Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NDJAMENA1014
2006-08-01 17:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: CHADIAN REBEL PRESENTS GLOOMY OUTLOOK

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011723Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4173
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 1232
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0715
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0291
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1503
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 2769
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1912
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 0283
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 1300
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0853
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0794
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001014 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: CHADIAN REBEL PRESENTS GLOOMY OUTLOOK


NDJAMENA 00001014 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Economic/Consular Officer Jitu Sardar for Reasons 1.4 (B
) and (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 001014

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, DS/IP/ITA,
DS/IP/AF, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR
DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF ASEC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD: CHADIAN REBEL PRESENTS GLOOMY OUTLOOK


NDJAMENA 00001014 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Economic/Consular Officer Jitu Sardar for Reasons 1.4 (B
) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Former GOC loyalist, current opposition
member and ethnic Zaghawa Tom Erdimi paints a troubling
near-term future for Chad. He claims that rebel groups
consider the possibility for political dialogue with
President Deby as dead, leaving the military solution as the
only way to change their governmentthe. Once the Chadian
rebel movement is able to organize itself in a coherent
fashion, it will plan a coordinated attack against GOC forces
to topple the regime. Currently, the Sudanese government has
tacitly agreed to support the efforts of the Zaghawa-led RaFD
rebel movement, but the Chadian rebel leadership understands
that the GOS has its own plans for a for a post-Deby Chad.
END SUMMARY.

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TIME FOR DIALOGUE IS OVER, PREPARE FOR WAR
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2. (C) On July 3, Tom Erdimi, former GOC official and one of
the leading personalities in the Chadian rebel movement, met
with Embassy N,Djamena Economic/Consular Officer (on leave
in the U.S.) to discuss the political situation in Chad, the
status of the rebel movement, and his outlook for the
country,s future. At the back-end of a Denny,s restaurant
on the south side of Houston, which he currently calls home
as he files for political asylum, Erdimi boldly claimed that
the rebel movement was alive and well. While the April 13
attack failed, it demonstrated the capabilities of the rebels
to reach the capital. Subsequent attacks in the border towns
of Tine, Adre, and Ade were intended to counter the
impression that the rebel cause was finished, and encourage
the defection of GOC soldiers to the rebel cause.


3. (C) According to Erdimi, following the May 3 elections,
the rebel movement hoped that President Deby would make a

genuine effort to open a political dialogue that would
include all sectors of Chadian society. The movement had
hoped that President Deby would allow the African Union or an
external actor to facilitate such a dialogue, and that he
would accept any power-sharing arrangements proposed by the
facilitator. However, he said, Deby,s decision to allow for
political dialogue only on his own terms, through a committee
of &wise men,8 was particularly discouraging. He
highlighted a senior military official,s memo in July
calling for the President to allow a constructive political
dialogue as a sign of criticism of Deby within his own ranks.
However, according to Erdimi, Deby,s refusal to accept
dissenting viewpoints only reveals his arrogance and refusal
to cede any of his power.


4. (C) Erdimi pointed out that if the international
community were to play a stronger role in pressuring Deby to
accept &a legitimate form8 of political dialogue, rebel
groups would be willing to lay down their arms and allow the
process to move forward. He said that the armed opposition
groups felt strongly that the U.S., European Union, and other
international partners were following the French lead, which,
the rebels believe, is to support the Deby regime. &As long
as the international community permits Deby to act without
constraints,8 stated Erdimi, &the rebel movement will
continue to mobilize against the regime.8

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COORDINATION IS CRUCIAL, AS IS SUDAN,S ROLE
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5. (C) Erdimi told Emboff that the armed opposition
currently has the means to defeat President Deby. The Rally
of Democratic Forces (RaFD) movement currently has 1,500
troops and the United Force for Change (FUC) coalition, which
attacked N,djamena in April, has 3,000 troops. Most of the
rebel fighters, according to Erdimi, were well trained and

NDJAMENA 00001014 002.2 OF 002


capable, and were more experienced than the recent recruits
in the Chadian National Army. Thus, while Deby,s forces
would continue to pose a challenge because of newly purchased
military equipment, the relative inexperience of his soldiers
would put Deby at a disadvantage.


6. (C) Erdimi stated that the primary constraint on the
rebel movement was a lack of coordination among rebel groups.
(Note: This lack of coordination may be exacerbated by
inter-ethnic tension and distrust. The RaFD is dominated by
dissident members of President Deby,s own Zaghawa tribe. The
FUC coalition is made up of rebel groups that represent
several other ethnic tribal groups, including the Tama.)
Mahamat Nour, leader of the FUC, was refusing to go along
with other members of his coalition in the coordination of
attacks and discussions of post-Deby power sharing
arrangements. Erdimi contended, however, that following the
failure of the April 13 attacks, many of Nour,s supporters
have joined the ranks of the RaFD. (Comment: This
inter-tribal distrust was on clear display during the April
attack. As the FUC forces were close to the capital, Erdimi
called AF/C, expressing serious concern that if the largely
non-Zaghawa FUC forces did enter N,Djamena, there would be
ðnic cleansing8 of the city,s Zaghawa civilians. We
understand that the Zaghawa civilians supported GOC forces in
repulsing the rebels.)


7. (C) Meanwhile, the GOS has agreed to continue to support
Chadian rebel activities, and offered assistance to the
Zaghawa RaFD. Erdimi described the relationship as one of
necessity: the rebels require material support for their
cause, and Sudan would like to see Deby removed from power.
Erdimi said that the RaFD had pledged to the regime in
Khartoum that once in power, the RaFD would not support
Sudanese rebel groups in Darfur. Nevertheless, Erdimi noted
that he and other Chadian rebels were quite aware of
Khartoum,s own designs, including wanting a non-Zaghawa in
power. However, as Erdimi stated, &better to have an enemy
supporting you to remove the devil from power.8

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WE WILL NOT HARM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
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8. (C) Concerning possible threats to international
humanitarian workers in Eastern Chad and other expatriates
throughout the country, Erdimi stated that the rebel movement
understood the fears of international organizations operating
in Chad, and would try to defeat Chadian military forces at
the Chad-Sudan border. However, if the Chadian army
resisted, they would be forced to enter the capital. Erdimi
assured EmbOff that the international community would know
well in advance of a rebel attack, so as to make the
necessary arrangements to protect its citizens and interests.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


9. (C) Erdimi,s comments indicate that the rebel movement
is still extremely active and prepared to launch an offensive
against the Chadian regime once it is adequately organized.
We should recognize that these assessments by a rebel leader
about Chadian rebel capabilities might be exaggerated.


10. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
WALL