Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI1224
2006-03-16 10:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALIA: IGAD SUMMIT IN NAIROBI RISKS UPSTAGING

Tags:  PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0951
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHNR #1224/01 0751028
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161028Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0368
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 8115
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA 0379
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD//
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA //POLAD//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RHMFISS/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL//POLAD//
RUFTNAB/COMUSNAVCENT
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001224 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2026
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: IGAD SUMMIT IN NAIROBI RISKS UPSTAGING
SOMALI PARLIAMENT


CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POL COUNSELOR LISA PETERSON, REASONS
1.4 (B,D)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001224

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2026
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: IGAD SUMMIT IN NAIROBI RISKS UPSTAGING
SOMALI PARLIAMENT


CLASSIFIED BY ACTING POL COUNSELOR LISA PETERSON, REASONS
1.4 (B,D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Somali politicians fear that the upcoming summit of
the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) may
repeat the mistakes of March 2005. The specter that Somali
President Yusuf may again ask IGAD to express readiness to
deploy foreign troops from neighboring countries to Somalia,
in the absence of a request from the Somali Parliament,
leaves open a risk of IGAD again catalyzing the cleaving of
the Transitional Federal Institutions into irreconcilable
factions. High tensions in Mogadishu, with clan-based
militias ready to fight over nearly anything, could quickly
explode into combat on the question of a perceived, imminent
"Ethiopian invasion". END SUMMARY

SUMMIT AGENDA
--------------


2. (SBU) Somali affairs will figure prominently on the
agenda of the 25th Ordinary Session of the IGAD Council of
Ministers (March 17-18),and on that of the 11th Summit of
IGAD Heads of State and Government that follows on March 20
(both in Nairobi). The African Union set the stage January
25th with its Summit decision on a possible deployment of an
IGAD Peace Support Mission to Somalia (known as IGASOM).
The AU made explicit reference to the need for an exemption
of the United Nations arms embargo imposed on Somalia under
UNSCR 733 (1992) in order for any peace support mission to
operate inside Somalia. Observers are concerned that IGAD
will now pronounce as to whether it is prepared with a
detailed mission plan for such a deployment.

HOW IT IS SUPPOSED TO HAPPEN
--------------


3. (SBU) The UN Security Council's March 10, 2006
deliberations on Somalia produced a draft Presidential
Statement (PRST) that proposes a sequence of actions needed

for a peace support mission to deploy to Somalia. In it,
the UNSC reiterates the urgent need for the Somali
Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) to finalize an agreed
national security and stabilization plan (NSSP). Should the
NSSP in fact include the need for a peace support mission,
then "the AU and IGAD is to work out a detailed mission plan
in close coordination with and with the broad consensus of
the TFIs (Transitional Federal Institutions) and consistent
with the national security and stabilization plan". At that
point, the draft PRST states that UNSC would stand ready to
consider an exemption to the UNSCR 733 arms embargo.

DEJA VU
--------------


4. (SBU) Observers call attention to the similarities
between this situation and that which held in March 2005.
At that time, the TFIs were still located in Nairobi.
President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed had requested a peace
support mission force of 20,000 men -- without the authority
to do so under the Transitional Federal Charter. The TFP
was deeply divided over the issue, seeing Yusuf's request as
opening the door to an invasion of Ethiopian troops. The
USG demarched regional states, and announced publicly, that
"The United States shares the concerns of the International
community and many Somalis regarding the introduction of
foreign troops into Somalia ... Somalia's neighbors have
legitimate national interests [...] however, any external
force should exclude troops from these countries." (Press
Statement of the Department's Spokesman of March 3, 2005).


5. (SBU) The IGAD Heads of State met the morning of March
17, 2005, and endorsed an IGAD deployment plan that included
dominant roles for troops from Ethiopia and Djibouti. That
same evening, a plenary session of the TFP collapsed in a

NAIROBI 00001224 002 OF 002


televised brawl and chair-throwing session over whether to
endorse the IGASOM proposal. The TFP would not come
together in a plenary session for another 11 months.

STILL NO VOICE
OF THE BROAD CONSENSUS
--------------


6. (SBU) The TFP ended 11 months of stalemate on February
26, 2006 meeting in extraordinary session inside Somalia.
The subject of an IGASOM deployment is resurrected at each
meeting of the IGAD Council of Ministers, and in
deliberations of the African Union, despite the fact that
many Somali politicians think the issue has been set aside.
TFP members believe that the Somali Parliament must
consider, debate, and approve a National Security and
Stabilization Plan (NSSP) as a preliminary to any deployment
planning for a foreign peace support mission. Since a NSSP
is not yet before the TFP, there should be nothing for the
IGAD Heads of State to discuss.


7. (SBU) President Yusuf, however, is rumored to again be
discussing with IGAD neighbors the intervention of their
troops to stabilize Somalia. The rumors have gathered
considerable steam since the February 18-24 on-and-off
fighting in Mogadishu among clan-based militias representing
the "Alliance to Restore Peace and Combat against
International Terrorism", and the "Council for Uprising and
Defending the Religion and the People." Somalis and some
international community members point out that it was the
lawlessness of Mogadishu that was Yusuf's justification for
seeking foreign military assistance in the first place.
They note that it is the same Hawiye clan warlords that have
again turned the capital into a war zone.

THEY'RE ALREADY THERE
--------------


8. (SBU) The Somali rumor mill is also reporting that large
numbers of Ethiopian troops are on heightened alert,
positioned both on and over the border with Somalia. An
AMCIT employee of an international NGO, traveling March 11-
15 in Gedo region, reported that his staff is completely
convinced that large numbers of Ethiopian troops are present
in Dolow, Ethiopia, "awaiting an invitation from the TFG to
the AU to send in troops." He reported in a March 15 email
to Somalia Watcher having observed himself small numbers of
Ethiopian troops in the Somali town of Dolow (the two towns
are just across the Ethiopia-Somali border from each other).
He noted that this was not unusual, "but their presence is
now much more open than it has been for a number of years."

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Somalia Watcher has encouraged contacts in the Kenyan
Government, and others close to the President and Prime
Minister, to urge the two leaders -- seen to be closest to
Ethiopia -- to consider the sequence of events set out in a
series of UNSC Presidential Statements before asking for an
IGASOM deployment without Parliamentary approval. The
specter of an IGAD Summit Communique once again providing
the catalyst for the TFIs to descend into division has a
number of political actors on edge as the Summit date
approaches. With tensions very high in Mogadishu, and the
fear of an "Ethiopian Invasion" a cause celebre among a
broad cross section of Somali society -- not to mention the
country's Islamists and Jihadis -- we must hope that the
IGAD Foreign Ministers and Heads of State approach their
drafting exercise with real care. END COMMENT.

ROWE