Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI1701
2006-04-20 06:44:00
SECRET
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

(C) CHALLENGES IN OUR CT RELATIONSHIP WITH KENYA

Tags:  ASEC PTER PGOV PINR PINS PREL MARR KDEM KE 
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RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
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S E C R E T NAIROBI 001701 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2026
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINR PINS PREL MARR KDEM KE
SUBJECT: (C) CHALLENGES IN OUR CT RELATIONSHIP WITH KENYA

REF: A. REF A: NAIROBI 04636

B. REF B: NAIROBI 00343

C. REF C: NAIROBI 04764

D. REF D: NAIROBI 01500

E. REF E NAIROBI 00566

Classified By: Pol/C Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T NAIROBI 001701

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/01/2026
TAGS: ASEC PTER PGOV PINR PINS PREL MARR KDEM KE
SUBJECT: (C) CHALLENGES IN OUR CT RELATIONSHIP WITH KENYA

REF: A. REF A: NAIROBI 04636

B. REF B: NAIROBI 00343

C. REF C: NAIROBI 04764

D. REF D: NAIROBI 01500

E. REF E NAIROBI 00566

Classified By: Pol/C Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Post faces an increasingly difficult
operating environment in which to pursue counter-terrorism
(CT) cooperation with the Kenyan Government (GOK). In the
absence of a focused, functional government that views CT as
part of its political and national interest, Post is pursuing
a strategy of working with individual agencies to accomplish
specific, targeted goals. Other donor nations, in particular
the British, are pursuing similar strategies. Even if CT
legislation is finally approved, Post is unlikely to achieve
much in terms of shaping a Kenyan national CT policy during
the run-up to the 2007 national elections. However, we will
continue to work on various programs with the police,
military, immigration, prosecution and intelligence services
to increase their capacity to patrol their borders, secure
their airports and pursue suspected terrorists. END SUMMARY.

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GOK Not on Board with CT Effort
--------------


2. (C) The biggest stumbling block in our CT efforts in
Kenya has been achieving government buy-in at the political
(ministerial) level. In 2004 and 2005, we faced the challenge
of helping the GOK accept terrorism as a Kenyan problem and
one it must address. Convincing the government to conduct a
national public outreach strategy to sensitize the public to
terrorism issues never proved fruitful. Although some
progress was made in raising the importance of CT in
bilateral discussions, the GOK was slow to move on any true
policy issues. To date, they still have not finalized a
national CT strategy.


3. (S) Since the failure of the November constitutional

referendum, the Kibaki administration has been virtually
paralyzed. Distracted by corruption scandals(many involving
ministerial, security-related procurements),engaged in
mutual backstabbing, and desperate to set the stage for
re-election in 2007, Kibaki,s ministers do not view CT
efforts as in their political interests at this time.
Additionally, Security Minister John Michuki,s proclivity to
bad governance -- he publicly supported the March 2 raids on
the Standard Newspaper and KTN television station -- and his
focus on crime as a greater threat to national security than
terrorism render our expectations for his role as a CT
partner exceptionally low.

--------------
What Inter-Ministerial Cooperation?
--------------


4. (C) A secondary problem is the inability of various
ministries to work together. Currently, there is little or
no coordination among police, prosecutors and other relevant
government ministries that deal with terrorism issues. There
is a National Security Advisory Committee responsible for
coordination CT efforts, but it meets too infrequently to
adequately address and thwart terrorist threats. This was
evident immediately after October 2004,s explosion at Wilson
Airport. The GOK,s uncoordinated response supplied further
evidence of a stove-piped approach to national emergencies.


5. (C) This problem is not as evident at the working level.
When we brought police and prosecutors together during the
initial phase of Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) training,
they worked well as a team. The same proved true in the
recent cocaine verification/destruction exercise; once the
policy debate was over, and an interagency team assembled,
they worked extremely well together. Our Coastal Security
program is yet another good example, where we have brought
Kenya Navy, Kenya Police, and Kenya Wildlife Service together
in joint maritime operation training. However, when it comes
to larger strategic pieces, such as a JTTF, getting the
senior officials to work together has proven next to
impossible.

--------------
Where Does That Leave Us?
--------------


6. (C) These conditions make it increasingly difficult to
engage in constructive and action-oriented dialogue on
matters of national CT strategy. Particularly in the run-up
to the 2007 elections, objectives such as passing CT
legislation, incorporating a viable CT strategy into Kenya,s
national security plan, or facilitating coordination within
the GOK to effectively stop a CT threat, will likely not
garner much interest. The new terrorism bill, although
redrafted and ready for presentation to Parliament, will not
likely be approved as it is not considered an
election-winner. (NOTE: The 2003 Suppression of Terrorism
Bill came under fire from human rights groups and Muslim
organizations. It was withdrawn, and the GOK has promised
for three years now to redraft a bill incorporating civil
societies, concerns. The new bill has yet to be made public.
END NOTE.) In fact, there was no mention of CT issues during
the re-opening of Parliament on March 21. UNDP has picked up
the cause of helping Kenya pass CT legislation (ref A),but
their program has yet to make progress.


7. (C) Our CT assistance programs that required large GOK
buy-in have, for the most part, stalled. The JTTF is the
prime example. The U.S. helped Kenya set up the JTTF in
2004-5 to improve police and prosecutors, ability to
cooperate on CT issues. (NOTE: the JTTF's utility has just
been proven, as its work led directly to Kenya's first-ever
terrorism-related conviction -- this April's conviction of
terror suspect Omar Said Omar on weapons charges (Ref C.).
END NOTE) The GOK disbanded the unit shortly after formal
training concluded without explanation. Foreign Minister
Rafael Tuju told Ambassador in January it died for ego and
bureaucratic reasons, not policy differences, and that he
wanted to revive the JTTF. But, again, nothing has moved
since. Whatever the reason behind the failure, the JTTF,
which requires buy-in from several top government officials,
is unlikely to be resuscitated against a backdrop of
political posturing ahead of the 2007 elections. Simply put,
it just is not high enough on ministers' lists of priorities
at this time. Our efforts to refocus CT investigative
capacity-building directly to the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
(ATPU) is proving to be more successful than the larger JTTF
concept.


8. (S) Our border operations proposal (ref B) is another
example of the government,s sluggishness when it comes to
planning and carrying out security programs. The Ambassador
briefed the plan to President Kibaki January 25. Kibaki
showed great enthusiasm and said he would make it happen.
Defense Minister Karume likewise committed to it January 31,
and directed his staff to begin the necessary planning. Yet,
the Kenyan Department of Defense Chief of Staff refused the
plan, and it has since died. The whole fiasco brought into
question the true extent of Kibaki,s (and Karume's)
authority and ability to make things happen.


9. (C) Despite all this, Post continues to push forward with
existing CT programs, albeit on a more localized scale. Our
British counterparts are employing the same strategy. They
have drawn down their CT assistance programs in Kenya and are
focusing solely on projects with individual authorities.
Their main efforts will focus on border security programs
with the Administration Police and continued aviation
security programs. Our programs are following a similar vein,
with added emphasis to securing the coastal borders.


10. (S) Our most successful efforts have been specific
programs with elements of the police or military, and our
cooperation with the civilian and military intelligence
services. The strongest example is the ongoing Maritime
Operations (MAROPS) training conducted by U.S. Navy Special
Warfare personnel out of Manda Bay Navy Base. Eleven classes
have undergone the training since 2004. Some classes have
even incorporated the police, Administration police, and
Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS). The Anti Terrorism Assistance
(ATA) coastal security program centered on the Police could
prove to be another strong program, pending signature of an
MOI from the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Security
(ref C). The program will provide boats and training to civil
authorities on the Coast with the ultimate goal of conducting
joint maritime patrols. Similar, and a complement, to our
Navy MAROPS program, this targeted effort to secure the
borders has the potential to yield real results.


11. (C) Several other localized programs continue to
produce some positive results. TIP/PISCES, a computerized
tracking system at international airports, has been another
USG success in Kenya. The Government increased its usage of
the system to a national average of 95 percent in 2005. The
stop-list resulted in several suspect turnovers last year.
The U.S. Federal Aviation Authority has had some success in
improving aviation security, but consistent enforcement of
security procedures and planning remains a challenge. The FBI
has provided training courses, including the current
initiative to assist in automating the Kenyan fingerprint
system with the goal to share fingerprints of suspected
terrorists. The FBI also has a good working relationship with
members of the Criminal Investigation Department,s (CID)
Criminal Intelligence Unit.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) In the current political climate, we will not gain
much traction pushing policy objectives that are not directly
seen as election-winning issues. Unfortunately, and despite
repeated terrorist attacks in Kenya, CT is not one of those
issues. However, we have made some positive in-roads with
certain agencies, particularly the Kenyan Navy, Intelligence
service, Administration Police, ATPU and CID. We will
continue to focus our efforts on increasing Kenya,s
capability to secure its borders, while keeping our eyes open
for opportunities to engage on broader CT objectives.
BELLAMY