NMRD REPRESENTATIVE ON SITUATION IN DARFUR,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001173

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: NMRD REPRESENTATIVE ON SITUATION IN DARFUR,
EASTERN CHAD


NDJAMENA 00001173 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Representatives of the NMRD, a non-signatory
to the Darfur Peace Agreement, still wish to be involved in
the Darfur Peace Agreement's implementation, but point to the
need for dialogue among the non-signatories of the DPA and
their inclusion into the implementation of the agreement.
They continue to resist efforts by President Deby's
half-brother Daoussa to incorporate them into the Justice and
Equality Movement and the National Redemption Front. NMRD
representatives strongly suspected continued Sudanese support
of Chadian rebel groups operating in Hadjer Marfaine. END
SUMMARY.

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SITUATION DETERIORATING IN DARFUR, NEED FOR DIALOGUE
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2. (C) During a meeting with Ambassador Wall, Khalil
Abdullah, General Secretary for the National Movement for
Reform and Development (NMRD),said that the movement is
prepared to take part in the implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement, but urged the U.S. and international
partners to re-examine the compensation aspects of the DPA,
and include the non-signatories of the DPA in the
discussions. Abdullah, who had returned from Darfur to
N'Djamena for only a few days, said that the impact of the
recent GOS offensive on the civilian population in Darfur was
tremendous, and would be disastrous in the coming weeks if
the international community could not implement the DPA.
However, lack of individual compensation for victims of the
Darfur conflict made the agreement a tough sell to the people
of the region. If the U.S. wanted to move forward with the
implementation of the DPA, it would have to re-think how to
compensate those affected by the crisis.


3. (C) Abdullah also told the Ambassador that
non-signatories needed to be included in this process. This
involved the non-signatories talking to each other, and then
talking to the international partners. Abdullah claimed that
NMRD field commanders had been in touch with representatives
from the National Redemption Front and other non-signatories,
as well as supporters of Sudanese Presidential Advisor Minni
Minawi, in an attempt to assist bringing disputing rebel
movements together and hammer out differences. He admitted
that dialogue was extremely difficult to enforce, but was
essential for the long term prospects of the DPA.

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NOTHING TO DO WITH JEM
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4. (C) Abdullah was adamant in noting that this dialogue
could not include members of the Justice and Equality
Movement. He noted that the NMRD had fundamental differences
with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, and could not fully support
any coalition that consisted of the JEM. Abdullah also
claimed that Daoussa Deby, half-brother to President Deby,
was continuing attempts to convince the NMRD to join the JEM
and NRF. According to Abdullah, while they were currently in
N'Djamena on an unofficial basis (as the Chad-Sudan agreement
prevented the GOC from formally permitting the transit of
Sudanese rebel movement leaders),Daoussa Deby was still
contacting them, and calling on them to join the NRF's battle
against the GOS. Abdullah also said that Daoussa Deby
promised to support their military efforts if they did join
the NRF. He told the Ambassador that the NMRD would continue
to reject any overtures by Daoussa Deby and the Chadians, and
still respected the N'Djamena Humanitarian cease-fire
agreement of 2004. However, if attacked by the Sudanese
Armed Forces, the NMRD would have to defend itself.

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CHADIAN REBELS AND POSSIBLE SUDANESE SUPPORT

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5. (C) Abdullah noted that while the NMRD had no recent
interaction with Chadian rebel groups, they were aware of the
fighting that was taking place in the area of Hadjer Marfaine
between Chadian rebels and the Chadian national army.
Abdullah said that the NMRD strongly suspects continued
Sudanese support for Chadian rebel groups. According to him,
Chadian rebels who were repelled after the battle in Aram
Kolle on September 11 fled to the Jebel Moon area, and were
being permitted by the GOS to remain in the area. Abdullah
also claimed that Sudanese intelligence officers were seen in
the area of Hadjer Marfaine two days before the attack in the
area, indicating that they were alerting the Chadian rebels
of a possible military attack by Chadian forces.


6. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL