrior chief who almost
certainly believes no one can rule
Chad better than he. He appears to
take counsel from no one. Due to the
insurgency in the East and communal
violence along the border with Sudan,
Deby is presently detached from the
everyday concerns of government and
the non-military needs of his
country. He is fighting for his
political life--and perhaps his
physical life too.

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The Probability
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20. (U) Despite the best efforts of
the international donor community,
free, fair, and transparent
legislative elections will be
extremely difficult to pull off in

2007.


21. (U) President Deby has no
interest in permitting a legislative
body that could oppose his plans,
question his priorities and his use
of state money, or undercut his
efforts in the East. The MPS has no
interest in jeopardizing the
employment of its adherents and the
privileges of rank. The opposition
has no interest in legitimizing what
it believes will be a fraudulent MPS
victory. The EU and the
international community ultimately
cannot guarantee the sanctity of the
ballot box in the absence of the
government's unwillingness to cede
power.


22. (U) Exacerbating electoral
credibility are the security
situation in the East and the
implementation of press censorship.
Rebellion and communal violence in
the East have resulted in tens of
thousands of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDP) whom it will be
extremely difficult to keep track of
as election day approaches. The
Chadian military and security forces,

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already stretched thin along the
eastern and southern borders, would
be hard pressed to provide security
at every polling station or offer
even modest assurances of safety for
international observers in the border
regions. Finally, the provision for
press censorship banning reports on
rebel activities and communal
violence contained in the current
State of Emergency--which the
National Assembly extended on
November 24 for six months--would
make it impossible for the opposition
to discuss issues that could
reasonably be expected to play a
major role in a national legislative
election.


23. (U) Given the current power
structure's incentives to retain
power and the difficulty inherent in
conducting free, fair, and
transparent elections in a censored
and volatile environment, the GOC
would find it extremely difficult to
conduct elections meeting even
minimal international standards of
credibility.

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The Possibility
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24. (U) Nonetheless, there is a
possibility. The Chadian government
has begun preparing for the
legislative elections almost a year
in advance, which represents a
significant improvement in its
planning process. The European
Union, with the full backing of the
French and German bilateral missions,
has committed significant funding to
the electoral process, as well as a
plan that the EU believes will
provide institutional backbone for a
transparent election. The European
Commission's new Ambassador to Chad,
Gilles Desesquelles, recently arrived
from TOGO where he participated in
the effort to reform that country's
election process, is committed to
pushing the plan forward in
cooperation with the donor community.
The Chadian Prime Minister has
accepted the European plan on behalf
of the government. Some Chadian
opposition party leaders have
indicated a qualified willingness to
participate in the legislative
elections if certain reforms are
implemented.


25. (U) Settling the framework and
finances for the NA election gives
the EU's experts time to develop
voter registration procedures,
electoral code changes, and a
structure for the election commission
that is acceptable to reasonable
observers. The experts' electoral
timetable and progress indicators
will give the international donor
community and the opposition
objective milestones by which to
measure the government's headway--and

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commitment to reform.


26. (U) Although prospects for a
free, fair, and transparent vote next
year remain unlikely, the convergence
of the GOC's unexpectedly early
planning process, the EU's well-
funded plan, and the arrival of an
allied ambassador with experience in
problematic electoral environments
gives Chad a slim chance for a
somewhat more credible process in

2007. To the extent these reforms
can be implemented, this will make it
harder to manipulate the electoral
process during the presidential
elections in 2011. While avoiding
any false hopes of rapid progress, we
nonetheless believe we should support
efforts for electoral reform in Chad
next year and urge that resources be
made available to allow us to do so.


27. (U) Tripoli minimize
considered.

Wall