Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI4420
2006-10-16 03:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:
SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST AT WILSON AIRPORT
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHNR #4420/01 2890337 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 160337Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4880RHEFHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004420
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, EB/TRA/AN, S/CT
DEPT ALSO PASS TO DOT/OST CONNIE HUNTER
FOR DHS/TSA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAWLEY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PTER EAIR CASC ECON KE SO
SUBJECT: SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST AT WILSON AIRPORT
Classified By: Charge John Hoover for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004420
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, EB/TRA/AN, S/CT
DEPT ALSO PASS TO DOT/OST CONNIE HUNTER
FOR DHS/TSA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAWLEY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PTER EAIR CASC ECON KE SO
SUBJECT: SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST AT WILSON AIRPORT
Classified By: Charge John Hoover for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary: Concerns about security and possible terrorism at
Nairobi's Wilson Airport persist. The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
(KCAA) notice of October 4 moving all Somalia passenger flights from
Wilson to the better-regulated Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
(JKIA) should help, but Kenya Airport Authority's (KAA) plans to
upgrade Wilson do not appear likely to effectively address other
vulnerabilities. The UK revised its travel advisory on September 26
to specifically mention problems at Wilson, and Post will likely
recommend a similar change at the next renewal of the Department's
travel warning. End Summary.
What is the Threat?
--------------
2. (SBU) Wilson Airport is a general aviation airport on the south
side of Nairobi, about 4 km from the city center, and 14 km from the
U.S. Embassy. The basic threat at Wilson is the possibility of
aircraft hijacking/hostage taking involving AmCits, or a suicide
flight against the U.S. Embassy. Although Immigration and Customs
are supposed to check all incoming flights at Wilson, controls are in
fact weak, raising the possibility that Wilson could be a conduit for
weapons or terrorists smuggled from Somalia into Kenya. Flights from
Somalia or other foreign origins could also be used for suicide
attack against the Embassy or other targets. The GOK has still not
responded to Embassy's repeated requests to publish the alleged
restriction of the Embassy's airspace, or to establish an early
warning system with the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority's (KCAA) radar
operators.
3. (C) The expansion of territory controlled by the Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC) in Somalia has raised the GOK's security
concerns about flights from Somalia. On October 4, after meetings
with the aviation industry and the National Aviation Security
Council, the KCAA issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) requiring all
flights carrying passengers to or from Somalia to use JKIA, effective
immediately. Private aviation representatives welcomed the change,
which they had long advocated. While the NOTAM allowed cargo flights
to and from Somalia to use other airports (Wilson),it specified that
all flights carrying more than the required flight crew must also use
JKIA. A KCAA official told EconOff that any passengers from Somalia
arriving at Wilson would be arrested, along with the air crew. If
any cargo flight arrived with more than the required one or two crew,
all the personnel would be arrested. He could not say whether
passengers would be taken to JKIA Immigration for processing or be
returned to Somalia. An Immigration official at Wilson told a DHS
officer he thought the ban on Somalia passengers would be temporary.
Wilson Airport Remains Vulnerable
--------------
4. (U) There are about 200 "resident aircraft" based at Wilson
Airport. A third of these are very light "private" recreational
aircraft. The rest, ranging from 4-seater Cessna 182 to a Dash 7,
are flying commercially. Although most are small aircraft that
cannot carry a significant cargo of fuel or explosives, in the
absence of greater control over flights in and out of Wilson, these
aircraft still represent a potential threat to the Embassy. Most
commercial flights are domestic, transporting tourists to/from the
game parks and coastal resorts. There are a few private aircraft
operators who fly for pleasure or to carry supplies to their farms, a
few flights training new pilots, and a few charter operators who fly
business people and tourists to East African towns and cities. After
Somalia collapsed in the early 1990s, Wilson Airport became the
gateway for daily flights carrying miraa (khat) to Somalia, and
passengers and refugees to Kenya. Currently, there are about 20
flights daily from Wilson to Somalia.
5. (U) Until the perimeter fence was built in 1979, anybody could
drive into the various Wilson airport hangars and offices bordering
the tarmac from Langata Road. The British and U.S. governments have
been working with KAA and KCAA to improve security at all Kenyan
airports, including Wilson, through the Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA)
program. The World Bank is funding a multi-million dollar program to
upgrade Kenya's airports, including Wilson, to expand their capacity
to handle the burgeoning demand and improve their safety and security
to the FAA Category One and ICAO standards necessary for direct
flights to the U.S.
6. (SBU) There is one small terminal at Wilson with no proper
passenger check-in facilities, and some of the operators have built
their own terminals for handling passengers. There are currently 17
entrances to the tarmac through various hangars, gates and private
terminals. Currently, KAA Security tries to screen all passengers
and luggage at the terminal before they board their flights and all
employees before they go out onto the airfield. Flights are also
required to taxi to a police checkpoint before takeoff, but any check
is perfunctory. Emboffs have observed workers and police walking
around without displaying badges, and senior GOK officials avoiding
screening. KAA security officials explained the unbadged casual
workers were on a group pass, but quickly installed a machine to
produce temporary badges. No solution has yet been found to force
police to display their badges.
5. (SBU) KAA officials asked UK and U.S. Embassy officials
responsible for aviation security and safety to review a proposal a
Dutch firm submitted to the KAA under the World Bank upgrade project
to build a fence between the existing hangars and terminals and the
runway with three gates for aircraft. After walking the whole
flightline and observing the lax security at several points, the
officials stated the proposal would not improve safety or security.
(A fuel facility did not ask the visitors walking past tanks if they
had any matches or lighters.) The proposal for security officials to
stop and search all taxing planes at the gates was impractical and
would not be effective. Instead, the officials recommended KAA staff
and equip three access points to the runway, taxiways, hangars and
terminals with full, consistent screening for all passengers, staff,
equipment and cargo. Buildings along the flightline could either
have access to the road or to the flightline and hire their own
security guards against theft. If they needed access to both the
road and the flightline (Flying Doctors),they should pay KCAA to
provide security personnel for screening. It is currently easy for
persons to avoid KAA screening by walking through hangars.
6. (C) British Emboff informed KAA the High Commission would
recommend adding a specific mention about Wilson to their travel
advisory because of concerns about the threat represented by Somalis
entering Kenya, even if they are processed by Immigration. Emboffs
reminded KAA Security Chief Stanley Mutungi that KAA is legally
responsible for overseeing the security of incoming flights. He
noted that enforcing inspection and screening requirements in
Mogadishu would be rather difficult, that some Somalis are sent back,
and offered to provide the list of all Somalis who have arrived at
Wilson. The PISCES system set up by DHS at Wilson is operating, and
Immigration recently used it to process 28 Western tourists. DHS
plans to connect the Wilson PISCES system to Immigration HQ to
provide real time monitoring and make it easier for Immigration to
use the "Stop List."
7. (C) Both Embassies asked for the report on the 2005 explosion at
Wilson, but Mutungi claimed that Police Commissioner Ali has the only
copy. Emboffs also expressed concern about proposals from a GOK
Committee, warning that transferring security responsibility from KAA
to the police would not meet ICAO requirements, and would lead us to
strengthen the travel warning. Pryor warned HMG would likely ban BA
flights to Kenya. Instead, they suggested that KAA improve its staff
and procedures, and press Commissioner Ali for a dedicated airport
police detachment answerable to the KAA Managing Director.
8. (U) On September 26, the UK added the following text to its Kenya
travel advisory: "We are concerned about the lack of security
arrangements in place at Wilson airport in Nairobi. The airport is
mainly used for domestic flights, including charters. These have
been raised with the Kenyan authorities. We continue to monitor the
situation. You should remain vigilant at all times." After
reviewing the security situation with TSA rep and Econoff, Consul
General agreed he would propose similar changes in the Department's
travel warning when it comes up for renewal in December 2006.
Worried About KAA and World Bank Oversight
--------------
9. (C) Separately, KAA's decision to sign a contract with a Chinese
firm with no previous airport construction experience for the first
phase of JKIA expansion sparked worries about the integrity of the
World Bank's oversight of its multi-million dollar airport upgrade
and expansion project. A confidential source informed the TSA rep
that KAA had demanded bidders provide a $1 million kickback to
Managing Director George Muhoho, but this allegation has not been
confirmed. Anil Bhandari, the Washington-based Bank official in
charge of the project, and the DOT's Safe Skies for Africa Program
Director had asked the local Bank staff to include the TSA rep in all
discussions and reviews, but the local staff ignored access requests
from the TSA rep and did not oppose KAA's accepting both the Chinese
bid and the Dutch contractor's design. Bhandari is expected to
transfer from Washington to Nairobi in October, and we hope he will
establish closer oversight over subsequent stages of the program.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Emboffs have often advised KCAA that the only way to develop
100% screening and badge display is to develop a policy for everyone
and stick to it, especially for senior GOK officials. Once
established, the police can be required to comply. After relating
expats' stories of bribed Customs officers allowing planes to arrive
"empty" and then unload goods in a hangar, the DHS officer running
the PISCES system at Wilson believes there are many GOK personnel at
Wilson ready to facilitate entrance to Kenya for any arriving Somali.
KAA could threaten to ban flights until Mogadishu airport
establishes satisfactory security procedures, but miraa growers have
powerful economic interests and political influence that have
overcome previous bans.
HOOVER
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, EB/TRA/AN, S/CT
DEPT ALSO PASS TO DOT/OST CONNIE HUNTER
FOR DHS/TSA ASSISTANT SECRETARY HAWLEY
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PTER EAIR CASC ECON KE SO
SUBJECT: SECURITY CONCERNS PERSIST AT WILSON AIRPORT
Classified By: Charge John Hoover for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)
1. (C) Summary: Concerns about security and possible terrorism at
Nairobi's Wilson Airport persist. The Kenya Civil Aviation Authority
(KCAA) notice of October 4 moving all Somalia passenger flights from
Wilson to the better-regulated Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
(JKIA) should help, but Kenya Airport Authority's (KAA) plans to
upgrade Wilson do not appear likely to effectively address other
vulnerabilities. The UK revised its travel advisory on September 26
to specifically mention problems at Wilson, and Post will likely
recommend a similar change at the next renewal of the Department's
travel warning. End Summary.
What is the Threat?
--------------
2. (SBU) Wilson Airport is a general aviation airport on the south
side of Nairobi, about 4 km from the city center, and 14 km from the
U.S. Embassy. The basic threat at Wilson is the possibility of
aircraft hijacking/hostage taking involving AmCits, or a suicide
flight against the U.S. Embassy. Although Immigration and Customs
are supposed to check all incoming flights at Wilson, controls are in
fact weak, raising the possibility that Wilson could be a conduit for
weapons or terrorists smuggled from Somalia into Kenya. Flights from
Somalia or other foreign origins could also be used for suicide
attack against the Embassy or other targets. The GOK has still not
responded to Embassy's repeated requests to publish the alleged
restriction of the Embassy's airspace, or to establish an early
warning system with the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority's (KCAA) radar
operators.
3. (C) The expansion of territory controlled by the Council of
Islamic Courts (CIC) in Somalia has raised the GOK's security
concerns about flights from Somalia. On October 4, after meetings
with the aviation industry and the National Aviation Security
Council, the KCAA issued a Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) requiring all
flights carrying passengers to or from Somalia to use JKIA, effective
immediately. Private aviation representatives welcomed the change,
which they had long advocated. While the NOTAM allowed cargo flights
to and from Somalia to use other airports (Wilson),it specified that
all flights carrying more than the required flight crew must also use
JKIA. A KCAA official told EconOff that any passengers from Somalia
arriving at Wilson would be arrested, along with the air crew. If
any cargo flight arrived with more than the required one or two crew,
all the personnel would be arrested. He could not say whether
passengers would be taken to JKIA Immigration for processing or be
returned to Somalia. An Immigration official at Wilson told a DHS
officer he thought the ban on Somalia passengers would be temporary.
Wilson Airport Remains Vulnerable
--------------
4. (U) There are about 200 "resident aircraft" based at Wilson
Airport. A third of these are very light "private" recreational
aircraft. The rest, ranging from 4-seater Cessna 182 to a Dash 7,
are flying commercially. Although most are small aircraft that
cannot carry a significant cargo of fuel or explosives, in the
absence of greater control over flights in and out of Wilson, these
aircraft still represent a potential threat to the Embassy. Most
commercial flights are domestic, transporting tourists to/from the
game parks and coastal resorts. There are a few private aircraft
operators who fly for pleasure or to carry supplies to their farms, a
few flights training new pilots, and a few charter operators who fly
business people and tourists to East African towns and cities. After
Somalia collapsed in the early 1990s, Wilson Airport became the
gateway for daily flights carrying miraa (khat) to Somalia, and
passengers and refugees to Kenya. Currently, there are about 20
flights daily from Wilson to Somalia.
5. (U) Until the perimeter fence was built in 1979, anybody could
drive into the various Wilson airport hangars and offices bordering
the tarmac from Langata Road. The British and U.S. governments have
been working with KAA and KCAA to improve security at all Kenyan
airports, including Wilson, through the Safe Skies for Africa (SSFA)
program. The World Bank is funding a multi-million dollar program to
upgrade Kenya's airports, including Wilson, to expand their capacity
to handle the burgeoning demand and improve their safety and security
to the FAA Category One and ICAO standards necessary for direct
flights to the U.S.
6. (SBU) There is one small terminal at Wilson with no proper
passenger check-in facilities, and some of the operators have built
their own terminals for handling passengers. There are currently 17
entrances to the tarmac through various hangars, gates and private
terminals. Currently, KAA Security tries to screen all passengers
and luggage at the terminal before they board their flights and all
employees before they go out onto the airfield. Flights are also
required to taxi to a police checkpoint before takeoff, but any check
is perfunctory. Emboffs have observed workers and police walking
around without displaying badges, and senior GOK officials avoiding
screening. KAA security officials explained the unbadged casual
workers were on a group pass, but quickly installed a machine to
produce temporary badges. No solution has yet been found to force
police to display their badges.
5. (SBU) KAA officials asked UK and U.S. Embassy officials
responsible for aviation security and safety to review a proposal a
Dutch firm submitted to the KAA under the World Bank upgrade project
to build a fence between the existing hangars and terminals and the
runway with three gates for aircraft. After walking the whole
flightline and observing the lax security at several points, the
officials stated the proposal would not improve safety or security.
(A fuel facility did not ask the visitors walking past tanks if they
had any matches or lighters.) The proposal for security officials to
stop and search all taxing planes at the gates was impractical and
would not be effective. Instead, the officials recommended KAA staff
and equip three access points to the runway, taxiways, hangars and
terminals with full, consistent screening for all passengers, staff,
equipment and cargo. Buildings along the flightline could either
have access to the road or to the flightline and hire their own
security guards against theft. If they needed access to both the
road and the flightline (Flying Doctors),they should pay KCAA to
provide security personnel for screening. It is currently easy for
persons to avoid KAA screening by walking through hangars.
6. (C) British Emboff informed KAA the High Commission would
recommend adding a specific mention about Wilson to their travel
advisory because of concerns about the threat represented by Somalis
entering Kenya, even if they are processed by Immigration. Emboffs
reminded KAA Security Chief Stanley Mutungi that KAA is legally
responsible for overseeing the security of incoming flights. He
noted that enforcing inspection and screening requirements in
Mogadishu would be rather difficult, that some Somalis are sent back,
and offered to provide the list of all Somalis who have arrived at
Wilson. The PISCES system set up by DHS at Wilson is operating, and
Immigration recently used it to process 28 Western tourists. DHS
plans to connect the Wilson PISCES system to Immigration HQ to
provide real time monitoring and make it easier for Immigration to
use the "Stop List."
7. (C) Both Embassies asked for the report on the 2005 explosion at
Wilson, but Mutungi claimed that Police Commissioner Ali has the only
copy. Emboffs also expressed concern about proposals from a GOK
Committee, warning that transferring security responsibility from KAA
to the police would not meet ICAO requirements, and would lead us to
strengthen the travel warning. Pryor warned HMG would likely ban BA
flights to Kenya. Instead, they suggested that KAA improve its staff
and procedures, and press Commissioner Ali for a dedicated airport
police detachment answerable to the KAA Managing Director.
8. (U) On September 26, the UK added the following text to its Kenya
travel advisory: "We are concerned about the lack of security
arrangements in place at Wilson airport in Nairobi. The airport is
mainly used for domestic flights, including charters. These have
been raised with the Kenyan authorities. We continue to monitor the
situation. You should remain vigilant at all times." After
reviewing the security situation with TSA rep and Econoff, Consul
General agreed he would propose similar changes in the Department's
travel warning when it comes up for renewal in December 2006.
Worried About KAA and World Bank Oversight
--------------
9. (C) Separately, KAA's decision to sign a contract with a Chinese
firm with no previous airport construction experience for the first
phase of JKIA expansion sparked worries about the integrity of the
World Bank's oversight of its multi-million dollar airport upgrade
and expansion project. A confidential source informed the TSA rep
that KAA had demanded bidders provide a $1 million kickback to
Managing Director George Muhoho, but this allegation has not been
confirmed. Anil Bhandari, the Washington-based Bank official in
charge of the project, and the DOT's Safe Skies for Africa Program
Director had asked the local Bank staff to include the TSA rep in all
discussions and reviews, but the local staff ignored access requests
from the TSA rep and did not oppose KAA's accepting both the Chinese
bid and the Dutch contractor's design. Bhandari is expected to
transfer from Washington to Nairobi in October, and we hope he will
establish closer oversight over subsequent stages of the program.
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Emboffs have often advised KCAA that the only way to develop
100% screening and badge display is to develop a policy for everyone
and stick to it, especially for senior GOK officials. Once
established, the police can be required to comply. After relating
expats' stories of bribed Customs officers allowing planes to arrive
"empty" and then unload goods in a hangar, the DHS officer running
the PISCES system at Wilson believes there are many GOK personnel at
Wilson ready to facilitate entrance to Kenya for any arriving Somali.
KAA could threaten to ban flights until Mogadishu airport
establishes satisfactory security procedures, but miraa growers have
powerful economic interests and political influence that have
overcome previous bans.
HOOVER