Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI5345
2006-12-22 10:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

KENYA: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

Tags:  PTER ASEC EFIN KE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2350
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #5345/01 3561005
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221005Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6148
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RHMFIUU/CJTF HOA
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 005345 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT BRIAN PHIPPS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: A) SECSTATE 177128
B) SECSTATE 175295

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 005345

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT BRIAN PHIPPS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC EFIN KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: 2006 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM

REF: A) SECSTATE 177128
B) SECSTATE 175295


1. (U) This is post's submission for the 2006 Country Report on
Terrorism. Begin text:


2. (SBU) The government of Kenya continued to cooperate with the
United States in identifying terrorist groups operating within
Kenya. However, more work remains to be done in domestic areas such
as law enforcement, enacting counterterrorism legislation, and
prosecution of alleged terror suspects. The Council of Islamic
Courts, which has connections to terrorist organizations, rose to
power in much of neighboring Somalia, a move that could lead to
greater insecurity in northeastern Kenya, with its ethnic Somali
population. Many Kenyans and other observers blame the well-armed
condition of robbers and carjackers on arms smuggling across the
porous Kenya-Somalia border. The ready availability of fraudulent
relationship and identification documentation among Somalis raises
terrorism vulnerabilities.


3. (SBU) Kenya registered little progress toward the overall
strengthening of its capabilities to combat terrorism, prosecute
terror suspects, or respond to emergencies. The U.S.-supported Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF),disbanded by the government of Kenya in
2005, was not revived. The Government of Kenya did not engage in a
national discussion to sensitize the public to terrorism issues, nor
did it finalize a national counterterrorism strategy.


4. (SBU) Although Kenya still lacked counterterrorism legislation,
the government made some legislative progress. Kenya has previously
drafted but has still not submitted to Parliament a counterterrorism
finance bill that, along with other legislation, is needed to bring
the country into compliance with relevant UN resolutions. In April
2003, Kenya published a draft "Suppression of Terrorism Bill," only
to withdraw it after harsh criticism from human rights groups and
Kenyan Muslim communities. The Kenyan government wrote another
draft of the bill in May, according to the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime, but, like the year before, did not officially publish the
document or submit it to Parliament. In November, the government
published the text of the Proceeds of Crime and Money Laundering

Bill for public comment, but did not submit it to Parliament. Until
the bill is passed, Kenya has no way to effectively implement UN
1267 Committee terrorist finance sanction designations. The Central
Bank of Kenya issued guidelines effective January 1, 2007 under
Section 33K of the Central Bank of Kenya Act to strengthen controls
over foreign exchange bureaus to regulate their use of third party
checks and telegraphic transfers, transactions that may have
previously been used for money laundering or terrorist finance.


5. (SBU) There continued to be insufficient coordination among
police, prosecutors, and other relevant government ministries that
deal with terrorism issues. The U.S. Embassy's Regional Security
Officer, in conjunction with the State Department's Antiterrorism
Assistance Program and the State Department-funded Department of
Justice Resident Legal Advisor's Office, continued to focus on
increasing the Kenyan Government's capacity to effectively
investigate and prosecute terrorism through a wide variety of
training programs and capacity-building and other assistance. Other
U.S. government agencies and departments offering extensive training
and assistance in this regard include the Combined Joint Task
Force-Horn of Africa, the Navy Seals, the Department of
Transportation, the FBI, and the Departments of Homeland Security
and Justice.


6. (SBU) Although Kenyan officials are concerned about the
possibility of terrorist threats from Somalia, it remains unclear
just how far the government of Kenya, particularly the Ministry of
Internal Security and the Kenyan version of the National Security
Council, is willing to cooperate with the US when it comes to
terrorism issues regarding Somalia. In the run-up to presidential
elections in 2007, passage of the controversial anti-terrorism bill
is unlikely.


7. (SBU) ATA-trained police investigators and counterterrorism
prosecutors are credited with the re-arrest and successful
prosecution of Kikambala bombing suspect Omar Said Omar after his
acquittal on the main charge. (Fifteen people were killed in the
2002 bombing of the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya.) On April
4, 2006, a Kenyan Magistrate Judge found terrorism suspect Omar Said
Omar guilty of illegal possession of a firearm, ammunition, and
explosives. He was sentenced to seven/eight years in prison.


8. (SBU) While FAA and TSA training efforts in recent years improved
aviation security, consistent enforcement of security procedures and
planning remained a challenge, particularly at Wilson airport.
Security has improved at Kenya's main air entry point, Jomo Kenyatta
International Airport. In November 2006, the Kenyan government
effectively banned all flights to/from Somalia except for

NAIROBI 00005345 002 OF 002


humanitarian aid flights and flights to the Transitional Federal
Government's center of Baidoa. It is unclear how long the order
will stand, especially in view of political pressure from growers of
miraa, or qat, who have been deprived of their main market by the
ban.

RANNEBERGER