Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI1111
2006-03-10 08:47:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Nairobi
how-toVZCZCXYZ0017 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHNR #1111/01 0690847 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 100847Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0201
UNCLAS NAIROBI 001111
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL/C/P DIANE KOHN, AF/E
USAID FOR AFR/DP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON KCOR KCRM PGOV KE
SUBJECT: IAGGA REPORT FOR KENYA
REF: State 30961
Mission Nairobi's response to reftel follows below, and
has also been conveyed to State/INL/C/P by separate e-
mail.
Government Efforts
--------------
The performance of the Government of Kenya (GOK) in 2004
and 2005 was mixed at best, with steady progress on the
institutional and legal fronts juxtaposed with a serious
lack of high-level political commitment to combating
corruption. In April 2004 serious allegations of grand-
scale graft at the highest levels of the sitting Kibaki
administration surfaced in connection with the so-called
Anglo-Leasing procurement scandals. Eventually, five
officials were charged; their cases are still pending in
court. Investigations against more senior leaders ended
at that time without any further arrests or prosecutions.
The GOK's credibility in the war on corruption collapsed
in early 2005 when John Githongo, the President's anti-
corruption czar, resigned and went into self-imposed
exile. Soon thereafter, the highly-regarded Director of
Public Prosecutions was fired and the local director of
Transparency International was forced to resign. In
early 2006, Githongo went public with his Anglo-Leasing
evidence, which directly implicated several key
ministers, presidential advisors, and influential
businessmen. Under intense pressure from the public and
the media, one implicated minister was left out of the
cabinet following a reshuffle in December, and two others
resigned in February 2006. However, the GOK has not
acted against others directly implicated in the scandals
or their cover-up. Further, it is widely believed that
high-level prosecutions are being delayed or blocked by
the Attorney General in response to political
considerations. Investigation and prosecution of alleged
high-level complicity in multi-ton cocaine shipments
through Kenya have similarly stalled.
Progress was also mixed regarding follow up on corruption
perpetrated under the previous Moi Administration. In
2004, the GOK released a Land Commission report, which
includes two annexes revealing names of high-level former
and current GOK officials implicated in the "irregular"
acquisition of public lands. Substantial action to
recover illegally acquired land has yet to be taken,
however. Some money associated with the Anglo-Leasing
scandals was returned mysteriously to the GOK in 2004.
However, other efforts to recover the proceeds of
corruption hidden earlier overseas, as detailed in a
report compiled and completed in 2005 by Kroll
Associates, have yet to yield results. In February 2006,
the GOK released the Goldenberg Report, which recommends
action against dozens of businesspeople and members of
the former administration in connection with a massive
financial scandal from the early 1990s. As a result of
the report's findings, one implicated minister in the
Kibaki administration was forced to resign.
On the institutional front in 2004, the National Anti-
Corruption Campaign Steering Committee was appointed,
along with the leadership of the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission (KACC). The KACC, the country's leading graft
investigative body, became fully staffed and operational
in mid-2005 and has launched dozens of investigations and
forwarded files for prosecution to the Attorney General's
Office. In April 2005, in response to pressure from
civil society and development partners, the GOK prepared
a 12-month anti-corruption action plan, and in some areas
such as public expenditure management reform and civil
service reform, important progress has since been made.
Further, the GOK pushed through two important bills in
Parliament late in 2005 dealing with privatization and
government procurement. If effectively implemented, the
laws have the potential to eliminate or sharply narrow
loopholes through which corruption has traditionally
flourished in Kenya. Finally, Kenya has both signed and
ratified the UNCAC, while it has signed but not yet
ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption (AUCPCC).
Law Enforcement and Legal Systems
--------------
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the USG continued support to
the specialized unit on anti-corruption, economic crimes,
serious fraud, and asset forfeiture within the Department
of Public Prosecutions (DPP). As a participating
institution in the GOK's Governance, Justice, Law, and
Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Program, the DPP contributes
to the key result area focused on reducing corruption.
The USG assistance to the DPP contributes towards the
professional prosecution of criminal corruption cases
through: an improved case tracking system; the
development of specialized curriculum and delivery of
subsequent training; the provision of direct technical
assistance through a Resident Legal Advisor and short-
term technical experts; enhanced monitoring and
evaluation; the establishment of a reform program
secretariat; and the acquisition of reference materials
SIPDIS
and related equipment for a dedicated research facility.
Transparent Governance
--------------
In 2004, the USG's key anti-corruption partner was the
Department of Governance and Ethics (the DGE),within the
Office of the President and led by John Githongo (see
above). In collaboration with the Kenya chapter of
Transparency International (TI-Kenya, also a USG
grantee),the DGE hosted an international experts meeting
in 2004 on the challenges that "new governments" face
when tackling corruption fQowing a political
transition. USG-sponsored activities with the DGE
included the design of several anti-corQtion measures
such as a system for the collection, storage, and
analysis of public officers' asset declaration forms, a
public complaints unit, an assets restitution division,
and a national baseline survey of citizens' views of
corruption. Following Githongo's resignation, which
called into question the GOK's commitment to fighting
corruption within its own ranks, the USG ended its
support to the DGE, and the GOK subsequently disbanded
the office altogether.
Assistance to the Parliament continued to further
strengthen the legislature's oversight capacity. With an
emphasis on oversight committees, the USG trains
legislative staff, including researchers, so that the
committees may more effectively hold the Executive to
account. USG support also facilitates Parliament's
outreach to civil society and the private sector to
solicit citizen's views and expert opinions when
considering and amending legislation. USG funds are
being used to build Parliament's in-house budget analysis
capacity and will enable Parliament to provide more
substantive input into the budget process. As part of
this, Parliament is expected to shortly establish both a
Parliamentary Budget Committee and a Budget Office.
Civil Society
--------------
As the GOK's progress in combating graft has waned, the
USG has maintained support to civil society organizations
(CSOs) that monitor government performance and advocate
for accelerated reforms. Since 2004, the USG has awarded
grants to Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K),the
Center for Governance and Development (CGD),the Kenya
Institute for Supplies Managers (KISM),the Institute for
Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR),and the Kenya
chapter of the International Commission of Jurists
(ICJ/K). USG support to CSOs enhances non-governmental
advocacy capacity and increases the public demand for
anti-corruption reform. Furthermore, to strengthen CSOs
such as TI-Kenya and other groups engaged in policy
reform, advocacy, and GOK monitoring, the USG is
launching a program to strengthen CSOs' technical skills
and sustainability through a training and capacity
building component. The program will engage new non-
governmental partners in anti-corruption efforts,
including private sector coalitions, professional
associations, membership organizations, and faith-based
groups.
Advocacy
--------------
Improving governance and assisting in the fight against
corruption are major themes of the U.S. Mission in
Nairobi in both its private and public diplomacy. The
U.S. decision to halt funding for certain governance-
related activities following the Githongo resignation was
announced in a major and widely read public address by
the Ambassador on the theme of corruption and good
governance. U.S. Mission leadership has also been
instrumental in keeping governance concerns front and
center in the broader donor dialogue with the GOK and in
making improved governance and tangible GOK actions
against corruption a prerequisite for improved GOK-donor
relations. In 2004, the U.S. revoked the visa of a
former high-level Kenya official for his central role in
grand scale corruption under the previous administration.
In 2005, again to plaudits from a majority of Kenyans,
the USG similarly suspended entry into the U.S. of a
standing minister in the Kibaki administration.
BELLAMY
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL/C/P DIANE KOHN, AF/E
USAID FOR AFR/DP
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON KCOR KCRM PGOV KE
SUBJECT: IAGGA REPORT FOR KENYA
REF: State 30961
Mission Nairobi's response to reftel follows below, and
has also been conveyed to State/INL/C/P by separate e-
mail.
Government Efforts
--------------
The performance of the Government of Kenya (GOK) in 2004
and 2005 was mixed at best, with steady progress on the
institutional and legal fronts juxtaposed with a serious
lack of high-level political commitment to combating
corruption. In April 2004 serious allegations of grand-
scale graft at the highest levels of the sitting Kibaki
administration surfaced in connection with the so-called
Anglo-Leasing procurement scandals. Eventually, five
officials were charged; their cases are still pending in
court. Investigations against more senior leaders ended
at that time without any further arrests or prosecutions.
The GOK's credibility in the war on corruption collapsed
in early 2005 when John Githongo, the President's anti-
corruption czar, resigned and went into self-imposed
exile. Soon thereafter, the highly-regarded Director of
Public Prosecutions was fired and the local director of
Transparency International was forced to resign. In
early 2006, Githongo went public with his Anglo-Leasing
evidence, which directly implicated several key
ministers, presidential advisors, and influential
businessmen. Under intense pressure from the public and
the media, one implicated minister was left out of the
cabinet following a reshuffle in December, and two others
resigned in February 2006. However, the GOK has not
acted against others directly implicated in the scandals
or their cover-up. Further, it is widely believed that
high-level prosecutions are being delayed or blocked by
the Attorney General in response to political
considerations. Investigation and prosecution of alleged
high-level complicity in multi-ton cocaine shipments
through Kenya have similarly stalled.
Progress was also mixed regarding follow up on corruption
perpetrated under the previous Moi Administration. In
2004, the GOK released a Land Commission report, which
includes two annexes revealing names of high-level former
and current GOK officials implicated in the "irregular"
acquisition of public lands. Substantial action to
recover illegally acquired land has yet to be taken,
however. Some money associated with the Anglo-Leasing
scandals was returned mysteriously to the GOK in 2004.
However, other efforts to recover the proceeds of
corruption hidden earlier overseas, as detailed in a
report compiled and completed in 2005 by Kroll
Associates, have yet to yield results. In February 2006,
the GOK released the Goldenberg Report, which recommends
action against dozens of businesspeople and members of
the former administration in connection with a massive
financial scandal from the early 1990s. As a result of
the report's findings, one implicated minister in the
Kibaki administration was forced to resign.
On the institutional front in 2004, the National Anti-
Corruption Campaign Steering Committee was appointed,
along with the leadership of the Kenya Anti-Corruption
Commission (KACC). The KACC, the country's leading graft
investigative body, became fully staffed and operational
in mid-2005 and has launched dozens of investigations and
forwarded files for prosecution to the Attorney General's
Office. In April 2005, in response to pressure from
civil society and development partners, the GOK prepared
a 12-month anti-corruption action plan, and in some areas
such as public expenditure management reform and civil
service reform, important progress has since been made.
Further, the GOK pushed through two important bills in
Parliament late in 2005 dealing with privatization and
government procurement. If effectively implemented, the
laws have the potential to eliminate or sharply narrow
loopholes through which corruption has traditionally
flourished in Kenya. Finally, Kenya has both signed and
ratified the UNCAC, while it has signed but not yet
ratified the African Union Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption (AUCPCC).
Law Enforcement and Legal Systems
--------------
Throughout 2004 and 2005, the USG continued support to
the specialized unit on anti-corruption, economic crimes,
serious fraud, and asset forfeiture within the Department
of Public Prosecutions (DPP). As a participating
institution in the GOK's Governance, Justice, Law, and
Order Sector (GJLOS) Reform Program, the DPP contributes
to the key result area focused on reducing corruption.
The USG assistance to the DPP contributes towards the
professional prosecution of criminal corruption cases
through: an improved case tracking system; the
development of specialized curriculum and delivery of
subsequent training; the provision of direct technical
assistance through a Resident Legal Advisor and short-
term technical experts; enhanced monitoring and
evaluation; the establishment of a reform program
secretariat; and the acquisition of reference materials
SIPDIS
and related equipment for a dedicated research facility.
Transparent Governance
--------------
In 2004, the USG's key anti-corruption partner was the
Department of Governance and Ethics (the DGE),within the
Office of the President and led by John Githongo (see
above). In collaboration with the Kenya chapter of
Transparency International (TI-Kenya, also a USG
grantee),the DGE hosted an international experts meeting
in 2004 on the challenges that "new governments" face
when tackling corruption fQowing a political
transition. USG-sponsored activities with the DGE
included the design of several anti-corQtion measures
such as a system for the collection, storage, and
analysis of public officers' asset declaration forms, a
public complaints unit, an assets restitution division,
and a national baseline survey of citizens' views of
corruption. Following Githongo's resignation, which
called into question the GOK's commitment to fighting
corruption within its own ranks, the USG ended its
support to the DGE, and the GOK subsequently disbanded
the office altogether.
Assistance to the Parliament continued to further
strengthen the legislature's oversight capacity. With an
emphasis on oversight committees, the USG trains
legislative staff, including researchers, so that the
committees may more effectively hold the Executive to
account. USG support also facilitates Parliament's
outreach to civil society and the private sector to
solicit citizen's views and expert opinions when
considering and amending legislation. USG funds are
being used to build Parliament's in-house budget analysis
capacity and will enable Parliament to provide more
substantive input into the budget process. As part of
this, Parliament is expected to shortly establish both a
Parliamentary Budget Committee and a Budget Office.
Civil Society
--------------
As the GOK's progress in combating graft has waned, the
USG has maintained support to civil society organizations
(CSOs) that monitor government performance and advocate
for accelerated reforms. Since 2004, the USG has awarded
grants to Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K),the
Center for Governance and Development (CGD),the Kenya
Institute for Supplies Managers (KISM),the Institute for
Policy Analysis and Research (IPAR),and the Kenya
chapter of the International Commission of Jurists
(ICJ/K). USG support to CSOs enhances non-governmental
advocacy capacity and increases the public demand for
anti-corruption reform. Furthermore, to strengthen CSOs
such as TI-Kenya and other groups engaged in policy
reform, advocacy, and GOK monitoring, the USG is
launching a program to strengthen CSOs' technical skills
and sustainability through a training and capacity
building component. The program will engage new non-
governmental partners in anti-corruption efforts,
including private sector coalitions, professional
associations, membership organizations, and faith-based
groups.
Advocacy
--------------
Improving governance and assisting in the fight against
corruption are major themes of the U.S. Mission in
Nairobi in both its private and public diplomacy. The
U.S. decision to halt funding for certain governance-
related activities following the Githongo resignation was
announced in a major and widely read public address by
the Ambassador on the theme of corruption and good
governance. U.S. Mission leadership has also been
instrumental in keeping governance concerns front and
center in the broader donor dialogue with the GOK and in
making improved governance and tangible GOK actions
against corruption a prerequisite for improved GOK-donor
relations. In 2004, the U.S. revoked the visa of a
former high-level Kenya official for his central role in
grand scale corruption under the previous administration.
In 2005, again to plaudits from a majority of Kenyans,
the USG similarly suspended entry into the U.S. of a
standing minister in the Kibaki administration.
BELLAMY