DPA DISENCHANTMENT AMONG CHADIAN OFFICIALS AND

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001306

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CD PGOV PREF PREL SU KPKO
SUBJECT: DPA DISENCHANTMENT AMONG CHADIAN OFFICIALS AND
SUDANESE REBELS

REF: NDJAMENA 01272


1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Representatives of both the Chadian
Government refugee agency (speaking unofficially) and a
Chad-based Darfur rebel group had common interpretations of
the ineffectiveness of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) and
of the responsibilities of the international community,
namely the United Nations (UN),in protecting Sudanese
refugees in Chad. Their November 2 and 3 comments were
indicative of a growing restlessness and frustration on this
side of the border with Sudan with the continued consequences
of protracted Darfur fighting. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On November 2 Poloff spoke with Nour Abdoulaye,
First Secretary of the N'Djamena Office of the Chadian
National Commission for Refugee Assistance (CNAR),which
oversees the 235 Chadian gendarmes divided among each of the
12 refugee camps in the eastern part of the country. On
November 3 Poloff met with Adam Shogar, spokesman for the G19
faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA).

DPA Disenchantment
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3. (SBU) Neither Abdoulaye nor Shogar had kind words for the
DPA's prospects for success, with Abdoulaye noting that the
Darfur crisis had persisted and in fact worsened in spite of
the Abuja Accords, making them a "bad solution" to the
problems of western Sudan. A "good solution," Abdoulaye
contended, would come from continued dialogue among
non-signatories to the DPA, a dialogue to be brokered by
either the African Union or the UN.


4. (SBU) Shogar vowed that his group would never commit to
the DPA without assurances from the Sudanese Government of
National Unity (GNU) on the issues of power-sharing,
wealth-sharing, compensation for conflict-affected
populations (the biggest bone of contention for
non-signatories, according to Shogar) and integration of
rebel fighters into the Sudanese national forces.


5. (SBU) Shogar acknowledged "rumors" that the GNU had
indicated it would re-open discussions of the DPA with
non-signatory groups, but he dismissed such claims as
disingenuous. Shogar argued that the GNU was not ready to
accept a democratic system in the Sudan, one that would
ultimately grant every citizen a vote, which would mean the
end of the ruling minority National Congress Party (NCP).
Shogar asserted, however, that the NCP must be removed from
power for progress to be made in Sudan.


6. (SBU) Shogar remarked that the DPA's only real tangible
result was "to give a job to Minni" (Minni Minawi, leader of
the SLM/A faction that signed the DPA) and to grant
unwarranted power to both Minawi and Sudanese President
Bashir, contrary to the will of Darfurians. For these
reasons, Shogar insisted that DPA implementation NOT form the
basis of the mandate of any eventual UN force in Darfur.

UN Role in Darfur Crisis = Pick Up the Slack
--------------

7. (SBU) Both Abdoulaye and Shogar agreed that a UN presence
in Chad was necessary to protect the refugees in the camps
along the border, something which Abdoulaye admitted the 235
gendarmes at a ratio of one per thousand refugees lacked the
capacity to do. Nor could the gendarmes ensure border
security: Abdoulaye argued the UN should assume this
responsibility so that the GOC could concentrate on ensuring
its own territorial integrity in the face of cross-border
incursions by Sudanese groups in violation of the Tripoli
Accords.


8. (SBU) Shogar agreed that a UN presence in Chad would be
helpful in protecting refugees from attacks by the Janjaweed
and Chadian rebels. He was explicit in identifying what he
considered key aspects of the mandate of a UN Darfur force,
reiterating that it not be based on DPA implementation.
Instead, Shogar contended the UN focus on protection of
civilians, disarmament of the Janjaweed where Khartoum had
failed to do so, and accountability for human rights
violators through collaboration with the International
Criminal Court. Such discussion, however, was useless,
according to Shogar, given Bashir's resounding no to UN
Security Council Resolution 1706. "Let us fight the Sudanese
Government ourselves," Shogar offered, given what he saw as
the UN's "failure" in this regard.

Comment

NDJAMENA 00001306 002 OF 002


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9. (SBU) There is clearly a disconnect between the upper and
lower echelons of the GOC regarding both the DPA and a
possible UN presence on this side of the border. Despite the
fact that senior GOC officials are currently leery of UN
personnel in Chad, some lower-level GOC officials, including
CNAR representatives and several prefets and sous-prefets,
nevertheless retain the view that a UN deployment would be in
Chad's best interest. The same discrepancy exists with
regard to the DPA, which the high levels of the GOC formally
support. However, the DPA disillusionment recently expressed
by CNAR and G19 representatives illustrates the pervasiveness
of such sentiment, not only among refugees (reftel) but among
lower-ranking government officials and rebels alike. This
attitude does not bode well for the success of an eventual UN
Darfur deployment, which would be charged with DPA
implementation. While imperfect, the DPA still represents
the best way forward on Darfur peace and must accordingly not
be cast aside while a more "attractive" alternative is
sought. END COMMENT.
WALL