EASTERN CHAD/SUDAN: PERSPECTIVES FROM DPA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001024

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DARFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/07/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: EASTERN CHAD/SUDAN: PERSPECTIVES FROM DPA
NON-SIGNATORIES AND SIGNATORIES

Classified By: ECONOMIC/CONSULAR OFFICER JITU SARDAR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Darfur Peace Accord signatories and
non-signatories from the Sudanese rebel movement residing in
Chad continue to accuse each other of being responsible for
the recent violence in Darfur. Non-signatories still
continue to call for a re-evaluation of the DPA, and have
noted their intention to continue fighting GOS forces if
provisions of the DPA are not reconsidered. Apparently,
Chadian authorities have demanded all Sudanese rebels groups
to leave Chad. However, according to representatives from
the Sudan Liberation Movement loyal to Minni, Chadian
authorities were trying to kidnap them and hand them over to
the Sudanese rebel non-signatories. END SUMMARY.

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DPA NON-SIGNATORIES CONTINUE TO RESIST KHARTOUM
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2. (C) On August 4, the Ambassador met with Sudanese
Liberation Movement, and National Redemption Front, member
Adam Shogar to discuss the recent activities by
non-signatories in Darfur. Shogar told the Ambassador that
non-signatories of the Darfur Peace Accords were still
unwilling to sign the document due to the DPA's failure to
protect the rights of the Darfurian people. He stated that
the DPA's inability to provide a level of proportional
political representation and economic wealth that the
Darfurian people deserved was unacceptable to the Darfurian
people. According to Shogar, opposition to the DPA by
Darfurians in the refugee camps in Chad and in Sudan is a
clear indication that the international community needs to
either alter the DPA to better reflect the needs of the
people of Darfur, or re-open negotiations for an accord that
is acceptable to Darfurians. The Ambassador told Shogar that
the United States still considered the DPA the best chance
for peace in Darfur, and hoped that hadn't signed the
agreement would reconsider their decision and support the
DPA.


3. (C) Shogar also said that violence was not the preferred
option for the NRF non-signatories. Even though they hoped
to have a constructive dialogue with SLM representatives
loyal to Minni Minnawi, attacks by forces loyal to the SLM
made a peaceful resolution impossible. Shogar claimed that
attacks against NRF forces by SLM-Minni loyalists and GOS
troops in the Birmazza area were repelled back, and the NRF
controlled most of Western Darfur. He added that the Chadian
military was not providing any support, and the NRF was
obtaining military equipment and vehicles from victories
against the Sudanese Armed Forces and Minni loyalists.


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SLM Minni SUPPORTERS DENY INSTIGATING ATTACKS
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4. (C) During a meeting with Economic/Consular Officer that
same day, representatives of the SLM loyal to Minni stated
that recent reports of attacks in villages near Korma were
not conducted by SLM-Minni forces, but rather were acts of
self-defense by Minni loyalists against members of the
National Redemption Front and SLM forces loyal to AbdulWahid
Ahmed Nur. They also accused Chadian regular military
elements of assisting in the attacks against SLM Minni
supporters.


5. (C) Abdallah Ahmed Tahir, security chief for the
SLM-Minni representative office in N'Djamena, stated that
non-signatories were conducting attacks against SLM-Minni
loyalists due to a false belief that Sudanese Armed Forces
were allied with Minni's forces. He denied this assertion,

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and said that while the GOS and the SLM were in agreement on
the need for the implementation of the DPA, no troops loyal
to Minni were working with the SAF. Tahir added that Minni's
troops were not involved in last weekend's attacks by the GOS
in the Jebel Moon.

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CONTINUED CHADIAN INVOLVEMENT
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6. (C) Both Shogar and the SLM-Minni supporters noted that
Chadian authorities from the Ministry of Public Security
asked all Sudanese rebel groups to leave Chad in the coming
days. According to the groups, the Ministry stated that
based on the recently-signed agreement with the Chadian and
Sudanese governments, the GOC was obligated to stop housing
members of the Sudanese rebel movement. Shogar told the
Ambassador during their conversation that he and other
members of the NRF in N'Djamena planned to return to Darfur
to join other fighters in resisting the Sudanese government.



7. (C) On August 5, Djabadien Hussein, Information Officer
for the SLM-Minni Minawi group, urgently telephoned
Economic/Consular Officer to notify him that Chadian
authorities from the Ministry of Public Security and a
special advisor to Daoussa Deby (half-brother and counselor
to President Deby) named Moussa Sner had threatened to
forcefully remove all members of the SLM-Minni group from
their current residence that day and immediately put them on
an African Union plane to Darfur with Sudanese rebel
non-signatories of the DPA.


8. (C) Hussein contended that the move was a ploy by Chadian
authorities not only to remove supporters of Minni from Chad,
but also to put them in the hands of their adversaries in the
NRF. Hussein and others feared that once on their way to
Darfur, opposing Sudanese rebels would attempt to either kill
them, or incarcerate them in NRF-controlled establishments in
Darfur. He finally said that his group had learned that GOC
authorities were providing money and weapons to the NRF
members on their way to Darfur, to assist in operations
against Minni's forces and Sudanese troop. On the night of
August 6, Hussein told Economic/Consular officer that the GOC
had finally backed off of its threat, apparently with
intervention from the African Union, and would permit the
Minni loyalists to stay in Chad for the moment. He added
that the Minni loyalists was still concerned about future
threats to physically threaten group members.

WALL