Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06NAIROBI106
2006-01-10 05:48:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

KENYA: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (CORRECTED)

Tags:  PTER ASEC MARR EFIN KE 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000106 

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR, NCTC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR EFIN KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (CORRECTED)

REF: A. A) 05 SECSTATE 193439

B. B) 05 NAIROBI 5180

(U) This corrects reftel B. Classification downgraded to SBU,
note changes in paragraph 10.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NAIROBI 000106

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE, S/CT - ED SALAZAR, NCTC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR EFIN KE
SUBJECT: KENYA: 2005 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT (CORRECTED)

REF: A. A) 05 SECSTATE 193439

B. B) 05 NAIROBI 5180

(U) This corrects reftel B. Classification downgraded to SBU,
note changes in paragraph 10.


1. (U) This is post's submission for the 2005 Annual
Terrorism Report. The first section updates the 2004
Patterns of Global Terrorism section on Kenya. The second
section provides supplemental information.

Proposed Text for Patterns of Global Terrorism Report
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Kenya remains an active partner in the war on
terrorism and continues to provide assistance targeting
terrorist groups operating within Kenya. The government
established the National Counter Terrorism Center in January
2004 as well as a National Security Advisory Committee to
oversee its operations. However, in 2005, Kenya registered
little to no progress towards the overall strengthening of
its capabilities to combat terrorism, prosecute terror
suspects, or respond to emergency situations. In 2005, the
GOK disbanded the U.S.-supported Joint Terrorism Task Force
(JTTF),set up in 2004 to improve police and prosecutors,
ability to cooperate on CT issues. The government did not
engage in a national discussion to sensitize the public to
terrorism issues, and it has not yet finalized a national
counter terrorism strategy. In April 2003, Kenya published a
draft "Suppression of Terrorism" bill, only to withdraw it
due to harsh criticism from human rights groups and Kenyan
Muslim communities. The GOK wrote a new draft in 2005 but
did not officially publish the document or submit it to
parliament. In a similar fashion, Kenya has drafted, but not
yet submitted to Parliament, the anti-money laundering and
CT finance legislation needed to bring the country into
compliance with relevant UN resolutions.


3. (SBU) Kenya and the United States continue to share
information on suspected terrorists, including those
associated with or supportive of al-Qaida. The Kenyan
government has taken the initiative in arresting terrorist
suspects and disrupting terrorist operations. In November
2005, three transit passengers were arrested at Jomo Kenyatta
International Airport for wearing shoes with electronic

switches, four men were arrested in October 2005 for
allegedly funding terror activities, and one man was arrested
in December in Northeastern province for possession of a
rocket launcher and RPGs with the alleged intent of smuggling
them to Mombasa. The seven terror suspects -- arrested in
November 2003 on charges related to the Kikambala hotel
bombing and attempted shoot-down of an Israeli airplane in
November 2002, the 1998 attack on the U.S. Embassy in
Nairobi, and a 2003 plot to attack the new U.S. Embassy --
were acquitted in June 2005. To date, nobody has been
successfully prosecuted in relation to these terrorist acts.
Kenya continues to be an active participant in the Terrorist
Interdiction Program (TIP/PISCES),and in 2004 and 2005 made
security improvements at airports and hotels, particularly in
Mombasa. The government,s ineffective response to the
explosion at Wilson airport in October, 2004 however,
indicates the need for improved security as well as a
mechanism to coordinate government CT efforts.


4. (SBU) Kenya has ratified all 12 international
counterterrorism conventions and protocols but has yet to
incorporate many of the requirements into national law or a
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Kenya does not have
a comprehensive counterterrorism law, as required by UNSCR

1373.

Supplementary Information
--------------


5. (SBU) The GOK promised the Embassy it would provide an
integrated, inter-ministerial national security strategy by
March 2004. A draft was prepared, but it was not discussed
at inter-ministerial level or at Parliament, and it is
unclear if it was ever finalized. The Kenyan Department of
Defense (KDOD) drafted a national defense strategy &White
Paper8 that stresses the need for a comprehensive,
joint-service/interagency approach to coastal and border
security to counter terrorism, but it must be put in context
of an overall national security strategy. Since 2004, the
Kenyan Navy has participated in 10 iterations of combined
Maritime Operations and Training along the coast of Kenya
with US Navy elements. This helped train the Kenyan Navy on
coastal security operations. The USG will give the Kenyan
Navy six coastal security boats by March 2006, permitting
them to conduct MAROPS on their own boats. These are funded
under the Coastal Security component of the East Africa
Counter Terrorism Initiative (EACTI). In addition, a company
from the Kenya Army 20th Para Battalion was trained in 2005
as a pre-emptive, cross border strike force company under
U.S. Foreign Military Financing.



6. (SBU) The Kenyan Government continued to improve aviation
security in 2005 through the Kenya Airport Authority (KAA)
and the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA). FAA and TSA
trained managers and inspectors to better oversee and
maintain security procedures and planning. However,
consistent enforcement of security procedures and planning
remains a challenge. Under the Safe Skies program, FAA is
helping Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania update and harmonize their
safety regulations to create a regional Civil Aviation Safety
structure and a regional Civil Aviation Security Structure.
However, future funding for Safe Skies in Kenya is in
jeopardy in FY 2006 and beyond because of U.S. legal
restriction on assistance to governments which are parties to
the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court but which have not signed Article 98 non-surrender
agreements with the U.S. The World Bank is also moving
forward on projects to improve access controls, perimeter
fencing and the terminal building structure. Kenya's civil
aviation officials also want to improve pilot registrations,
flight plan recording, and terminal security for the
country's general aviation sector.


7. (SBU) 2005 has not been a strong year for Kenyan CT
efforts from the consular section,s perspective. Numerous
cases continue to come to consular,s attention of Kenyans,
previously denied visas, who returned with new passports in
new identities in an effort to circumvent the name-check
system. Fortunately, the number of such cases has decreased
significantly in the last three months. While these cases
appeared to be limited to desperate visa applicants, the ease
with which they could obtain new identities and passports was
alarming and caused concern about who else could do so. The
Kenyans blamed the problem
on lack of resources, an inadequate late-birth registration
procedure, and the influx of Somalis across porous borders. A
major source of the problem is as likely official corruption.



8. (SBU) The Government of Kenya has increased its usage of
the TIP/PISCES system to a national average of 93% in the
period covered by this report. Three airports currently
operate the system: Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International
Airport (JKIA),Eldoret and Moi International Airport in
Mombasa. The fourth software installation was damaged during
the October 18 explosion at Nairobi's Wilson
Airport and is currently offline. It is due to come back
online in early 2006. Although the buildup to
present-day usage was slow in coming, the system has yielded
impressive results thus far. The stop-list has resulted in
several suspect turnovers, to include a Korean national
suspected of human trafficking and various individuals wanted
on narcotics trafficking charges. The stop-list has been
equally helpful in ongoing bilateral CT efforts. DHS trained
200 more immigration officers in 2005.


9. (SBU) Kenya lacks counterterrorism legislation, and the
current laws make it difficult to prosecute terror suspects.
For example, the Evidence Act of 2002 says that any
confessions not made before a magistrate are inadmissible.
Because of this law, the concrete evidence against the seven
terror suspects on trial was ruled inadmissible by the lower
courts because it resulted indirectly from information given
by an &illegal8 confession. The government passed a
&Miscellaneous Bill8 in 2005, which amended the Evidence
Act. The new law states a confession can be made in front of
a judge, magistrate or senior police officer. The GOK
redrafted the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2005 after a
two-year hiatus, following the failure of the initial draft
in 2003. However, the government did not table the new bill
in Parliament in 2005.


10. (SBU) Currently, there is insufficient coordination
among police, prosecutors, and other relevant
government ministries which deal with terrorism issues. This
was evident immediately after October 2004 explosion at
Wilson airport. It was unclear who was in charge of the
response and investigation. The police, security services
and other government agencies offered conflicting opinions as
to the cause of the explosion; the government has yet to
release a report on the incident. Embassy RSO, in conjunction
with the DS Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, continues to
focus on increasing the Kenyan Government's
capacity to effectively investigate and prosecute terrorism.


11. (U) Embassy POC for CT: Yael Eisenstat,
Eisenstatyd@state.sgov.gov (classified),Eisenstayd@state.gov
(unclass).
BELLAMY