Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA1032
2006-08-11 14:27:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: DAOUSSA DEBY DENIES CHADIAN SUPPORT FOR

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8187
RR RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHNJ #1032/01 2231427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 111427Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4196
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1243
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0172
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0726
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0302
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0908
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1514
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2782
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1923
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0287
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1313
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0864
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0803
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001032 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DARFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: DAOUSSA DEBY DENIES CHADIAN SUPPORT FOR
DARFUR MILITIAS

REF: STATE 1422

NDJAMENA 00001032 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 001032

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DARFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: DAOUSSA DEBY DENIES CHADIAN SUPPORT FOR
DARFUR MILITIAS

REF: STATE 1422

NDJAMENA 00001032 001.2 OF 003



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Daoussa Deby, special advisor and
half-brother of President Idriss Deby Itno, denied
accusations by Sudanese Liberation Movement leader Minni
Minawi and others that the Chadians are supporting Sudanese
rebels who refused to sign the Darfur Peace Accords. He
asserted that while the signing of the July 26 agreement
between the Chadian and Sudanese governments is a positive
step in bilateral relations, the international community
should pressure the GOS to cease harboring and supporting
Chadian rebels movements in Sudan. Deby also believes that
international partners should examine whether the
implementation of an agreement opposed by a majority of
Darfurians is truly a viable option for peace in the region.
In a separate conversation, the Chadian Ambassador to the
United States rejected the notion that Chad sought to
undermine the DPA. Assistance to the Darfur non-signatories
(from whatever quarter) was simply an expedient tool to use
against Khartoum. END SUMMARY.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHAD DOES NOT MILITARILY SUPPORT SUDANESE REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (U) On August 10, the Ambassador met with Daoussa Deby,
presidential advisor and half-brother to President Deby, to
discuss reftel points. The Ambassador noted that the U.S.
was extremely concerned by reports of Chadian support for
non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Accords, and pointed out
that the U.S. would support targeted United Nations sanctions
against Chadian officials who were supporting Sudanese rebel
activity. The Ambassador also said that continued violence
would endanger the DPA, which the United States viewed as the
best way to achieve peace in Darfur.


3. (SBU) Deby thanked the Ambassador for his comments, and
categorically denied any Chadian military support for
Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur. Any Chadian military assets

in the region were located on the Chadian side of the border,
trying to defend the border towns of Adre, Tissi, and Tine.
He said that the only assistance that the GOC had provided
for Sudanese rebel groups was the right of transit and the
right to reside in the country, assistance that was actually
requested by the African Union in 2004. The GOC, according
to Daoussa, would soon cease this support in accordance with
the commitments the Chadian government made in signing the
July 26 agreement with the GOS.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHAD WANTS PEACE IN DARFUR
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


4. (SBU) Deby also said that support for Sudanese rebel
activity in Darfur was contrary to Chad's wish to see peace
and stability in the region. After all, Chad was as much of
a victim as the Darfurians from the conflict. To that end,
noted Daoussa, Chadian authorities were hosting over 200,000
Sudanese refugees, and had acted as a mediator in the Darfur
peace talks. Beyond that, President Deby had publicly
supported the Darfur Peace Accords following its signing in
Abuja.


5. (SBU) Daoussa pointed out that the President invited
DPA-signatory Minni Minawi to N'Djamena following the
conclusion of the Abuja talks, and told him that while Deby
supported the DPA, he was fearful that the GOS would arm
Sudan Liberation Movement forces loyal to Minni to destroy
all Sudanese rebel groups opposed to the signing of the DPA.
According to Daoussa, three days following the meeting,

NDJAMENA 00001032 002.2 OF 003


Minni's forces, backed by GOS forces and equipment, attacked
the non-signatory umbrella group G-19. Daoussa said that
Minni, who was accusing the Chadians of arming the dissident
Sudanese rebel groups, was no better than the Djanjaweed in
the level of brutality he and his supporters inflicted on the
Darfurians during their attacks. He, as Daoussa stated, was
a "bad horse" who could not be trusted by the international
community. Daoussa added that Minni was blaming the Chadians
for being responsible for his defeats in Darfur, because he
did not want to admit to his supporters that other Sudanese
rebel movements had defeated him and marginalized his
influence in the region.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
MAKE SURE THAT SUDAN IS HELD ACCOUNTABLE
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


6. (SBU) Deby turned to the subject of Sudan, and said that
the GOC was pleased with the recent agreement with the
Sudanese, and hopeful of improved relations. He noted that
following the swearing-in ceremony of President Deby on
August 8, the Head of State met with President Bashir of
Sudan, President Qadhafi of Libya, President Bongo of Gabon,
and President Sassou-Nguesso of Congo to discuss
possibilities for improved border security and a
re-establishment of respective embassies. According to
Daoussa, these discussions reaped some positive results, and
established a basis for further dialogue.


7. (SBU) Nevertheless, Daoussa stated that the GOC was
concerned about the GOS's commitment to improve diplomatic
relations with Chad. After all, past agreements in Tripoli
and Banjul had not been successfully implemented, and the GOS
continued to harbor a Chadian rebel movement within its
borders. According to Deby, if the GOS wishes to demonstrate
its commitment to stability in the region, it should stop its
support for Chadian rebels who were able to directly attack
Chad in the heart of its capital on April 13. "The ball is
in Sudan's court," noted Daoussa. To that end, the
international community could play an extremely important
role in pressuring Khartoum to promote stability and cease
its support of Chadian rebel groups. An international
presence along the border, Daoussa believed, would assist in
keeping the Sudanese in check.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
IS THE DPA REALLY THE BEST SOLUTION FOR PEACE?
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (SBU) On the DPA, Daoussa argued that while the U.S. and
others thought the agreement was the best chance for peace in
Darfur, they should consider the feasibility of implementing
an agreement that is not accepted by the majority of Sudanese
rebel groups. He stated that the rebels concerns for greater
compensation for Darfurian victims and a concrete time-frame
for the disarmament of the Djanjaweed militia were genuine
concerns that should be considered by the international
community. After all, not developing a final agreement that
is acceptable to most Darfurians would only exacerbate the
level of violence and instability in the region, and hinder
the repatriation of the Sudanese refugees back to their
homeland.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
AMBASSADOR BASHIR ON SUPPORT TO DARFUR REBELS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (SBU) In a private lunch with the Ambassador, Chad's
Ambassador to the United States disavowed any Chadian
interest in undermining the DPA. He acknowledged however,

NDJAMENA 00001032 003.2 OF 003


that it was "possible" that Darfur non-signatories were
receiving assistance from Chadian sources. According to him,
assistance to the non-signatories was simply an expedient
tool to use against Khartoum.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


9. (SBU) Daoussa's denial of Chadian military support to
Sudanese rebels is not surprising, despite the proliferation
of assertions that such support is continuing. We will
continue to share the concerns in reftel with other members
of the Chadian government.


10. (U) Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL