SOMALI REFUGEES IN KENYA (C-TN6-01351)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 003900

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, INR, PRM
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/07/2026
TAGS: PREF PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALI REFUGEES IN KENYA (C-TN6-01351)

REF: STATE 142476

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Classified By: A/POL CHIEF CRAIG WHITE REASON 1.4(d)


1. (C) The following answers are keyed to original lettered
questions in reftel.


A. (C) HOW HAS THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA RESPONDED TO THE FLOW
OF SOMALI REFUGEES TO DADAAB? IS THE INFLUX OF SOMALI
REFUGEES INTO KENYA A THREAT TO KENYAN STABILITY? IF SO,
HOW? The GOK continues to fulfill its international treaty
obligations and grant Somalis prima facie refugee status in
Kenya. We are not aware of any reports of refoulment.
Especially given continuing drought conditions throughout
much of Kenya, the GOK does not have the resources to assist
refugees at Dadaab. UNHCR-Kenya has recently received $1.5
million (it requested $2.3 million) from UNHCR-HQ to provide
non-food items. However, we expect continuing shortages of
basic humanitarian assistance items such as soap, cooking
fuel, and blankets. Since January 2006, the UN estimates
21,000 new arrivals at Dadaab. Once UNHCR registers these
refugees (a long process, complicated by lack of resources
and Kenyans fraudulently trying to register alongside the
legitimate refugees),WFP will begin providing food
assistance (currently the new arrivals rely on charity of the
existing population). WFP does not have the resources to
provide the international standard of 2,100 kilocalories/day
and will have to reduce rations unless the donor community
makes additional pledges. WFP-Kenya expressed appreciation
for USG contributions, and is scheduled to meet with the EC
this week to seek their support.


B. (C) WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE FALLOUT WHEN THE GOVERNMENT
OF KENYA REFUSED ASYLUM TO 17,000 SOMALIS IN 2005? We are
not aware of any fallout from the 2005 incident, which took
place in northeast Kenya near the border town of El Wak. As
noted above, the GOK has generously extended entry to all
Somali refugees. The GOK continues to express concerns about
UN assistance benefiting Kenyan-Somalis and works closely and
cooperatively with UNHCR to prevent this. Kenya has a
clearly defined policy that all refugees must reside in
designated refugee camps except when individual protection
issues require otherwise. In the above-mentioned case the
refugees were refused official asylum after declining to move
to the Dadaab refugee camp, but were allowed to remain in the
El Wak area without support until the intra-clan conflict
just across the border had subsided.


C. (C) HOW HAS THE SIZE, EXPENSE, GROWTH, AND EXISTENCE OF
THE CAMPS AT DADAAB TAXED THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT? WHAT PLANS
DOES THE GOVERNMENT HAVE IN PLACE TO RESPOND TO THESE
STRAINS? As noted above, the GOK relies on the UN to provide
assistance and protection. The government provides no direct
support and incurs almost no expenses to sustain the camp
except for minimal security services. The government has
signaled that UNHCR may begin scouting out a location for a
fourth camp at Dadaab and UNHCR has undertaken this task.
UNHCR reports that with some infrastructure upgrades (e.g.,
digging additional boreholes) it can absorb another 30,000
arrivals within the three existing camps that make up Dadaab.
If the influx exceeds this number, UNHCR plans to appeal to
donors to fund construction of the fourth camp.


D. (C) HOW IS THE ONGOING CONFLICT IN SOMALIA POLARIZING THE
REFUGEE POPULATIONS IN DADAAB? HOW IS THE UIC INFLUENTIAL?
HOW DIVIDED IS THE POPULATION ALONG CLAN LINES? The camp is
divided along clan lines, but even isolated incidents of clan
violence are rare. Clan politics mostly play out in
competition over limited employment opportunities, slots in
the primary and secondary schools, or in distribution of
other non-food resources. We are not aware of the level of
influence Mogadishu-based Islamic Courts may have in the
camp. There has been some anecdotal reporting from NGOs
about conservative Islamic imams preaching at some of the
over 100 mosques scattered throughout Dadaab. These partners
have raised warning flags about the number of idle youth in
Dadaab and the possibility of recruitment into radical
Islamist causes if education and other services are not
provided to keep them occupied. The majority of new refugee
arrivals come from Mogadishu and cite "militia conflict" as

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the cause for fleeing. It's not clear whether the new
arrivals felt targeted by the Islamic Courts, a particular
war lord, were just escaping the crossfire, or possibly, were
affected by the drought. Decisions to flee are likely based
on a combination of reasons.


E. (C) HOW IS KENYA PATROLLING ITS BORDER WITH SOMALIA? IS
IT TURNING AWAY ADDITIONAL ASYLUM SEEKERS? IF SO, WHERE ARE
THE FAILED ASYLUM SEEKERS GOING? HOW ARE SOMALI REFUGEES
REACTING WHEN THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT REFUSES THEM ADMISSION TO
KENYA? The Kenya-Somalia border is extremely porous and
there is limited, if any, patrolling. The GOK grants Somalis
prima facie refugee status and does not/not turn asylum
seekers away.


F. (C) WHAT NGOS AND/OR IOS ARE ON THE GROUND TO RECEIVE AND
ASSIST THE REFUGEES? IS THE GOVERNMENT OF KENYA PERMITTING
THESE NGOS AND IOS ACCESS TO THE REFUGEE POPULATIONS? Among
the NGO's currently working in Dadaab are CARE Kenya, GTZ,
FilmAid International, and the Kenyan Council of Churches.
The IOs working in Dadaab include UNHCR, WFP, IOM, and
UNICEF. As noted above, the GOK cooperates well and closely
with UNHCR and NGOs but follows a hands-off policy for the
most part. UNHCR (in part through arrangements with NGO
implementing partners) provides shelter, water/sanitation,
education, and medical assistance - but there are gaps,
particularly in basic non-food items (e.g., soap, blankets,
cooking fuel) and in non-life sustaining services such as
secondary education, income generation, etc. WFP provides
food. UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF will be conducting a Joint
Assessment Mission to Dadaab the week of September 18, and
likely call a donors conference soon after to appeal for
additional pledges to meet assistance gaps.


G. (C) HOW IS THE KENYAN GOVERNMENT CONTROLLING THE NUMBER
AND BEHAVIOR OF SOMALI REFUGEES IN THE COUNTRY? Kenyan
police provide security at Dadaab for both the refugees and
aid workers there. The GOK does not attempt to control the
behavior of Somali refugees other than to enforce the laws of
Kenya, which include strict travel restrictions for official
refugees outside of refugee camps.


H. (C) ARE THE SOMALI REFUGEES IN KENYA RECEIVING SUFFICIENT
FOOD, WATER, HEALTH CARE, AND SHELTER? Due to the length of
time the Somalia refugees have been in Dadaab - some for over
15 years - overall resources directed to them have diminished
as other refugee and humanitarian crisis have taken center
stage. Food rations were cut to 1,900 kcals per person per
day for two months of this year, below the SPHERE mandated
standard of 2,100 kilocalories per person per day. In
addition, because registration of refugees has been delayed,
many new arrivals have not received a ration but rather have
been provided for by fellow clan members at the camp. UNHCR
and other contacts expect the number of new arrivals to total
30,000 by December. Under this scenario, food rations will
likely be cut back to 1,900 kcals or lower if new resources
are not provided by donors. (NOTE: State/PRM recently
provided an additional USD 2 million to WFP Kenya to help
cope with the shortages within the refugee food program. END
NOTE.)

The water system at the camp currently provides nearly the
minimum standard of 15 liters per person per day, but is old
and needs substantial upgrading. Health care currently meets
minimum standards. Shelter for the camp's 130,000
longer-term occupants is adequate, but there have been some
delays in providing shelter for new arrivals. All of these
deficiencies are due to lack of donor support for IO and NGO
partners at Dadaab in particular, and for refugee operations
worldwide. (NOTE: While some services do not meet minimum
standards within the refugee camp, it should also be noted
that conditions within the camp are markedly better than for
the surrounding host community. This is the reason that many
Kenyans of Somali ethnicity attempt to enter the camp
fraudulently. END NOTE.)


I. (C) IS THERE A POTENTIAL FOR TERRORIST OPERATIVES TO
EXPLOIT THESE LARGE REFUGEE FLOWS AND, IF SO, HOW? The
porous border with Somalia and the significant influx of
refugees could provide an opportunity for armed combatants or

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extremist elements to enter Dadaab posing as refugees. While
we are not aware of any extremist elements recruiting or
operating in the camp, there is certainly a possibility for
this in the future. As mentioned in the answer to D, some
NGO partners have raised warning flags about the number of
idle youth in Dadaab and the possibility of recruitment into
radical Islamist causes if education and other services are
not provided to keep them occupied. Simply put, there is a
concentrated population of over 30,000 Muslim young men
between the ages of 16 and 45. Due to lack of resources, the
NGOs and IOs working in Dadaab are able to provide little or
no opportunities for education, income generation, or other
diversions or activities. The population has no ability to
leave Dadaab legally, and represents a real opportunity for
recruitment by Islamic extremists.


2. (C) COMMENT: We appreciate the GOK's continuing
recognition of Somalis as refugees on a prima facie basis.
Refcoord Addis Ababa, in consultation with Embassy Nairobi,
has been and will continue to be involved in and support the
UN's forward-leaning contingency plans for the influx of
Somali refugees to both Kenya and Ethiopia. END COMMENT.


3. (U) RefCoord Addis co-drafted this message, which was
cleared by Embassy Nairobi's Somalia Working Group.
RANNEBERGER