SOMALIA: PARLIAMENT ADJOURNED; DONORS EXAMINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 001082

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, EUR, NEA
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2026
TAGS: PGOV PTER EAID PREL MOPS ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA: PARLIAMENT ADJOURNED; DONORS EXAMINE
SECURITY REQUESTS

REF: (A) NAIROBI 869, (B) Nairobi 949, (C) NAIROBI 924

CLASSIFIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELOR MICHAEL J. FITZPATRICK,
REASONS 1.4 (B,D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Somali Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP)
appears set to attempt the actual work of creating
legislative committees and discussing the country's future.
A risk that the TFP would tear itself apart over the fate of
the Prime Minister seems to be receding, as MPs fear that
finding someone to replace him would be too difficult.
Donors traveled to Baidoa March 7 to discuss medium-term
costs of a pilot security and stabilization scheme for the
new "home" of the TFP, requiring international underwriting
of the cantonment of local militias. Ongoing clan fighting
in Mogadishu, much of it pitting an array of forces against
Islamic Court-backed militias, risks reducing Baidoa to a
political sideshow. END SUMMARY

SPEAKER'S TACTICAL RETREAT
--------------


2. (C) The first session of the TFP inside Somalia kicked
off exactly as scheduled on February 26. At the end of the
first day of the TFP session in Baidoa, Somalia Watcher's
contacts at the session had confidently predicted that
discussions of the agenda would proceed the next day,
February 27 (ref A). In fact, deep divisions among the
members of the TFP surfaced almost immediately. But the
split is no longer along the old lines that pitted the TFG
President, Prime Minister, and Minister for International
Cooperation in Jowhar on one side against a group of
warlord/MP/Ministers, lumped with civil society activists
and the Speaker of the TFP in Mogadishu. Instead, it is
between MPs who seek to bring down the Prime Minister, and
those who fear the vacuum that may be created should he be
removed from office.


3. (C) A week later, PM Gedi seems to have dodged the
bullet. Before Baidoa, MPs thought that the agenda-setting
battle would center on whether the TFP would make the first
order of business the removal of Prime Minister Ali Mohammed
Gedi and the non-functioning Council of Ministers. They
speculated privately that TFP Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh
Aden had cut deals with President Yusuf and Gedi, trying to
avoid tearing the institutions apart by frontal political
attack against individuals or their clans. They expressed
the fear that, with Gedi brought down, there would be a
brutal fight to try to find a replacement from the Hawiye
clans. (NOTE: There is no obvious candidate available in
either of the powerful Abgal or Haber Gedir sub clans -- and
the currently mooted front runner, Minister for National
Security and warlord Mohamed Qanyare Afrah, is unacceptable
as being (a) from the small Hawiye sub clan of the Murosade,
and (b) engaged in combat operations with both the Abgal and
the Haber Gedir. END NOTE.)


4. (C) That the Speaker adjourned the TFP session fewer than
36 hours after its opening could certainly be due to the
absence of completed shelters where the session was to have
taken place. Nonetheless, Sharif Hassan made it clear to
the press that a key reason was to give the TFP members time
to begin sorting out exactly what they wanted to do now that
they were assembled in one place at one time.


5. (C) The Speaker reconvened the MPs on March 6 and it
appears that the TFP has focused entirely on naming members
to the various parliamentary committees, with a commitment
to create as many committees as necessary to ensure that
every one of the 211 MPs present are members of one. If
nothing else, direct confrontation has so far been avoided.

BUILDING SECURITY
--------------

NAIROBI 00001082 002 OF 003




6. (C) Efforts to establish security in Baidoa received a
significant boost through a well-organized TFI lobbying
campaign for donor support. The Danish Chair of the Somalia
Donor's Group received on February 28 a letter from PM Gedi,
requesting urgent (and substantial) assistance in building
an environment of security in Baidoa for the medium term
(defined as one to three months). A small group of donors
had agreed by March 2 to travel to Baidoa to discuss the
request with relevant ministers, MPs, the President and
Speaker. Although the trip was postponed as information on
the abduction of a UNICEF international (AmCit) employee hit
the press (Reftels B and C),the group did travel on March

7. Meanwhile, Somali politicians created three committees
on Baidoa security.

(A) The Security Supervisory Committee (which brings
together the three major Rahanweyn Mirifle warlords in the
Baidoa area with the Minister of Defense and five soldiers
still carrying ranks from the Siyad Barre-era armed forces):

-- Hassan Mohamed Nur (AKA "Shatigudud"),Minister of
Agriculture and Committee Chairman
-- Adan Mohammad Nur (AKA "Adan Madobe"),Minister of
Justice
-- Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP, Baidoa Warlord
-- Abdirahman Mahamud Ali, Minister of Defense
-- LTGEN Ismail Qassin Naji
-- BGEN Abducadir Ali Diriye
-- BGEN Ali Mohamed Hassan Loyan
-- BGEN Bashir Mohamed Jama
-- COL Mohamed Sheikh Madobe

(B) The Security Logistics Committee (two members):

-- Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade, MP, Baidoa Warlord and now head
of "Logistics Administration"
-- Sherif Amin Ali Mohamed, named "Storekeeper of the
Ministry of National Assets of the TFG"

(C) The Regional Security Committee of Bay and Bakol
Regions:

-- Aden Mohamed Nur (AKA "Saransor"),a significant warlord
in the area.
-- Abshir Hussen Ali (Gab),Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Hassan Moallim Ahmed (Bikolo),Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Khalif Sheikh Abdullahi, Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Hassan Adan Bullow, Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Isak Malas, Unknown to Somalia Watcher
-- Abdullahi Ibrahim Abdi (Karkadey),Unknown to Somalia
Watcher

A PLAN
--------------


7. (C) March 3 saw the delivery to donors of a draft
"Encampment Plan for the Militia and other Armed Units in
Bay and Bakool Units", signed by Security Committee members
LTGEN Ismail Qassin Naji, BGEN Ali Mohamed Hassan (AKA
"Loyan"),BGEN Bashir Mohamed Jama, COL Mohamed Sheikh
Madobe, and Aden Mohamed Nur (AKA "Saransor").


8. (C) The encampment plan concludes that the rapid pace of
developments since January and the serious need for
assistance to establish a permissive security environment
justifies donor financing to build a Baidoa security
apparatus in the absence of the kind of full disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program normally
required for many donors to be able to contribute. The
document stresses that the "Technical Security Task Force" -
- apparently synonymous with the three committees set forth
above -- must address the security challenge by keeping
armed militias out of Baidoa proper. Noting some 3,000
militiamen belonging to Bakool/Bay warlords Habsade,
Shatigudud, and Adan Madobe already encamped 25 kms
southeast of Baidoa at a defunct military base in the town

NAIROBI 00001082 003 OF 003


of Daynuunay, the encampment plan called for dividing these
and any other militias into 4 camps outside the city. These
four camps would require food and water support estimated at
$3 per man per day -- a starting price tag of nearly
$10,000/day. Further costs would include clothing,
equipping, and encamping 500 security personnel drawn from
the three warlord's forces, with payment of $3 per diem to
rank-and-file policemen, $7 for the 30 officers among them.
Renovation of the Baidoa Police Division HQ, the Central
Police Station, the Central Prison, and 6 sub-stations are
proposed.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) PM Gedi's staying power is curious. Although he is
vaguely useful to the TFIs as a Prime Minister coming from
the powerful Abgal sub-clan of the Hawiye, he is not seen as
able to deliver the broad plurality of his own Warsangeli
sub-sub-clan, let alone of the Hawiye clan. Perhaps Yusuf
thinks he needs to keep Gedi (as well as Jurile) because
Italy wants them kept, and Italy is ready to continue
financing the TFIs (with cash and in kind) notwithstanding
the international community's qualms and desires to "first,
do no harm". But if nothing else, removing Gedi means a
vacuum in the PM's chair, and likely a complete removal of
the Council of Ministers. Filling that vacuum means finding
a PM from among the Hawiye, either the Abgal or the Haber
Gedir, a process that could lead to a major political fight
within the TFP, and perhaps feed the clan military fighting
in Mogadishu.


10. (C) Sub-clans of the Hawiye are still in a face-off over
control of the capital. Key warlord/minister/MP members of
the "Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Combat
against International Terrorism" are fully employed trying
to ensure their survival, and/or to roll back the Islamic
Court/Ayr militias whose strength and public support have
remained considerable. With such a cloud hanging over
Mogadishu, the playing of politics in Baidoa risks becoming
a less-than-relevant sideshow. END COMMENT.

BELLAMY.