Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI2425
2006-06-02 11:09:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: A STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT

Tags:  PREL PTER PGOV EAID SO 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHNR #2425/01 1531109
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021109Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2173
S E C R E T NAIROBI 002425 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV EAID SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: A STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. STATE 77563

B. NAIROBI 1824

C. NAIROBI 1653

D. STATE 53551

Classified By: A/PolCouns L. Peterson, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

S E C R E T NAIROBI 002425

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2026
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV EAID SO
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: A STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. STATE 77563

B. NAIROBI 1824

C. NAIROBI 1653

D. STATE 53551

Classified By: A/PolCouns L. Peterson, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: Post envisions a Somalia strategy that builds
on existing counterterrorism contacts and tactics, connecting
the ARPFAT with the TFIs, establishing relations with
moderate Islamic courts, and developing a network within the
Ayr and business communities in Mogadishu. This approach
will enhance, but not replace, existing search and seize
activities. It will have a follow-on benefit of
strengthening the TFIs by assisting with their Mogadishu
relationships, potentially drawing in more players that will
boost their credentials. Post is ready to launch expanded
humanitarian and development activities as soon as resources
are available. Efforts to strengthen the TFIs will be
largely diplomatic, working in concert with our international
colleagues to convey messages of encouragement for progress
made and to rein in anti-democratic tendencies. While the
TFIs are still exceedingly fragile, they appear unaffected by
the fighting in Mogadishu and should be recognized for
withstanding a potentially fatal development. This strategy
will depend on significantly increased contact work, for
which we will require additional personnel and other
resources. END SUMMARY.

COUNTERTERRORISM
--------------

2. (S) Fazul, Nabhan, el-Sudani, Abdi, and Ayrow must be
removed from the Somali equation. Ref C discusses a short
term objective of defeating al Qaida and its affiliates in
Somalia and denying them a safe haven and platform for their
operations. Use of "non-traditional liaison partners" (e.g.
militia leaders) to gather intelligence and pressure AQ
networks may seem unpalatable choices, particularly in light
of civilian casualties in recent rounds of fighting in
Mogadishu. However, these partners are the only means
currently available to remove these five individuals from
their positions in Mogadishu, from whence they are able to
continue planning to strike U.S. interests, including soft

targets that could include private Americans. This short
term strategy becomes even more compelling given the fact
that al Qaida is rebuilding its infrastructure in Kenya.
Time is not on our side. Arguments from diplomatic and NGO
colleagues that a subtler approach of engaging a broader
variety of actors will help us address our CT concerns fail
to take into account the immediacy of the threat posed by
these five leaders, and underestimates their ability to
undermine engagement efforts through intimidation, threats,
and assassinations. We believe a strategy of broader
engagement is necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve our
CT goals. As such, we argue that the short term strategy of
locating and nullifying high value targets remains valid,
although modifications should be explored to improve the
prospects for success.


3. (S/NF) In order to enhance our CT efforts, and to build
relationships that will further our efforts in delivering
humanitarian assistance and supporting institution building
and government formation, Post sees a need to expand our
contacts in Mogadishu and work to bring them into allignment
with the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). This will
involve first supporting efforts to reconcile ARPFAT
warlord/ministers with the government in Baidoa. We can use
the relationships and resources available through SIMO to
bring the ARPFAT leadership to Nairobi to meet with TFI
leaders, starting with Assembly Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh
Aden. Given past affiliations between Sharif Hassan and
select members of the ARPFAT leadership, he is the individual
most likely to gain entree and perhaps convince the ministers
that they are better off joining their forces with the TFIs.
This is an option that has already been explored with Sharif
Hassan and UN Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) Francois Fall, both of whom thought it was worth
pursuing. Given UN buy-in, we would be in a position to
limit our role to behind the scenes facilitation. We would
like to commence this effort as soon as it is possible to
bring both sides to Nairobi. Timing will be affected by the
fighting in Mogadishu, as the ARPFAT will be unwilling to
leave Mogadishu if they believe territory will be lost in
their absence. The potential duration of this effort is
completely unpredictable. Efforts to reconcile the Mogadishu
warlords with the other members of the TFIs have been a
constant for at least the past three years. However, if
successful this time around, such reconciliation will provide
a boost for both efforts to counter the terrorist threat and
to strengthen the TFIs.


4. (S) The next critical step is to identify and engage with
moderate members of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC). Not
all courts are preaching extremism, nor do all Mogadishu
residents support the jihadist tendencies of some of the
court leaders. However, Mogadishu residents appreciate the
degree of order the courts have brought to their lives and
will support the courts over the warlords, in spite of any
misgivings they may have about the accompanying ideology. We
must balance our association with the Mogadishu alliance with
support to the moderates within the court system.
Establishing such connections could weaken the network
protecting the high value targets, will make clear that we
are not attacking Islam, and will put us in a position to
dialogue with entities that can either help Somalia
transition to a more stable state or continue to foment
instability in pursuit of their individual power objectives.
To achieve this, we propose working with the League of Arab
States (LAS) representatives in Nairobi for assistance in
identifying the moderate leaders and for making initial
contact with these leaders. Ideally, we would like to see
the LAS working to bring the courts into dialogue with the
TFIs as well. We have not yet approached the LAS with this
proposal, so do not have a sense of whether they would be
willing to be helpful. We are unable to estimate a
time-frame for the evolution of this effort, but would like
to commence contacts immediately.


5. (S) Finally, we need to enhance our contacts in the Ayr
community and the Mogadishu business community. The more
contacts we are able to establish with moderate members of
these groups, the more we will be able to chip away at the
relative solidarity currently enjoyed by the UIC. This is,
by far, the longest term and most difficult component of the
CT strategy because of our inability to enter Mogadishu.
There is also not an obvious organization to act as an
intermediary for us in such contacts, so we will be dependent
on the travel schedule of Ayr and business leaders to
Nairobi. For the moment, we can only implement this
component on a catch-as-catch-can basis.


6. (C) It should be emphasized that we are not/not proposing
a new, high-profile, US-led recoconciliation effort in
Somalia. On the contrary, we are proposing a series of
modest initiatives which we believe would be fully supported
by the UN special representative here and the main
international actors in Nairobi, initiatives which would
probably not materialize unless the US lent quiet,
behind-the-scenes support. It is essential that the USG
remain in close touch with key UN, EU and African states
involved in Somalia and that our activities be coordinated
with them. UN, EU and key African officials in Nairobi have
all expressed a keen interest in such coordination with the
USG.

DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
--------------

7. (SBU) The activities we propose supporting are spelled out
in detail in refs B and C. Most of these activities involve
expansion of existing programs, so USAID East Africa believes
additional activities can begin as soon as funding is made
available. As we await funding, individual European
countries, the European Union, and the UN are all
substantially ramping up their activities inside Somalia.
The longer we have to wait for funds, the more our
comparative impact diminshes.


8. (SBU) USAID East Africa has long-established relationships
within the Nairobi-based donor community, so is already
engaged in discussions on coordination of both relief and
development activities. Per ref C, USAID East Africa would
like to continue to provide modest financial support to the
Somalia Aid Coordination Body (being renamed the Somali
Support Secretariat) to ensure a continuation of the
excellent cooperation that has characterized donor relations
with regard to Somalia. Post is also trying to find ways to
ensure our voice is heard in the Coordination and Monitoring
Committee (established in October 2004 to provide a means of
coordinating key national, regional and international
stakeholders' activities),which is chaired by the Somali
prime minister and the UN SRSG. The meetings of this body
are to take place in Baidoa for as long as the government is
located there, limiting our ability to participate directly
in critical meetings. However, we tend to be of a like mind
with both Sweden and the UK, so may be able to draw on these
relationships in the short term to have our views put
forward. In order to fend off potential blocking maneuvers
that would prevent the use of such proxies, we will need to
engage the prime minister and the SRSG to gain concurrence
for such an approach. As the largest bilateral donor to
Somalia, we are in a strong position to make an argument for
special consideration of our participation, but this will
only be a short-term fix. If we are to be viable
participants in such an entity, we will need to have the
ability to travel to Baidoa for these meetings. (NOTE: As a
larger issue, ever more activities are taking place in
Baidoa. Our inability to travel to Baidoa puts us at risk of
being left behind as other donors enhance their direct
engagements with the TFIs. END NOTE.)

Institution Building and Government Formation
--------------

9. (C) When fighting in Mogadishu broke out on the eve of
parliament's move to Baidoa, diplomats and NGOs expressed
concern that this would be the death knell for the TFIs. On
the contrary, the TFIs have never done better. While they
are still exceedingly fragile, and their progress may only be
noted by Somali-philes, members of the TFIs have gotten down
to business in spite of activities in the capital. We (both
the U.S. individually and the international community
collectively) must do all in our power to publicly
acknowledge this progress, however modest, and further
bolster the institutions.


10. (C) Because we are not in a position to provide direct
financial assistance to the TFIs, the nature of our support
for the time being must be entirely diplomatic and symbolic.
We currently seize every opportunity to meet with the
President, Prime Minister, and Assembly Speaker when they are
in Nairobi. It is critical that this triangular approach
continue: If we distance ourselves from any one of the three,
we will weaken the whole. President Yusuf will be the most
difficult of the three to work with because of his
old-school, anti-democratic tendencies. Our work with Yusuf
will have to involve a fair degree of careful monitoring and
persuasion, in concert with our diplomatic counterparts, to
ensure that he does not undermine the TFIs' fragile progress
with his desire to be the strong-man leader of Somalia. Gedi
clearly wants our support and is a much easier interlocutor
than Yusuf, but he suffers from periodic popularity problems.
Sharif Hassan is a viable partner in terms of his
willingness to work with us. Given the enormity of his task
(trying to create a working parliament),our expectations for
signs of success must be appropriately modest. We must seize
any opportunities to help in this effort as a means of
helping ensure the TFIs survive until the end of their
mandate and are able to hand something over to a successor
government. We must reinforce the concept of an independent
parliament, but also a parliament that is able to work with
the executive and make compromises in the national interest.


11. (C) While we are focused on the top levels of government,
we must turn significant attention to the development of
local administrations. It has already taken so long for the
TFIs to get up and running that we have begun hearing reports
of rural communities essentially writing off this latest
government as another failed experiment. So much effort will
be required for the TFIs to get their own house in order, it
is difficult to see them extending their influence much
beyond Baidoa, or wherever they ultimately settle, before the
end of their mandate. Our development activities envision
engagement at local levels, both to provide a peace dividend
to these far-flung communities and to aid with the
development of functioning and effective governing
institutions at all levels. Our development assistance
activities will have to be coupled with diplomatic engagement
with the TFIs to develop connections between nascent local
and national authorities. We are likely going to have to
fend off a desire by the TFIs to centralize authority as much
as possible - an arrangement that is completely unworkable in
the immediate term. Diplomatic engagement will need to be
carried out in concert with other donors, most likely the EU
and its member states. Italy is already discussing the
importance of regional authorities and the need to bolster
their capacities. We will need to engage with the Italians
to ensure our efforts are complimentary.

Sanctions
--------------

12. (C) The above proposals will rely on some key decisions
regarding sanctions, both international and domestic. Our
international partners are seeking harmony with us on the
issue of the UN arms embargo. Many would support a selected
lifting of the embargo in order to assist the TFIs with their
security and stabilization plan, but would first like to know
what stance the U.S. will take. On the domestic front, we
need to examine sanctions such as those imposed under the
Brooke Amendment and consider whether a waiver will be
possible. Given the need to bolster the TFIs, Post believes
such a waiver would be warranted.

Work Arounds
--------------

13. (C) As long as official American travel into Somalia is
so heavily restricted, we will need to utilize other avenues
available to us. We propose putting more effort into
developing contacts in Eastleigh, Dadaab refugee camp, and
the Kenyan-Somali border areas to at least gain a better
understanding of conditions inside Somalia. We would also
like to make greater use of the border areas as potential
meeting locations for local Somali leaders who may find it
difficult to get all the way to Nairobi. We must also better
use our relationships with implementing partners (such as
CARE) and donor colleagues (such as the UN) to broaden our
knowledge base of circumstances inside Somalia.

Resources
--------------

14. (C) One Somalia Watcher, an under-sized RSO office, and a
smattering of USAID staff who cover Somalia as part of larger
portfolios will not be able to engage in all of the direct
contacts necessary to make the above activities bear fruit.

BELLAMY