Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI3004
2006-07-10 13:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: COURTING AND POSTURING

Tags:  PREL PGOV PTER SO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4768
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #3004/01 1911341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 101341Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2948
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003004 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: COURTING AND POSTURING

REF: NAIROBI 2873

NAIROBI 00003004 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: PolCouns Larry Andre, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003004

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: COURTING AND POSTURING

REF: NAIROBI 2873

NAIROBI 00003004 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: PolCouns Larry Andre, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: European members of the IGAD/AU mission to
Somalia came away with the impression that the Islamic Courts
in Mogadishu are much more organized than the government in
Baidoa. The Transitional Federal Government seems to have no
clear idea of what it must do to implement the National
Security and Stabilization Plan, nor does it appear
adequately prepared to face the Courts in the next round of
dialogue in Khartoum. The Courts met the mission with
representatives of multiple sectors of Mogadishu society,
including women and the TFG-appointed governor, in a clear
attempt to create an impression of their inclusiveness. It
was apparent, however, that the Courts were calling the shots
within this group. All interlocutors in Mogadishu opposed
any intervention by foreign military forces, particularly
those from Ethiopia. Italian Envoy Rafaelli subsequently
traveled to central Somalia, north of Mogadishu, to meet
individually with Hassan Dahir Aweys, a meeting that has
raised some eyebrows in the international community and
hackles in the TFG. Some elements within the TFG seem
increasingly inclined to ditch the dialogue and pursue a
military option against the Courts, primarily to protect
their own positions. END SUMMARY.

BAIDOA
--------------

2. (C) Italian Special Envoy Mario Rafaelli and European
Commission Head of Delegation Eric Van der Linden provided
members of the diplomatic corps a read-out of their
participation in the IGAD/AU mission to Somalia (reftel).
Travelers were underwhelmed by the TFG, with Rafaelli
describing these meetings as "totally useless." The
ministers stressed the importance of implementing the
National Security and Stabilization Plan, but seemed to have
no particular thoughts on what they must do to achieve this.
In a private meeting, President Yusuf agreed that it was
important for the group to travel to Mogadishu, but asked
that they meet with representatives of all different groups
while there. In a subsequent, more public, meeting, Yusuf

issued a lengthy tirade about the terrible situation in
Mogadishu, stating his belief that the radicals are pushing
aside what moderates may be there. Yusuf requested a
briefing from the group after they completed their travels.
The EC and Italy stated to other diplomats in Nairobi that
they would like this briefing to take place in Nairobi with
only Yusuf present. There are concerns that Yusuf will be
swayed by those elements within the TFG who are not keen to
pursue dialogue because it could lead to changes within the
cabinet.

MOGADISHU
--------------

3. (C) The delegation found Mogadishu a changed city. There
were no roadblocks in the vicinity of the hotel at which they
conducted meetings, and travelers were escorted by only one
technical (as opposed to eight a year ago). Rafaelli noted
that, prior to meeting with the delegation, the Courts
convened a meeting of representatives from various segments
of Mogadishu society to work out a common position. This
group included the Courts, civil society, women, traditional
elders, business, and the Mogadishu government (appointed by
the TFG). There were approximately 20 statements from the
Mogadishu group, each strictly limited to three minutes. All
speakers were strongly opposed to foreign intervention,
particularly by Ethiopia. Rafaelli said this meeting created
the impression that the Courts are very capable and
well-coordinated. He noted some evident contradictions
within the group (Kenyan Ambassador Affey, an ethnic Somali,
had advised that the individual translating for the group was
adding a radical twist to each of the interventions). While
the Courts were keen to have all represented groups speak,
they nonetheless emphasized their overall leadership role.
Court leaders apparently stated that they do not wish to
become the government, but could or would not state precisely
what they expect their role to be. Court officials indicated
they were including the TFG governor and his council in this
meeting because they had shared opposition to the warlords,
but this did not imply that the governor represented the
people of Mogadishu.


4. (C) Van der Linden noted that the Mogadishu presentations
appeared half prepared and half spontaneous. The Courts were
clearly trying to create an image of themselves as "basically
good guys." Van der Linden noted that, while there were

NAIROBI 00003004 002.2 OF 002


quite a few moderate elements present, the extremists clearly
have the upper hand. Rafaelli pointed out that the Courts
appear to recognize that if they are able to return Mogadishu
to a level of functionality within three months, they will be
a de facto counterweight to the TFG. Asked if there was any
sense that the Courts would be willing to play a role in the
TFG, Rafaelli stated that they would like representation in
parliament, particularly the seats of the recently sacked
ministers.


5. (C) Rafaelli and Van der Linden emphasized that the
international community must continue to support the TFG, but
the government must, in turn, play a stronger game in order
to effectively counter the Courts. In particular, the
government must develop a clear agenda for what it hopes to
achieve at the next round of talks in Khartoum. Rafaelli
stated the government does not seem to fully comprehend what
has transpired in Mogadishu and is therefore not adequately
responding to the situation. He expressed concerns that some
in the government may be inclined to exploit divisions in
Mogadishu and spark new rounds of fighting, rather than
pursue dialogue.

ITALY FLIES SOLO
--------------

6. (C) Rafaelli subsequently returned to central Somalia on
July 8 to meet individually with Hassan Dahir Aweys. This
meeting was originally prepared with the concurrence of
President Yusuf, some weeks before the preparation of the
IGAD mission. Rafaelli's decision to proceed with this
meeting, particularly raising Aweys' profile with an
individual meeting so close after the Mogadishu meeting, has
raised some eyebrows in the international community and
hackles in the TFG. We do not yet have a read-out from the
Italians on this discussion.

ADVOCATES OF A MILITARY OPTION
--------------

7. (C) In a July 10 discussion with Presidential Chief of
Staff Dahir Mirreh Jibreel, Mirreh had little to say about
the upcoming dialogue in Khartoum. He advocated heavy
financial investment from the U.S. to help create a national
security force. Poloff pointed out that there remain legal
restrictions on direct assistance to the government and that
his proposal to create a national security force is the work
of years, not an activity that can immediately counter the
organizational threat posed by the Courts. Mirreh's stance
is apparently shared by Prime Minister Gedi and Planning
Minister Abdirazak Osman "Jurile", who, according to the EC's
Walid Musa, are advocating a military solution and rejecting
a resumption of the dialogue in Khartoum. (Gedi and "Jurile"
are particularly threatened by the dialogue, as they are the
most likely to lose their positions in a cabinet shuffle.)
Musa advised that the European Union will be issuing a strong
statement emphasizing that it will not provide assistance to
any entity that has rejected dialogue.

COMMENT
--------------

8. (C) It is interesting to note that, following the visit of
various delegations into Mogadishu the week of 3 July
(IGAD/AU and UN),the Islamic Courts Union on 9 July
undertook an attack on a Saad clan member, Abdi Awale
Qeybdid. Mogadishu today is certainly not as peaceful as the
ICU made it seem last week. The situation in Mogadishu
remains extremely fluid, with more fighting likely in the
coming weeks. END COMMENT.
ROWE