THE CHAD-SUDAN AGREEMENT: CAN IT HOLD?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: THE CHAD-SUDAN AGREEMENT: CAN IT HOLD?


NDJAMENA 00001094 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: POL/ECON/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: Chadian officials claim that the recent
Chad-Sudan agreement has the potential to improve relations
between the two countries and enhance regional stability, but
admit that it will be very difficult to implement. Some
half-hearted measures are reported to have been taken by the
two countries to put Chadian and Sudanese rebels on notice
concerning their presence in (respectively) Sudan and Chad.
Joint border patrols as provided for in the agreement are
viewed as highly unlikely. If the profound cynicism of
Chadian signer Mahamat Ali (former Minister of Territorial
Administration) is any indicator, this agreement is little
more than window-dressing. End summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
THE CHAD-SUDAN AGREEMENT: GOOD THING ON PAPER
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (SBU) President Deby embraced President Bashir during his
August 8 inauguration ceremony in a very public demonstration
of the GOC's intentions to renew diplomatic ties with Sudan.
Chadian authorities are touting the importance of the July 26
Chad-Sudan agreement for regional stability and the country's
domestic security. Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi noted
pragmatically in a meeting with Ambassador Wall that Chad's
decision to improve ties with Sudan was based on the GOC's
estimation that strained relations only created further
insecurity. The agreement encompasses reestablishing
diplomatic relations, creation of joint economic and
political commissions, and joint border patrols. A Chadian
delegation, led by the Foreign Minister and the Governor of
the Eastern Chadian province of Ouaddai, was recently in
Khartoum to begin dialogue on the enhancement of political
ties between the two countries.


3. (SBU) At the same time, governmental and non-government
interlocutors have warned that concrete steps are needed to
demonstrate sincerity. Sudanese support for rebels who
attacked the Chadian border town of Adre on December 18, and
who were able to penetrate directly into N'Djamena on April
13 still deeply rankles Chadians. Concrete Sudanese actions
to cease material and logistical support and expel Chadian
rebel groups will, according to these interlocutors, be the
major indication that the Sudanese are genuine in their
commitment to the July 26 agreement.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUDAN DELIVERS MESSAGE TO CHAD REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (C) Representatives of the National Redemption Front
believe that the Sudanese, while signing the agreement with
Chad, will be unable to expel the five major Chadian rebel
groups through forceful means, and will encourage the
movements to unite for a final push against the regime in
N'Djamena. According to NRF representative Tadjadiene Niam,
NRF sources within the Sudanese government learned of a
recent meeting in Khartoum involving Sudanese officials
(which included Sudanese intel chief Salah Gosh) and
representatives from the Chadian rebel movement. During this
meeting, Sudanese officials told the Chadian rebel groups
that the accord between the Government of Chad and the
Government of Sudan meant that Chadian rebels could no longer
remain in Sudan. They also said that the Chadian rebels were
currently weaker then their adversaries on the Chadian side,
primarily due to a lack of coordination. The officials
asserted the Chadian rebels must either unite, or face the
threat of expulsion (Niam noted that this threat was made
simply to force the movements to consider closer
coordination).


5. (C) NRF representatives have also said that training
camps continue to operate in Sudan. The representatives have
noted that the expulsion of Sudanese rebels by the Chadian
government is one thing (as the Sudanese rebels do not have

NDJAMENA 00001094 002.2 OF 002


large-scale established bases of operations). The removal of
Chadian rebels, who already have well-entrenched operations
within Sudan, is another. GOC officials have told the
Embassy that their intelligence shows continued arms
transfers from the Sudanese government to Chadian rebel
groups.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHAD MOVES TO EXPEL SUDAN REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (SBU) Meanwhile, in N'Djamena, the GOC is taking visible
measures to remove the Sudanese rebel movements in the
country. On August 23, Foreign Minister Ahmad Allam-mi
stated publicly that members of the Justice and Equality
movement were being rounded up and handed over to the African
Union. NRF Representative Niam told the Embassy the day
after the GOC action that while the Government had detained
several JEM leaders, the rebel movement, GOC, and the African
Union had mutually agreed on a specific timeframe for the JEM
leaders to leave the country. The GOC has also informed the
French Embassy of their intention to expel G-19 leader Adam
Shogar Supporters of the Sudanese Liberation Movement
faction loyal to Minni Minawi have also been asked by Chadian
authorities to leave, and have told the Embassy that they
plan to depart in the coming weeks. The African Union has
noted that while the Chadian authorities are claiming to
expel all rebels groups, they particularly want to see the
departure of those representatives loyal to Minni, as these
have been openly critical of GOC support of Darfur Peace
Agreement non-signatories.


7. (C) Aside from these measures, concrete steps towards
establishment of the Agreement's commissions and joint border
patrols are nowhere to be seen. Former Minister of
Territorial Administration, Mahamat Ali (who in fact signed
the agreement on behalf of the GOC) privately dismissed the
agreement in a meeting with EmbOffs as fine "theoretically"
but conveyed his deep cynicism that any of the specific
measures would ever be implemented, recalling the failure to
implement the February Tripoli accords between Sudan and
Chad. He particularly questioned whether joint border
patrols could ever be set up, given the situation on the
Chad/Sudan border. He asserted that without a "guarantor",
the agreement was worthless. Asked whether President
Quaddafi might be considered a patron of sorts for the
agreement, Mahamat Ali laughed that Quaddafi had offered
1,000 planes, cars and soldiers for the border which had
never materialized.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


8. (C) While the agreement appears to have made more
progress than the earlier Tripoli agreement as regards
normalizing diplomatic relations (and presumably opening up
lines of communication),we share the view that actions such
as joint border patrols are highly unlikely. Untangling the
Chad/Sudan relationship is no easier in the light of the July
Agreement, but one possible rationale for so much window
dressing may be that China asked Chad and Sudan to reconcile
in some form before agreeing to resume diplomatic relations
with Chad.


9. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
TAMLYN