Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA1351
2006-11-24 15:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO CHAD ON POLITICAL

Tags:  CD PGOV PREF SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7913
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1351/01 3281502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241502Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4596
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001351 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: CD PGOV PREF SU
SUBJECT: NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO CHAD ON POLITICAL
DIALOGUE AND REBEL STRENGTH

Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001351

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PARIS AND LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2016
TAGS: CD PGOV PREF SU
SUBJECT: NEW FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO CHAD ON POLITICAL
DIALOGUE AND REBEL STRENGTH

Classified By: DCM LUCY TAMLYN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: The new French Ambassador to Chad
acknowledged that France's special relationship with Chad
made it difficult to push for the kind of political overtures
which were needed to strengthen Chad's democratic
institutions; he looked to the EU troika to assist in
carrying the message. In his view, President Deby did not
want an international force in Chad to be a platform for a UN
force in Sudan, but did not appear against such a force in
principle and wanted to be consulted about its role. Foucher
also reported that a massing of three rebel columns was
taking place along the Chad/Sudan border. End Summary.

VISITS FROM PARIS
--------------


2. (C) The new French Ambassador to Chad, Bruno Foucher,
paid a call on the Ambassador November 24. Ambassador Foucher
touched on visits which he had already hosted and which he
expected in the next week. Commanding the most attention
would be the November 30 visit of French Prime Minister
Dominique de Villepin. De Villepin, according to Ambassador
Foucher, would make a three-hour "friendship stop" in
N'djamena with enough time for lunch with President Deby and
a tour of the French base before continuing on to
Johannesburg. Foucher noted that de Villepin and President
Deby were old acquaintances but that this would be de
Villepin's first visit to Chad as Prime Minister. He said
that there was no special message that de Villepin would
bring on the visit. A few days earlier, Ambassador Foucher
had hosted the visit of the French Minister of Defense.
During the Minister's meeting with President Deby, the
situation on Chad's eastern border, the situation in Central
African Republic (CAR),the recent Tripoli Summit and a
Chadian request for French equipment were discussed; the
visit was not, however, intended to convey any particular
message, according to Ambassador Foucher.

DEBY CONCERNED BY LACK OF CONSULTATIONS ON BORDER FORCE
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Ambassador Foucher reported that President Deby had
many questions concerning a possible international force on

Chad's eastern border. Foucher explained that Deby was
comfortable with a UN force in Darfur, but he hadn't
understood France's recent call for a force in Chad, and was
unhappy that he was not being consulted on this issue. Deby
furthermore made clear that he did not want such a force to
be a launching pad for a UN force in Darfur. Ambassador
Foucher commented that the force in question was a
realization of provisions of UN Security Resolution 1706, not
any recommendation for a new body. Foucher reiterated that
the President did not appear to be against a force in
principle, but needed to be consulted.


4. (C) Ambassador Foucher responded positively to the
Ambassador's query as to whether France would be interested
in joining with the U.S. and the EU in a common approach to
President Deby concerning an international force on the
border. He agreed with the Ambassador that the mandate still
needed to be determined, and the recommendation of the
upcoming UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
visit would set the stage for further clarification on this
point. The Ambassador recalled that a key concern of UNSCR
1706, para 9(d) was protecting the humanitarian space around
the refugee camps. A force to protect the refugees and the
humanitarian workers, and access to the camps was
straightforward. Whether such a force would have a mandate
to "dissuade" Janjaweed attackers in the Dar Silla region
would certainly require a more robust presence. Ambassador
Foucher agreed that in that case a new resolution might be
needed (which, in an event, might be in the offing as a
result of the Adis Ababa agreement.)

CHAD REBELS ON THE MOVE
--------------


5. (C) Turning to Chad's political situation, Ambassador
Foucher stated that rebels belonging to UFDD head Mahamat
Nouri were apparently moving to the Chad border in three
columns with anywhere from 250 to 400 vehicles. Surveillance
planes had been flown from France's Epervier base last night
but they had not been able to see anything. Foucher said
that the Chad Minister of Defense believed that Nouri was
moving forward in order to undermine the Tripoli accord
between Sudan and Chad. According to Foucher, however,
President Deby still believes that Nouri is taking orders
from Sudan and that the Sudanese were simply demonstrating
their duplicity. Ambassador Foucher reported that President

NDJAMENA 00001351 002 OF 002


Deby was very concerned about the situation in CAR. Northern
CAR was virtually out of Bangui's control and this ungoverned
area could be used by Sudan.

PRESIDENT DEBY'S POLITICAL FUTURE - A ROLE FOR EU PRESSURE
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's question on President
Deby's political future, Ambassador Foucher responded that
there were no apparent alternatives. However, if Deby were to
suddenly disappear from the scene, he feared inter-clan
warfare in Chad. According to Foucher, France believed that
President Deby needed to make political overtures --
"gestures" to Chad's political opposition. The EU wanted to
see credible elections in 2007 with the opposition
participating. For these reasons the EU was financing
electoral assistance. France did not agree with the Chadian
opposition that the armed opposition had a "right to speak"
under the current circumstances. To do so would be to
validate any Chadian who took up arms against the regime.
Turning to the tools at hand to prod the Deby regime to make
these gestures, Ambassador Foucher acknowledged that it was
better for the EU Troika to be advocating them, inasmuch as
France has a "special relationship" with Chad. A ministerial
level visit by the Troika - possibly headed by Commissioner
Luis Michell -- might be possible before the end of the year
to bring a message to the President.

TRIPOLI SUMMIT READ-OUT
--------------

7. (C) Foucher called the Tripoli Summit yet another effort
to reconcile Chad and Sudan and to implement the Tripoli
Accords. This included reiterating the need to pull rebels
100 kilometers from the border and disarm them. According to
Foucher, President Deby did not consider this feasible for
Chad, given the dispersed nature of the Sudanese rebels; on
the other hand, given that Sudan was manifestly arming and
supporting Chadian rebels, Sudan could disarm them if it
chose to do so. Ambassador Foucher appeared sympathetic to
Deby's argument, and noted that he had asked French
intelligence services in Paris to identify any Chadian
Government support for Sudanese rebels. Thus far they had not
been able to provide this. President Deby is supposed to
travel to Khartoum November 26 to discuss the proposal for
mixed forces to patrol the border. In the meantime, two
Chadian representatives have stayed behind in Tripoli to
continue working with Libyan authorities on efforts to bring
in Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) non-signatories, and two
Sudanese counterparts would join them.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (C) "End of an era" was not infrequently heard from
French colleagues describing the departure of Ambassador
Jean-Pierre Bercot. The new era appears to be one more
interested in taking advantage of EU cover to push for
strengthening of democratic institutions in Chad, recognizing
the limitations that France's "special relationship" with
Chad places on more aggressive bilateral pressure. Embassy
has received corroborating reports on Chadian rebel movements
and will report additional information as we receive it.


9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL