Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI1261
2006-03-20 14:40:00
SECRET
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: WORST COMBAT IN FIVE YEARS PUT AT USG

Tags:  PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE 
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INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 8124
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0382
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RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA //POLAD//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT //N2//
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001261 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: (X1, X6)
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: WORST COMBAT IN FIVE YEARS PUT AT USG
DOORSTEP

REF: A) NAIROBI 840, B) TD-314/12191-06, C) TD-314/19524-06

CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick. REASONS 1.4
(A,B,C,D)

SUMMARY
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 001261

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: (X1, X6)
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: WORST COMBAT IN FIVE YEARS PUT AT USG
DOORSTEP

REF: A) NAIROBI 840, B) TD-314/12191-06, C) TD-314/19524-06

CLASSIFIED BY A/DCM Michael J. Fitzpatrick. REASONS 1.4
(A,B,C,D)

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (S) A broad array of post's Somali and the international
community contacts see the heavy recent fighting in
Mogadishu between an Alliance to Combat Terror and Jihadist-
linked militias as being at least USG-financed, perhaps USG-
instigated. This broad consensus -- across clan and
political tendencies -- sees the conflict fundamentally as a
feud among segments of the large Hawiye clan, with an
overlay of "G-WOT vs. Jihad." Somalis tell us the court and
clan militias of the Ayr (the sub-clan most clearly
associated with the Islamists) are well placed to defeat
their clan rivals in what they see as the inevitable next
round of fighting. Armed businessmen and militia leaders
with the Alliance against the Islamists may be forced to re-
align along traditional clan lines, to the benefit of the
Islamists. The latter's' Jihadist goals are boosted by the
clarion call for the faithful to "Rally to Destroy the U.S.-
Backed Anti-Islam Alliance!" UN, EU and NGO sentiment
against U.S. actions is moving into the public arena. END
SUMMARY.


2. (S) Post provides following reporting and political
analysis drawn from several weeks of intense contact work
among a broad cross-section of sources across the Somali
political, clan, and religious communities present in
Nairobi. Elements are also drawn from (at times
confrontational) meetings with members of the international
community specializing in Somali affairs. The discussion
reflects the considerable misgivings of many of these
contacts regarding the Alliance against International
Terrorism, announced in Mogadishu January 18, and
crystallized via the February 18-21 fighting in Mogadishu --

the worst combat seen there in perhaps five years.


3. (S) Post stresses the following reflects the theories,
concerns and perceptions expressed within the broad
international community -- not a description of what has (or
has not) happened in Mogadishu. We believe it is critical
that Washington agencies be clearly aware of the impact of
recent events on the international community working in
Somalia.

WHAT MOTIVATED QANYARE?
--------------

4. (S) Members of the international community are scratching
their heads at a central question: Why did
Warlord/MP/Minister for National Security Mohamed Qanyare
Afrah suddenly come out so strongly as the central figure in
the Alliance to Combat Terror (ref A)? And why now? The
most popular theory expressed by Somalis (including those
from the Qanyare's own Murosade sub-clan of the Hawiye) is
that while he felt strong enough to mount a military
challenge against the Haber Gedir Ayr (another sub-clan of
the Hawiye with which he has had a grudge for nearly a
decade) he did not in fact choose the timing of the fight.
The prominence of Jihadi or Islamist extremists within the
Ayr gave Qanyare his cover to sort out his differences using
his current military strength. His allies were also well-
armed, and purportedly committed to a fight against Islamist
extremism. (NOTE: We are unable to determine who -- or
which side, the extremists or the "RPFAT" alliance"
initiated the fighting on 17-18 February. See also ref B.
END NOTE.)


5. (S) Somalia Watcher's sources speculate that Qanyare's
actions may also have been linked to his sense of being
sidelined in the process leading to the convening in Baidoa
of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament's (TFP) first
session inside Somalia. He is rumored to have tried to cut
a deal with Transitional Federal Government (TFG) President
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed to remove Prime Minister Ali Mohamed

NAIROBI 00001261 002 OF 004


Gedi (Hawiye Abgal Warsangeli),and allow either Qanyare
himself, or his designee, to take the premiership. Qanyare
is also rumored to believe that his agreement with President
Yusuf was sabotaged during mid-February reconciliation talks
among the President, the PM, and the Speaker in Yusuf's
hometown of Galkaiyo. Qanyare may have perceived that a
successful move to crush the most dangerous threat to the
TFIs in Mogadishu -- the Jihadi and Islamic Court militias -
- would boost his standing among the Hawiye as the man with
whom to be reckoned in all future divisions of power.

COULD HE WIN A CLAN WAR?
--------------

6. (S) Somalis from across the Hawiye clan spectrum who have
contacted Somalia Watcher since February 18 all agree on one
point: No matter what the rhetoric used by each side to
attract recruits or influence allies, once the fighting
started, it was a matter of 24-48 hours for it to morph into
a straight intra-clan conflict pitting Qanyare's Murosade
against the broader Ayr sub-clan and its Warsangeli allies.
In any such conflict, Hawiye clan realities and traditional
alliances would ensure that the small but powerful Murosade
would not achieve unilateral control over Mogadishu. Haber
Gedir pride alone would have guaranteed a fierce fight. No
one gave the Alliance any power to glue the disparate
Warsangeli, Sa'ad, Ayr, Murosade, and Da'oud participants
into a fighting force that could effectively confront the
broader interests of the Haber Gedir.

WHAT GAVE QANYAREQS POWER?
--------------

7. (S) Members of the international community who have
contacted Somalia Watcher since February 18, deeply invested
in the TFIs, have closely questioned Somalia Watcher as to
the exact nature of USG support to non-traditional partners
in the global war on terror in Somalia. Questions have been
direct: Did the USG finance, encourage, or incite Qanyare,
his Ayr ally Abdi Wa'al, Warsangeli businessman Bashir Raghe
Shirar, and others to begin open combat against Jihadi
militias in the capital? They claim this has been the
rallying cry of the Jihadist elements among the Ayr in
Mogadishu, their propaganda theme being "Join Jihad Against
the U.S.-Backed Alliance against Islam". UN Department for
Security and Safety (UN DSS) staff, briefing a February 21
meeting of donors on preparations for the parliamentary
session in Baidoa, stated (with no supporting evidence) that
the new Mogadishu Alliance is receiving financial and
material support from "major members of the international
community". Several journalists and NGO contacts have also
spoken to PolCouns in detail of what they term an "open
secret in Mogadishu" as to direct USG assistance to certain

SIPDIS
warlords.

CONFUSION REGARDING
U.S. INTERESTS
--------------

8. (S) Somali Watcher's contacts from a range of civil
society groups have sought out Somalia Watcher with the same
kinds of questions and perceptions. Somali Civil Society
activists (from both sides of the former Jowhar/Mogadishu-
based TFI factions; and from the Murosade, Warsangeli, Ayr,
Sa'ad, and Suleiman sub-clans of the Hawiye) have been
particularly eloquent in their requests that the USG temper
what they perceive as its role in the current conflict.
They point to a broad base of positive support for the U.S.
throughout Mogadishu civil society that had grown from the
USG positions expressed over the course of the political
stalemate in 2005. They state that if the USG does not see
the current conflict as supporting USG interests in the Horn
of Africa, the USG should make it publicly clear that we
repudiate the actions of those widely seen as our proxies.

INTERNATIONALS GOING
PUBLIC WITH CONCERNS
--------------

9. (S) While most internationals have kept their concerns in
diplomatic channels thus far, that is not going to remain

NAIROBI 00001261 003 OF 004


true for much longer. Some individual EU member states,
having concluded that the U.S. is supporting individual
warlords as a means to prosecute the GWOT, tell us they are
concerned that such actions now may set back both CT and
democratization objectives in Somalia. The draft text of
the EU's forthcoming "Annual Operational Review of the
Cooperation between the People of Somalia and the European
Community in 2005" -- a public document -- states "There are
worrying signs that the general population -- riled by overt
support of the United States for the warlords -- is
increasingly rallying to the cause of the jihadis."


10. (S) The United States will figure prominently in the
next semi-annual report to the Security Council of the UN
Monitoring Group (MG) on Somalia. The MG's March 9 biweekly
Report of Activities begins "Clandestine third country
support in Somalia was conspicuous during the current
reporting period... financial support was being provided to
help organize and structure a military-style counter
terrorism alliance." MG members told Somalia Watcher on
March 17 that their semi-annual report -- a public document
-- would name the United States explicitly as the "third
country" providing clandestine support. The MG will send by
March 24 a "due process" letter to US Mission UN, providing
the exact language of the section on USG activities, and
inviting comment. MG members made clear that the
description of USG activities contain sufficient specific
elements for the Security Council to determine that the
United States is in violation of the Somalia arms embargo as
set out in UNSCR 733 et seq, binding on all member states.
The final draft of the semi-annual report will go forward
for translation on or about April 3 -- with or without USG
comment.


11. (S) Monitoring Group members were at pains to stress
that they wanted to be as cooperative as possible with the
USG on the issue. Nonetheless, they made clear that they
could not ignore the preponderance of information they have
received supporting a conclusion of USG violation of the
arms embargo. The pointed out that they report would be
extremely detailed on a number of other subjects,
particularly the interface among Islamist extremists, Somali
clans, and powerful Somali business cartels, and would give
a full picture of the supply line for arms to the Islamists.
That said, they believed that their short paragraph on the
United States would attract considerable attention, and
wanted to ensure the USG was adequately forewarned.

COMMENTS
--------------

12. (S) COMMENT: In the words of February PCC on Somalia
(and, post understands, subsequently confirmed by the DC):
"The primary U.S. interest in Somalia is counter-terrorism,
but effective governance is required to address longer-term
U.S. counter-terrorism objectives." Therein lies the
conundrum. The perceptions surrounding this episode have
undermined our ability to maintain even the appearance of
unity of purpose with significant parts of the TFIs and
Somalia-oriented internationals. They view re-establishment
of governance as the pre-condition for effective CT -- and
the U.S. view has it the other way around.


13. (S) COMMENT (Cont.): These differences in approach can
no longer be papered over. We are currently seen by a broad
range of Nairobi-based colleagues (among Somalia experts in
the bilateral embassies, UN agencies, and multilateral
entities including the AU and League of Arab States) as
associated with the instigation of an ill-conceived clan war
in pursuit of a narrow (even if urgent) interest in
destroying a Jihadi cell within the Haber Gedir Ayr. The
perception -- fact-based or not -- is that the resulting
bloody conflict jeopardizes the survival of the TFIs and has
left large parts of Mogadishu in control of the very Jihadis
we are accused of seeking to eliminate. Somalia experts are
quick to express their assessment that the very structure of
the Alliance is inimical to the Somali clan context. (NOTE:
The Islamic Courts involved in the fighting are also clan-

NAIROBI 00001261 004 OF 004


based; see ref C. END NOTE.) Based on their assumption that
the USG encouraged the formation of the Alliance, these
Qperts ask whether the USG is fully aware of the broader
implications, including for our own interests, of the most
recent fighting. END COMMENT.
ROWE