NEW CHADIAN REBEL ALLIANCE--UFDD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001318

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV RREL PINR CD SU
SUBJECT: NEW CHADIAN REBEL ALLIANCE--UFDD


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Classified By: PolOff John O'Leary. Reason 1.4 (d)


1. (C) Summary. Three Chadian rebel groups formed a new
alliance in October 2006. According to its communique, the
Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD) wants to
organize transparent elections and abhors taking power by
force. Nonetheless, it sent an armed column into central
Chad in October and then, several days later, ambushed
pursuing Chadian government troops. Personality conflicts
and ethnic rivalries among the various rebel groups will keep
the rebellion divided, thus dissipating the UFDD's potency.
End comment.


2. (U) Three Chadian rebel groups announced in a communique
dated October 10, 2006 that they were forming a new rebel
alliance, the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development
(UFDD). The participating rebel groups are:

--A Gorane group, Union of Force for Development (UFD),
headed by former Chadian General, Defense Minister, and
Ambassador Mahamat Nouri Allatchi;

--An Arab groupm, Democratic Revolutionary Council (CDR),
headed by former Chadian Foreign Minister and Ambassador
Acheikh Ibni Oumar Said; and

--An Arab faction of the predominately Tama group, United
Front for Change (FUC),headed by former FUC Secretary
General Abdelwahid Aboud Makaye, of Ouaddaien origion.


3. (U) According to the communique, the three groups have
placed their fighters under a unified command and formed a
provisional executive bureau to give the UFDD political
leadership until the organization can hold a congress at an
unspecified date. The communique continued with the
following fundamental principles:

--an affirmation of faith in and attachment to the unity of
the sons and daughters of Chad;

--a rejection of power seized by armed force and a commitment
to hold a national forum comprised of representatives of the
various armed movements, political parties, and civil
society, for the purpose of deciding how to hold "free,
transparent and equitable democratic elections".

--a desire to strengthen solidarity and unity among the
political-military movements and to create "a large, united
front of forces passionate about peace and justice";

--a commitment to respect Chadian agreements with
international and regional partners;

--a commitment to abstain from interfering in the internal
affairs of other countries; and

--a call on Chad,s partners to help the Chadian people
"reestablish peace, unity, and justice".


4. (C) Observers consider the Gorane-Arab alliance
important because these two groups have historic commercial
and family ties; the Arabs are the largest Muslim ethnic
group; and the Gorane are known as fierce fighters. (Former
President Hissein Habre was Gorane.) Further, in the milieu
of Chadian ethnic politics, both groups traditionally disdain
the Zaghawa tribe of President Deby and rival rebel leader
Timan Erdimi (Rally for the Forces of Democracy--RaFD). The
UFDD alliance--if it holds--could mark a significant
development, not only in augmenting unified rebel forces, but
also in the ability of customarily ethnic-based rebels to
appeal to larger cross-sections of the Chadian public.


5. (U) Despite the UFDD's communique rejecting power taken
by force, the group engages in offensive operations against
the Deby regime. In late October, the alliance sent a column
into central Chad where it briefly menaced the Chadian
National Army (ANT) before withdrawing toward Central African
Republic and Sudan. On October 29, UFDD forces ambushed
pursuing Chadian forces, killing the ANT's commanding general
and capturing vehicles, ammunition, and other materiel. Both
sides reportedly took heavy casualties.


6. (C) Despite the reported urgings of Sudanese officials,
it does not appear at this time that the Chadian rebels will
be able to unite their major factions in any meaningful way.
Embassy sources indicate that such an alliance attempted in
August 2006 between Nouri,s own Union of Force for
Development (UFD) and Erdimi,s RaFD quickly collapsed due to
personality clashes between the two leaders. Additionally, a
number of sources indicate that the non-Zaghawa rebels are

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not anxious to replace Zaghawa Deby with Zaghawa Erdimi.


7. (U) Embassy files indicate that:

--Mahamat Nouri was born in 1947 near Faya Largeau in
northern Chad. A member of the Anakaza clan of the Gorane
tribe, he held the rank of Major General in the ANT and
served as Minister of Health in 1993, Livestock in 2000, and
Defense in 2003. He became Deby,s ambassador to Saudi
Arabia in late 2004 and held the post until his defection to
the rebel cause in April 2006. Embassy sources confirm that
he has diabetes. He is characterized as thoughtful,
cautious, and crafty. His defection in late spring 2006 was
considered to be a significant blow to the regime as he is
believed to hold considerable sway among the Gorane.

--Acheikh Ibni Oumar Said was born on July 13, 1951 in
N,Djamena. An ethnic Arab, he served in the Habre
government as Minister of Education, Defense, and Foreign
Affairs. With Deby,s assumption of power in 1990, he became
Special Counselor to the President and served as Ambassador
to the United States from 1992 to 1994. According to press
reports in 2004, he characterized Deby's desire for a third
presidential term as an attempt to become "President for
Life". He is a long-time opponent of Deby and has spent many
years in self-imposed exile, but he has never led a robust
military force.

--Abdelwahid Aboud Makaye, an ethnic Ouaddaien from the
Abeche region, was Secretary General of the FUC before
leading a faction into the UFDD. In a January 2006 interview
with Radio France International, he stated that the FUC had
friendly relations with the Sudanese government and had met
on Sudanese soil. Although he denied that the group received
logistical support from the GOS, he was arrested by Sudanese
authorities and held for several days. In September 2006, a
FUC spokesman indicated that Abdelwahid tried to unilaterally
depose FUC president Mahamat Nour, in violation of the
organization's bylaws. (Nour's exact status vis-a-vis the
FUC is unclear at this time.) In October, Abdulwahid's
faction joined the UFDD.


8. (C) Comment. It is by no means clear that the UFDD can
survive any longer than any of the other rebel coalitions.
Its October foray into Central Chad and successful ambush of
ANT forces, however, indicate that it can undermine popular
confidence in President Deby and play havoc with ANT morale.
Nonetheless, the apparent enmity between the Zaghawa RaFD and
the non-Zaghawa UFDD will work to Deby's advantage as he
struggles to defend his regime. End comment.


9. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
WALL