Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI2142
2006-05-16 14:54:00
SECRET
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALI PRESIDENT YUSUF: LOST IN TRANSLATION

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PINR SO KE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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P 161454Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1735
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002142 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALI PRESIDENT YUSUF: LOST IN TRANSLATION

Classified By: Political Counselor Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Reasons 1.4
(B) and (D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 002142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINR SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALI PRESIDENT YUSUF: LOST IN TRANSLATION

Classified By: Political Counselor Michael J. Fitzpatrick, Reasons 1.4
(B) and (D).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The Ambassador met May 15 with Somali
President Abdullahi Yusuf, who was transiting through Nairobi
en route to Somalia. Yusuf vacillated between professions of
wanting the Mogadishu ministers back in government and
threats of action against them if they did not come on board.
He reiterated his desire that we support the TFG,
specifically by working through it to advance our CT
objectives, a refrain that derives from Yusuf's desire to
centralize as much power as possible in his office. As we
explore with the different branches of government a way to
support reconciliation within the TFG and between factions in
Mogadishu, our contacts with Yusuf will remain key, but they
will likely be more damage control than constructive
engagement. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) After nearly a month away in various European and
African capitals, Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf passed
through Nairobi on his way back to Baidoa. In a May 15
meeting at the Ambassador's residence, Yusuf said he believed
circumstances were improving throughout Somalia, with the
exception of Mogadishu. He expressed concerns that what is
now happening in Mogadishu could easily happen in Merca and
Kismayo as well. It appears that the Islamic courts are
gaining ground, particularly in terms of support from the
general populace.


3. (C) Yusuf remained put out by the warlords who had been
made MPs and cabinet members, but still refused to come on
board with the government. He declared that he was for
neither side in the conflict in Mogadishu, but then proceeded
to describe the warlords as enemies of the people. The
people, he said, have drawn the conclusion that because those
killing them are ministers, the government must be behind the
fighting. Nevertheless, Yusuf said, "I still believe we need
to bring the warlords on board." The Ambassador agreed it
was important for the warlords to be brought back into
government and asked for Yusuf's thoughts on how to overcome

the current divisions. (Yusuf changed the subject.)


4. (S) The Ambassador referred to Yusuf's recent remarks in
Sweden, saying that his assertion that the U.S. was funding
the warlords had hurt our relationship and inadvertently
helped Hassan Dahir Aweys and his allies. Yusuf responded
that he had been asked who was behind the fighting, to which
he had responded that a foreign power was working with the
warlords instead of the government. He recalled previous
conversations with USG representatives in which he had
emphasized the need to work through, and thereby support, the
government. The Ambassador countered that we do support the
government, citing in particular his recent conversations
with the Prime Minister and the Speaker. He pointed out that
he did not see a contradiction between working with a few
individuals in Mogadishu on a specific activity and offering
our moral support to the government as a whole.


5. (C) Yusuf criticized PM Gedi's inability to have any
effect on the situation in Mogadishu. If a person can't do
anything in his own area, Yusuf asked, how can he rule other
Somalis? "Gedi needs to get his area under control." The
Ambassador agreed that this would be good, but noted that
Mogadishu involves particularly difficult circumstances. The
only way to get control of Mogadishu, he said, is to bring
the government and warlords together. The Ambassador
suggested that Yusuf make a public statement calling for a
cease-fire, asking the renegade ministers to come to Baidoa
and participate in the government, and warning the Somalis of
the dangers of extremist elements being sheltered in their
midst. Yusuf responded that he had already called for an end
to the fighting and asked the ministers to re-join the
government. If they failed to come back to the fold, he
would take action against them. The Ambassador counseled
that threats to the ministers would likely keep them away
from Baidoa and urged Yusuf to use less hostile approaches to
the warlords.


6. (C) COMMENT: Of the three pillars of our top level
engagement with the Somalis - President, Prime Minister, and
Speaker - Yusuf is the most difficult and least predictable.
He remains a warlord and old-style politician who,
ultimately, would like all power in Somalia to reside in his
office. His take-it-or-leave-it approach to the Mogadishu
ministers would not advance either the prospects of the TFG
or peace in Mogadishu, but neither of these points seem to
really matter to Yusuf. So firm is his belief in his own
authority that Yusuf at times interpreted our statements as
supporting his very hard line, meaning that points had to be

NAIROBI 00002142 002 OF 002


repeated several times to emphasize our belief in a need for
outreach to the warlords, not threats. Yusuf will be
critical to the success of any effort to draw the Mogadishu
ministers back to the government, but the nature of our
engagement with him will likely be more damage control than
constructive engagement. END COMMENT.


7. (C) BIO NOTE: Yusuf appeared in good health, although he
advised that he had undertaken medical consultations in
Germany in addition to his usual check-up in England. He was
surprisingly energetic and verbose, a departure from his
usual reserve when speaking English. Unfortunately, his
greater ease with either the language or the Ambassador does
not seem to have improved his understanding of our basic
points. END NOTE.
BELLAMY