Ambassador's Discussion with CIC Foreign Secretary Addow

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 005399

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E AND A/S FRAZER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ASEC MOPS SO ET KE KM
SUBJECT: Ambassador's Discussion with CIC Foreign Secretary Addow

Classified By: Ambassador Michael Ranneberger for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: During a December 29 meeting in Nairobi, the Islamic
Court (CIC) Foreign Secretary
Ibrahim Addow told Ambassador Ranneberger that the CIC is
willing to resume dialogue with the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) to find a political solution to the
current crisis in Somalia. Addow was unrealistic in asking for US
support
for the Khartoum dialogue process and withdrawal of Ethiopian forces.
The Ambassador made clear that the Khartoum process has been
overtaken by events. He told Addow that if moderates elements of the
Islamic Courts wanted to be part of the future of Somalia, they need
to reach out to TFG President Yusuf. Addow emphasized Sheikh Sharif's
leadership of the Courts and said he is willing to talk. He
maintained that if the Courts are attacked in Kismayo they will have
no choice but "to go underground," with resulting guerrilla warfare.
In a private exchange, the Ambassador urged Addow and the Courts'
leadership to cooperate to take action against the three high-value
targets. Addow was not forthcoming on this. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger, joined by Polcouns and
Regional Affairs Chief, met with Council of Islamic Courts'
(CIC) Foreign Secretary Ibrahim Addow, who was accompanied
by two lower-level CIC officials, at his residence on December

29. Addow is a graduate of American University in
Washington, D.C., and a U.S. citizen.

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CIC Down But Addow claims Not Out of the Game
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3. (C) Addow began by expressing his appreciation for the
time and effort the US is expending to help resolve the
crisis in Somalia. While acknowledging that the CIC is not
the whole solution to Somalia's ills, Addow asserted that
its success in bringing peace and stability to Somalia,
something which in the two plus years of its tenure the TFG
was unable to achieve, made it a necessary part of any
solution to the Somalia crisis. Addow asserted that the
CIC ordered their forces to withdraw rather than to fight
in populated areas which would put the population at risk.
He stressed that the CIC's withdrawal should not be
construed as a victory for the TFG, but rather that the CIC
still holds the hearts and minds of the population and that
popular support for the CIC remains undiminished.
Ethiopia's current "control" of territory is only a result
of force, the Ethiopians are seen as an occupying force, and there
will be "endless conflict" if Ethiopian
forces remain. He insisted "they (the Ethiopians) are
standing on a volcano that can erupt at any moment."
Addow said that the Courts will fight if attacked in Kismayo and will
then "go underground" and initiate a guerrilla-type struggle.


4. (C) The CIC foreign secretary presented Ambassador
Ranneberger with three requests. One, that there should be
an immediate ceasefire. Two, Addow insisted that
Ethiopian troops must withdraw from Somalia territory. And
three, he said that it is imperative that dialogue resume in Khartoum
as soon as possible.

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Opportunity Now
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5. (C) Ambassador Ranneberger told Addow that they were unrealistic
positions, overtaken by events. He told Addow that moderate elements
of the CIC who reject terrorism might still be able to be part of
Somalia's future, but they need to reach out to President Yusuf now.
The Ambassador reviewed in detail U.S. views on the current state of
play, emphasizing U.S. interest in seeing a broad-based, inclusive
national government based on the TFI and Charter.
He emphasized to Addow that the window of opportunity
for dialogue is very limited, and therefore time is of the
essence. The Ambassador suggested that Kenya could probably help to
facilitate such contacts, if the leadership of the Courts was
committed to working within the TFI/Charter framework.

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CIC Willing to Negotiate with Yusuf
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6. (C) Pressed on the dialogue issue, Addow eventually stated that
the CIC is ready and willing to
talk with President Yusuf
on power-sharing. Addow said that divisions within the TFG would make
achieving any sort of accommodation difficult. He explicitly cited
PM Gedi as a roadblock. In arguing for a formal process involving

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the Arab League, the U.S. and EC, Addow showed himself to be
unrealistic about dialogue. Addow nevertheless said several times
that CIC "leader" Sheikh Sharif would be willing to talk with Yusuf.
When the Ambassador said that any such discussion would have to be
without preconditions, Addow did not further argue the point.

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HVTs
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7. In a one-on-one talk, the Ambassador urged Addow and the other
moderate leadership of the remaining Courts structure to take action
against the high value targets. Addow was not forthcoming. He said
only that it was difficult to convince many within the Courts to do
something for the U.S. The Ambassador underscored the importance of
the HVTs and pointed out the taking appropriate action is in the
interest of the Courts.

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Addow and the Kenyans
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8. Addow called the Ambassador on the 29th to report on his meeting
with Kenyan Special Envoy Affey. Affey told Addow that the Kenyan
position on Somalia was "to wait and see."

Comment
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9. (C) Addow oscillated between bravado and a chastened recognition
of the Courts' fading role. The fact that he stressed Sheikh Sharif
as the leader of the Courts, and downplayed Aweys' role, is
interesting and may indicate real interest in quick, direct dialogue
with Yusuf, in part to prevent a final onslaught against the Courts.
The Courts have at best limited capability to conduct serious
guerrilla warfare, but they may have the capability to cause
significant difficulties for some period to come. The Kenyan cold
shoulder to the CIC is not surprisingly, but the Kenyans have been
closely engaged on Somalia. They are in frequent touch with the
Ethiopians and with us on the evolving situation and have emphasized
their interest in working closely with us to achieve shared
objectives of an inclusive national government for Somalia.


RANNEBERGER