Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA1079
2006-08-22 16:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

NRF REPS DECRY AU EVICTION DECISION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7753
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1079/01 2341624
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221624Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4271
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1261
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0181
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0745
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0324
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1537
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2803
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1952
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0309
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1339
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0882
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0826
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001079 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: NRF REPS DECRY AU EVICTION DECISION


NDJAMENA 00001079 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001079

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, D, DRL, PRM; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: NRF REPS DECRY AU EVICTION DECISION


NDJAMENA 00001079 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The representatives for the Justice and
Equality Movement/National Redemption Front, who are still in
N'Djamena, have instructed their representatives in El Fasher
that they should not leave the Cease Fire Commission unless
the African Union provides a written statement requesting
their departure. Once that happens, the NRF will issue a
statement no longer accepting the N'Djamena Humanitarian
Cease-Fire Agreement. While the NRF representatives
expressed its condolences to the African Union for the deaths
of two peacekeepers during the August 20 attack on a fuel
convey, they were extremely concerned by the AU decision to
coordinate investigation efforts with the Sudanese
government, and argued that the GOS would use the opportunity
to carry out its plan to wipe out all rebel groups who were
non-signatories to the Darfur Peace Agreement. END SUMMARY.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
REPRESENTATIVES PONDERING NEXT MOVE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) JEM representatives Ahmed Tougod and Tahjadeine Niam
met with Ambassador Wall on August 21 to discuss the recent
African Union decision to expel representatives from the
Justice and Equality Movement and the National Redemption
Front from the Cease Fire Commission and the Joint
Commission. Tougod stated that his plans to leave were
currently delayed following the AU's decision, and he and
members of the NRF hoped that the AU would review its
decision. Niam added that the AU Ambassador in Chad, Mahmoud
Kane, even expressed his surprise to Niam during a phone
conversation following the AU's decision. Niam said that he
was working with Kane and the African Union leadership to
determine if the representatives from the CFC could be
relocated to another area.


3. (C) The Ambassador noted the concerns that the United
States had with the AU's decision, and asserted that the AU's

decision could heighten tensions in Darfur. Tougod and Niam
agreed with this statement, and said that they were
instructing their representatives to the CFC in El-Fasher to
remain with the Commission until they received a formal
letter from the AU requesting their departure. If and when
such a letter was received, the JEM/NRF would ask its
representatives to leave the CFC, and the movement would
issue a statement announcing its pull-out from the N'Djamena
Humanitarian Cease-Fire Agreement. He argued that without a
presence in the CFC, the NRF could not bound to the
cease-fire.


4. (C) Tougod said that the Chadians had already provided a
formal request to the Sudanese rebels movements in N'Djamena
to leave Chad, but they had not been as forceful as in past
attempts in asking rebel representatives to leave the
capital. Niam pointed out that there was still a
contradiction in the Chadian decision to expel Sudanese rebel
groups (part of the July 26 agreement) and the memorandum of
understanding that was agreed to between the JEM and the GOC
during the May 2005 negotiations in Abuja. He added that
should the GOC press forward with their demand, Niam and
Tougod would highlight the contradiction in the two Chadian
agreements to the GOC authorities.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CONDOLENCES FOR THE AU, CONCERN WITH THE GOS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) Tougod and Niam stated that the NRF had already
issued a statement condemning the August 19 attack on an AU
fuel convoy, and expressing the movement's condolences for
the deaths of two AU peacekeepers who were killed during the
attack. However, they noted their extreme concern with the
AU's decision to ask for Khartoum's assistance in tracking
down the perpetrators. According to Niam, the AU could have

NDJAMENA 00001079 002.2 OF 002


asked the NRF to assist in locating the attackers (even if
they were within the movement),or could have conducted an
independent investigation without the support of either the
GOS or NRF. The presence of Sudanese Armed Forces with
African Union investigators meant that if the AU entered into
territory controlled by the NRF, then the possibility of
clashes between the SAF and NRF supporters was likely,
putting all parties, including the AU, at risk.


6. (C) Tougod added that the GOS would use the opportunity
to strike at NRF forces in the region. He pointed out the
heavy military buildup by the SAF that was taking place in
various points in Darfur, which, according to NRF sources
within the SAF, was part of a plan to crush the NRF in the
next 45 days to precede any U.N. decision on peacekeeping
forces for Darfur. Tougod said that after eliminating the
rebellion, the Sudanese would assert that a U.N. force was
unnecessary, as there was no resistance to the DPA's
implementation. He cited a number of troop and equipment
buildups in Tine, Jebel Moon, and Kutum. According to
Tougod, field commanders had indicated that 3,000 Sudanese
troops, 90 Toyota landcruisers, and over 600 Janjaweed
fighters were seen in the past day establishing positions 30
kilometers from El Fasher. Commanders loyal to Minni Minnawi
were assisting these efforts. Niam and Tougod said that the
NRF was prepared for any attacks by the SAF.

7. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL