SOMALIA: DONORS PREPARE TO SUPPORT SECURITY FOR THE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 001094

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: DONORS PREPARE TO SUPPORT SECURITY FOR THE
INTERIM SEAT OF PARLIAMENT

REF: NAIROBI 1082

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Donors and UN agency representatives have
enthusiastically endorsed a Security Plan for the
Transitional Federal Parliament's (TFP) interim seat in
Baidoa. A March 7 fact-finding trip may have generated
commitments of funds sufficient to finance the entire plan -
- including the very sensitive problem of feeding cantoned,
but not demobilized, militias. END SUMMARY

BAIDOA "UNDER CONTROL"
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2. (SBU) A small group of donors led by the Somalia Donors'
Group (SDG) chair (currently the representative from
Denmark) traveled to Baidoa March 7. The team explored
possible responses to the Transitional Federal Government's
(TFG) request for assistance to provide medium term security
to the temporary seat of Parliament (reported reftel).
Participants in the trip reported their findings to the SDG
March 8. The group included representatives of Denmark,
Italy, and the Delegation of the European Commission, and UN
staff from UNDP, UN Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS),
and the Acting UN Resident Coordinator. The overall
impression of the group was that the three principle
warlords in the area -- Minister of Agriculture and
Committee Chairman Hassan Mohamed Nur (AKA "Shatigudud"),
Adan Mohammad Nur (AKA "Adan Madobe"),Minister of Justice,
and Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP -- were cooperating well to
ensure the town was "under control".


3. (SBU) The participants recommended that the UNDP Rule of
Law and Security (ROLS) Programme undertake to implement
virtually all aspects of the plan related to policing of the
town. Representatives from the Delegation of the European
Commission stated that the EC stood ready to provide
significant financing to the UNDP-implemented elements.
(NOTE: An accurate budget has not yet been outlined for the
security plan, but UNDP estimates that the policing elements
account for some 70% of the total plan cost, with cantonment
for militias making up the other 30%, excluding food costs -
- see below. END NOTE.)


4. (SBU) The 30% of the plan that would not be under UNDP
implementation consists largely of infrastructure
development at militia cantonment sites -- shelter, water,
sanitation, and health clinics. The donor team observed
what they estimated to be 2,000-2,500 militiamen under the
command of Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe, camped 25
kms southeast of Baidoa at a defunct military base in the
town of Daynuunay. The team described the site as a roughly
6 kms square un-demarcated tract of empty land, with no
amenities -- the men (and some women) were sleeping in the
open, on the ground. The team was unable to visit a second
site, where they were told another several hundred
"freelance" militiamen were encamped.


5. (SBU) UN representatives briefed the SDG that the UN
Bureau for Conflict Prevention in Geneva was preparing to
fund the costs and guide implementation of the cantonment
site infrastructure project, under certain conditions.
First, the cantoned militiamen's arms would have to be
controlled, by the police units that UNDP would pull
together from the militias of the three principle warlords.
Second, the militiamen would all have to be registered, in a
verifiable manner. Last, the UN would commit to a project
lasting 6 months, for a total of 3,000 encamped militiamen,
in two camps (vice four requested).

FOOD
--------------


6. (SBU) Once the UN and donors had determined how policing

NAIROBI 00001094 002 OF 002


and cantonment infrastructure needs might be met, there
remained the most expensive and sensitive element of the
Baidoa Security Committee's plan -- feeding cantoned
militiamen. Donors made it clear to the Baidoa Security
Committee that they could not meet this cost, roughly
estimated at $1 million for 2 camps for 6 months (vice
earlier estimates of some $2 million for 4 camps). Most of
the donors in the SDG are constrained by the provisions of
the OECD Development Assistance Committee, which severely
limits the feeding of militias and armed forces outside of a
formal demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration
program (DDR). Donors and UN agencies agreed that the
Baidoa security plan could not be seen as "DDR", but was
rather an attempt to park armed militias away from the
center of political action to reduce the threat of
confrontation, and so could not be used as a justification
for a militia feeding.


7. (SBU) SDG members agreed that significant efforts to
overcome these constraints, which the SDG chair called
"serious technical problems", were justified in order to
show strong political support to the continued work of the
TFP. The team reported that President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed
had committed to producing sufficient funds to feed the
encamped militias for the first month, drawing from League
of Arab States (LAS)-provided assistance. He suggested that
a second month might be covered, especially if he were able
to tap funds from the Somali business community. Donors
suggested that the President should lobby the LAS for a
longer-term funding commitment to the cantonments' food
requirements. The LAS representative to the Donor Group
thought that his authorities would be very open to such a
commitment.

COMMENT
--------------


8. (SBU) European and LAS donors appear to be ready to move
forward rapidly to make the Baidoa Security Committee's
plans a reality. This would establish a loose framework and
basic essential security infrastructure for at least the
next 3-6 months. Donors on the Baidoa trip were very
complimentary of the way in which the principle warlords
Habsade, Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe had organized their
requests, conducted the meetings, and cooperated among
themselves to sell their plan to the donors. END COMMENT.

BELLAMY-